



2024

Hfx No. 538745

SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA

IN THE MATTER OF the *Companies Creditors Arrangement Act* R.S.C., 1985 c. C- 36 as Amended (the "CCAA")

AND IN THE MATTER OF an application by Blue Lobster Capital Limited, 3284906 Nova Scotia Limited, 3343533 Nova Scotia Limited and 4318682 Nova Scotia Limited (collectively, the "**Applicants**") for relief under s.11 of the CCAA and other relief

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANTS

**Motion to Approve SISP and Extend Stay
March 7, 2025 at 9:30 a.m.**

DARREN D. O'KEEFE
O'KEEFE & SULLIVAN
Counsel for the Applicants
80 Elizabeth Avenue, Suite 202
St. John's, NL A1A 1W7
dokeefe@okeefesullivan.com

MARC DUNNING
BURCHELL WICKWIRE BRYSON LLP
Local Counsel for the Applicants
1900 - 1801 Hollis Street
Halifax, NS B3J 3N4
mdunning@bwblp.ca

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KeyCite treatment

Most Negative Treatment: Check subsequent history and related treatments.

1991 CarswellOnt 7706
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)

Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.

1991 CarswellOnt 7706, 26 A.C.W.S. (3d) 683

BETWEEN: THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA Plaintiff and SOUNDAIR CORPORATION, CANADIAN PENSION CAPITAL LIMITED and CANADIAN INSURERS' CAPITAL CORPORATION Defendant

Rosenberg J

Judgment: May 1, 1991
Docket: 48593/90Q

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes and Lawrence Ritchie for the Royal Bank of Canada
William G. Horton, Nancy Spies and Carmen Theriault for Ontario Express Ltd. and Frontier Air Ltd., Sean F. Dunphy for Ernst & Young Inc., Receiver of Soundair Corporation, Jack Berkow and S. Goldman Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurer's Capital Corporation, John Morin for Air Canada

ROSENBERG J:

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1 Ernst & Young Inc. (the "Receiver") moved for an order approving the share Purchase agreement dated March 8, 1991 between Frontier Air limited, Ontario Express Limited ("OEL"), 174590 Canada Inc. and the Receiver (the "OEL Offer") and for an order authorizing and directing the Receiver and 174590 Canada Inc., as vendors, to complete that agreement in accordance with its terms.

2 The defendants, Canadian Pension Capital limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation (collectively "CCFL"), moved for an order approving the offer of 922246 Ontario Limited ("922") dated April 5, 1991 (the "922 Offer") to purchase the assets of Air Toronto, a division of Soundair Corporation ("Air Toronto" and "Soundair", respectively), or in the alternative for directions regarding the sale of the assets of Air Toronto.

3 Either as a result of the motion by CCFL or as a practical matter, the third possibility before the court is to order that neither offer be accepted and to make an order setting out the procedure to be adopted by the Receiver in dealing with the two competing groups wishing to purchase the assets of Air Toronto.

PARTIES

4 Matters involving the Soundair receivership came before me on a number of occasions and it was necessary to make a number of preliminary orders with regard to the aforesaid motions (i.e. ordering disclosure of certain information setting out time tables for offers to be submitted, scheduling cross-examinations, etc.). As a result of these preliminary appearances and

on hearing what cross-examinations had taken place and who participated, it became clear that the real issue to be determined was whether OEL or 922 would be successful in purchasing Air Toronto assets. This was the real contest before me. The OEL offer was supported by Canadian International Airlines Limited ("Canadian International") and the CCLF offer was supported by Air Canada and Air Canada was a substantial participant in this 922 offer by the time the motion was heard. Accordingly, I added OEL as a party with the full right to participate in the proceedings. CCFL being a party to the one motion was allowed to participate fully as a party with regard to both motions and Air Canada was allowed to participate to the extent that they wished to counter any allegations that were made against Air Canada. In fact, Air Canada did not make any submissions.

FACTS

5 Prior to April 26, 1990, Soundair was engaged in the air service business and operated three divisions, being Air Toronto, Odyssey International and Soundair Express. Air Toronto operates a scheduled airline, providing commuter services from Pearson International Airport in Toronto on an exclusive basis to certain cities in the United States of America (the "routes"). Many of the routes served as important feeders to various Air Canada routes.

6 By an order of Mr. Justice O'Brien of the Supreme Court of Ontario dated April 26, 1990 (the "Order"), Ernst & Young Inc. were appointed Receiver of the assets, property and undertaking of Soundair and the manager and operator of the assets, property and undertaking of Air Toronto.

7 Prior to the appointment of the Receiver, Soundair had been negotiating a sale of its Air Toronto division to Air Canada for approximately \$18,000,000 pursuant to the terms of a letter of intent dated April 4, 1990 from Air Canada to Soundair (the "Letter of Intent").

8 Paragraph 4(c) of the Order directed the Receiver,

... to negotiate and do all things necessary or desirable to complete a sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada and, if a sale to Air Canada cannot be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person, subject to terms and conditions approved by this Court.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH AIR CANADA

9 Upon being appointed, the Receiver advised Air Canada that it was prepared to complete a sale of the assets or business of Air Toronto to Air Canada as outlined in the letter of Intent. To that end, the Receiver entered into an agreement with Air Canada dated April 30, 1991. Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, the Receiver agreed, *inter alia*, to negotiate exclusively with Air Canada, such agreement being terminable by either party on five day's written notice.

10 During the negotiations from April to June of 1990, Air Canada conducted due diligence searches with respect to the assets and business of Air Toronto and had unlimited access to financial information relating to Air Toronto. On June 14, 1990, Air Canada lowered its offer for Air Toronto to \$8,200,000. The offer was subject to certain conditions and was stated to be open for acceptance by the Receiver until June 29, 1990.

11 On June 19, 1990, Mr. Raymond Lindsay, Vice President, Corporate Development and Commercial Holdings of Air Canada, wrote to Mr. Tim Prior, Manager of the Special Loans Branch of the Royal Bank of Canada, with a rationale for the reduction in the price Air Canada was willing to pay from \$18 million to \$8.2 million. The letter attached a formal offer to purchase Air Toronto for \$8.2 million. This letter also stated that if Air Canada did not acquire Air Toronto, Air Canada would terminate its existing contractual arrangements with Air Toronto and pursue alternatives to protect or retain connector traffic and revenues now associated with Air Toronto. The letter went on to say that Air Canada would not, except to the extent that it might be contractually obligated, continue to support Air Toronto after the expiry date contained in the offer even in circumstances where Air Toronto either continued to be operated in receivership in a connector relationship with Air Canada, or is sold to third parties not competitive to Air Canada (including Air Toronto employees) who wish to retain a connector relationship with Air Canada.

12 Contractual arrangements between Air Canada and Air Toronto included a connector agreement, a ground handling agreement and a hangarage agreement. The Receiver was of the view that if Air Canada took steps to terminate these agreements, the operations of Air Toronto would cease immediately and the possibility of a sale of Air Toronto would virtually be eliminated.

13 The Receiver advised Air Canada that based on the April 30, 1990 agreement, Air Canada had waived defaults, in particular defaults related to the receivership, under its agreements with Air Toronto and that, secondly, under the terms of the Court Order. Air Canada was not entitled to terminate the contractual arrangements without first seeking leave of the Court. The Receiver also advised Air Canada that the Receiver did not think that Air Canada's approach was "a very ethical way to deal".

14 The Receiver did not accept the Air Canada offer and allowed it to lapse on June 29, 1990.

15 On July 20, 1990, Air Canada served a Notice of Termination formally terminating the April 30, 1990 agreement. On the same day, by letter dated July 20, 1990 the solicitors for Air Canada formally advised the Receiver that Air Canada would not be participating in any "auction process" to sell Air Toronto. Mr. Lindsay of Air Canada also orally advised the Receiver at a meeting on or about the same date that Air Canada would not consent to the assignment of the Air Toronto connector agreement to any other party. The Receiver was of the opinion that the operations of Air Toronto were such that it required a connector agreement with one of the two main Canadian airlines in order to be a viable operation.

16 The Receiver had determined that certain conditions in the Air Canada offer of \$8.2 million could not be met and that the price would be further reduced and accordingly the Receiver embarked on a process of offering Air Toronto assets for sale generally in order to obtain a price better than the net anticipated in the Air Canada offer of \$8.2 million (\$8,200,000).

17 The receivership of Air Toronto had generated publicity in the airline industry as had the breakdown of negotiations with Air Canada. In August 1990 the Receiver contacted a number of potential bidders and those who had expressed an interest. The Receiver allowed interested parties to examine some financial and other information with respect to Air Toronto and advised these parties that expressions of interest were to be received by August 20, 1990.

18 A variety of offers for the purchase of Air Toronto were solicited and received by the Receiver before August 20, 1990. All of these offers were rejected as inadequate by the Receiver. One of these offers was participated in by Air Canada through Air Ontario, one of Air Canada's connector airlines.

19 The Receiver also approached a number of large American airlines to inquire about their interest in purchasing Air Toronto. The Receiver found in all cases that these airlines had no interest in acquiring Air Toronto.

20 The Receiver approached Canadian Airlines through its parent PWA Corporation ("PWA") to determine its interest in acquiring Air Toronto. The Receiver was advised by PWA to deal with OEL on any such transaction since OEL had the "franchise rights for the operation of regional routes in the geographical area served by Air Toronto and had the connector agreement in place with Canadian Airlines.

THE OEL AGREEMENT

21 OEL was contacted by the Receiver from time to time on matters relating to jet stream aircraft since both OEL and Air Toronto fly the same aircraft. The initial discussions with OEL revolved around the possibility that OEL might enter into a management contract with the receiver pursuant to which OEL would manage Air Toronto while Air Toronto remained in the possession of the Receiver. The Receiver and OEL had discussions on this possibility because it was the Receiver's view that while Air Canada had been forced to continue the connector agreement until it expired in 1992, Air Toronto had no ability to renew it. The Receiver's objective was to prevent Air Toronto from being out of business at the expiry of the Air Canada connector agreement.

22 The discussions between the Receiver and OEL started off with an evaluation on both sides as to what synergies there might be from a joint operation and how to share the benefit of those synergies. Air Toronto had the routes and a

management group that was good. OEL had a maintenance facility. OEL could provide a backstop on a much longer connector agreement and they also had the ability to move other aircraft onto these routes and there would be, as between the two parties, a saving in lease costs and fixed aircraft ownership costs. At some point in mid-January 1991, the Receiver took the position with OEL that it wanted a definitive agreement and did not want to operate in a joint venture for ever. The Receiver wanted to have “an out on these arrangements”.

23 The negotiations led to the delivery of a Letter of Intent dated February 8, 1991 sent by OEL to the Receiver which set forth the terms of a proposed purchase of the assets of Air Toronto by OEL. This Letter of Intent was accepted by the Receiver on February 11, 1991 and it contained the following provision:

Soundair and the Receiver agree not to negotiate with potential purchasers of, or solicit offers for, the Purchased Assets of Air Toronto from the date hereof to February 20 1991.

This provision was similar to the provision which the Receiver had agreed to when it was negotiating with Air Canada. The February 20 date was extended from time to time by agreement of the parties. The exclusive negotiation provision was intended to minimize the disruption to the operations of Air Toronto and was agreed to by the Receiver in recognition of the complex and time consuming negotiations which would be necessary and the need for OEL to produce confidential information to the Receiver in the course of the negotiations.

24 OEL also took the position that it did not want its offer shopped around and used to obtain higher offers.

25 The question of whether Air Toronto was to be affiliated with Air Canada or affiliated with Canadian Airlines was of some consequence because if Air Toronto operated out of Terminal 2 at Pearson International, the Terminal in which Air Canada operated, passengers flying from American cities via Air Toronto to Canadian cities other than Toronto, such as Winnipeg, Calgary, Vancouver, Ottawa, etc., would automatically fly on connecting Air Canada planes. Conversely, if they went into Terminal 3 where Canadian Airlines operated, they would fly to these other Canadian cities by Canadian Airlines. It was estimated that the connector travellers would generate millions of dollars per year of business for whichever airline was in the same terminal as Air Toronto and operated a connector agreement with them.

26 The Receiver’s reasoning in agreeing to confine its negotiations for the time being to OEL arose from its concern about the disruption to the employees of Air Toronto as a result of a number of the potential bidders seeking information from employees during the due diligence periods and also because it felt that there were only two practical buyers from whom it could obtain the best price - a purchaser affiliated with Air Canada or a purchaser affiliated with Canadian Airlines - since Air Canada had indicated an unwillingness to get into a “auction”. It appeared that the only practical alternative was to deal with OEL. The Receiver’s assumption about two possible purchasers was consistent with the fact that the present motions involve only two purchasers and each is affiliated with one of the major Canadian airlines.

27 There were only two creditors concerned with the sale of Air Toronto assets. The Royal Bank was owed in excess of \$65 million and CCFL was owed in excess of \$9.5 million. The Royal Bank was of the opinion based on the information received from the Receiver that the total recovery from the sale of all of the assets of Soundair would be in the range of \$25 million. The expected deficiency therefore would be in the range of \$50 million. Consequently, CCFL and the Royal Bank are the only creditors who will directly benefit monetarily from the sale of the Air Toronto assets.

28 The Royal Bank and CCFL were parties to an agreement (the “Inter Lender Agreement”) governing the distribution of funds realized from the security that they both held with regard to Soundair. There was a dispute between CCFL and the Royal Bank as to the division of the proceeds of the sale of Air Toronto. In December 1990 CCFL informed the Receiver that it might be interested in acquiring Air Toronto. Brown of CCFL at first tried to put together a bid with the management of Air Toronto for the assets of Air Toronto. On January 16, 1991 the Receiver provided CCFL with additional information concerning assets and the business of Air Toronto. By late January CCFL was aware that the Receiver was negotiating with DEL for the sale of Air Toronto. On February 8, 1991 the Receiver signed the Letter of Intent with DEL. By February 21, 1991 Brown of CCFL felt that the time frame was too short to deal with any other party and that CCFL should proceed with a bid on its own because of the negotiations between the Receiver and DEL. By February 28, 1991 CCFL was aware that the Receiver was negotiating solely with DEL. On March 1, 1991 Brown attended on Smith of Air Toronto. Smith provided to Brown further current financial information concerning assets and affairs of Air Toronto. Smith also provided Brown with a copy of a draft offering memorandum concerning the sale of Air Toronto which had been prepared at the direction of the

Receiver. The memorandum had not been finalized and what was provided was not the latest draft. The latest draft was actually finalized on March 1, 1991. During this meeting Smith also responded to all of the questions of Brown concerning Air Toronto and provided Brown with all of the information which he requested. It was acknowledged by Mr. Berkow, counsel for CCFL, that as of March 1, CCFL had all of the information that it required to submit an offer for Air Toronto. The draft offering memorandum had been given to Brown by Smith contrary to the instructions of the Receiver. Having all the necessary information to submit an offer, CCFL both verbally and in writing advised the Receiver as follows:

I am writing to confirm my previous verbal advice that we will be submitting an offer to you in regards to the Air Toronto operations and assets no later than noon on Tuesday March 5, 1991. *As we discussed this morning, our offer will not contain any conditions other than licence transfer provisions and other customary commercial provisions readily satisfied by you and/or the secured creditors.* Our offers will be for the assets of Air Toronto including all of the fixed assets understood to be \$2.7 million as of December 31st, 1990 as well as all consumable spares understood to be \$900,000 as of December 31, 1990. This, of course, will be detailed more fully in our offer. The purchase price will be \$9 million as follows: \$6 million in cash on closing; \$3 million over five years based on a comprehensive and realistic royalty arrangement - Total \$9 million. (Emphasis added).

Counsel for the Receiver answered as follows:

I have your letter of March 1, 1991 and look forward to receipt of your offer on Tuesday as indicated therein As a court appointed receiver, Ernst & Young is aware that they have an obligation to consider all offers made for the assets objectively with a view to maximizing realization. Indeed, this obligation extends right up until the time of court approval even if the receiver has agreed to accept another offer. In consequence you can be assured that your offer will be considered and brought to the attention of the court regardless of what recommendation is made.

29 Whether or not this response is consistent with the Receiver's obligation to OEL, it cannot be interpreted as refusing to consider the CCFL offer at a time when CCFL had all necessary information to submit an offer.

30 The Receiver received an offer on March 7th from CCFL for the purchase of the assets and undertaking of Air Toronto. The offer was not consistent with the information set forth in CCFL's letter of March 1, 1991. It was subject to conditions which were entirely beyond the control of the Receiver. It required a resolution of the problem with the Inter Lender Agreement between CCFL and the Royal Bank which could not be resolved by the Receiver. CCFL must have been aware when it submitted the offer with this condition that it was in direct contradiction to its letter of March 1, 1991.

31 In addition to the provision with regard to the Inter Lender Agreement which provided that the proceeds of sale go \$3.375 million to CCFL and the balance to the Royal Bank, the Agreement also provided that the purchase price was subject to a downward adjustment by the amount by which the book value of the fixed assets on closing was less than \$3,5 million.

32 On March 8, 1991 the Trustee accepted the OEL offer subject to court approval. The Receiver at that time had no other offer before it that was in final form or could possibly be accepted. The Receiver had at the time the knowledge that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and had not fulfilled the promise of its letter of March 1st. The Receiver was justified in assuming that Air Canada and CCFL's offer was a long way from being in an acceptable form and that Air Canada and CCFL's objective was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada.

33 On March 26, 1991 this matter came before me on the application of CCFL to require the Receiver to provide additional information concerning Air Toronto and to require the Receiver to receive a further bid from CCFL. I directed that further information be made available subject to certain agreements between counsel. On April 1, Air Canada initiated a site inspection on the premises of Air Toronto at which representatives of Air Canada and legal counsel for both Air Canada and CCFL were present. This on site inspection was not consistent with the agreement between counsel or my order of March 26th.

34 On March 26th I also ordered that CCFL be given until April 5, 1991 to submit a bid without prejudice to the position of OEL with regard to the approval of the Receiver's acceptance of OEL's bid.

35 On April 5th, an offer on behalf of 922 was submitted to the Receiver. 922 was incorporated specifically by CCFL and Air Canada to make this bid.

36 In order to remove the most objectionable condition from the 922 bid, CCFL entered into an agreement with the Royal Bank resolving the Inter Lender dispute in the Royal Bank's favour. In this agreement the Royal Bank agreed to support the 922 bid when it came before the court in preference to not only the OEL bid but any higher and better bid obtained. In addition, by letter supplemental to the agreement settling the Inter Lender dispute, CCFL confirmed to the Royal Bank that certain deductions possible under the agreement with the Receiver would be deducted from CCFL's share of the proceeds.

37 All of this was done without the participation of or the knowledge of the Receiver. At the time of the hearing the only creditors who would participate in the sale proceeds were in favour of the 922 offer and wanted to reject the OEL offer. These two creditors were prepared to favour the 922 offer regardless of any other offer that might be received.

COMPARISON OF THE TWO OFFERS

38 It is not possible to accurately compare the two offers. The Receiver's analysis of the two offers favours the OEL offer. Basically the OEL offer is for \$2 million cash and an additional amount by way of a share of the gross revenue of Air Toronto. The 922 offer is for \$6 million cash and up to \$3 million as a share of the net profit of Air Toronto. The 922 offer includes assets valued at about \$525,000 that are not included in the OEL offer. In addition, there are a number of adjustments probable in the 922 offer since the 922 offer requires that the 922 receive all profit and cover all losses from the time that the offer is accepted and also requires certain adjustments with regard to inventory that appear likely to lower the cash available on closing. In analysing the two offers however, I have come to the conclusion that knowledgeable creditors such as the Royal Bank would prefer the 922 offer even if the other factors influencing their decision were not present. No matter what adjustments had to be made, the 922 offer results in more cash immediately. Creditors facing the type of loss that the Royal Bank is taking in this case would not be anxious to rely on contingencies especially in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry.

39 After analysis of the arguments from both sides, that of the Receiver and OEL arguing that the OEL offer is better, and, the Royal Bank and CCFL arguing that the 922 offer is better, I have concluded that the 922 offer is marginally superior.

40 In addition to the fact that the 922 offer is slightly superior and is supported by the only two creditors who share in the proceeds, the offer is also supported by a large group of the employees of Air Toronto who wish to be under the Air Canada sphere of influence as preferred to the Canadian Airlines sphere of influence. I have not considered this aspect as relevant in my deliberations. I do not know the reasons that the pilots, for instance, have come to this conclusion. They may have a misunderstanding of the risk to their employment as a result of an OEL purchase. In any event, I do not consider that the wishes of the employees should influence the decision that has to be made. None of them came forward to testify so that the reasons for their support of the 922 bid could be tested.

DECISION

41 Mr. Burko on behalf of CCFL argued that CCFL and Air Canada had not been given an even playing field on which to compete and that therefore the process was defective. In my view the process was fair and equitable and reasonable from a business point of view at the time that the OEL offer was accepted. By that time any inequities to CCFL had been erased in that CCFL had all necessary information. They promised an offer and then submitted an offer that was entirely inconsistent with that promise. CCFL conveyed to the Receiver that there was no practical alternative to the OEL offer. Entering into the type of negotiations with CCFL and Air Canada that had taken place in the past was not desirable as the end was not predictable. The OEL offer was in final form and as counsel for the Receiver put it, the Receiver was looking at a fully baked loaf of bread versus some dough that possibly could be fashioned into a loaf of bread that might be marginally superior. On March 8, 1991 when the Receiver accepted the OEL offer, the Receiver had no assurance that the objectionable clauses in the 922 offer could be removed. Having determined that the process leading to the acceptance of the OEL offer and the entering into the contract subject to court approval was proper and further having determined that the interest of the creditors were marginally better served by the 922 offer, it is appropriate to consider the principals established by the case law to determine which offer should be approved by the court.

42 While the playing field was level and that the process was fair at the time the OEL offer was accepted, the process did not remain fair until the April 5th offer was received from 922. While it was clear when the parties appeared before me in March that the offer of 922 must in some respect be better than or at least arguably be better than the OEL offer, there was no assurance to that effect. However, by the agreement that resolved the Inter Lender dispute between the Royal Bank and CCFL, CCFL was able to determine that at least from the Royal Bank's point of view if they removed the objectionable condition their offer would be better than the OEL offer.

43 The Royal Bank knew the details of the OEL offer. By my order the two offers were to be made without either offeror knowing what the other offer's terms were. To this extent 922 received an advantage. For instance, if they had said in the negotiations with Royal Bank - no details of these negotiations were disclosed to the court - that we will remove the conditions and agree to the priorities but we will reduce our offer by \$1 million and the Royal Bank had said, "no, that is not satisfactory", then they would have an indication of what was required in the Royal Bank's mind to beat the OEL offer. They had accordingly an assurance that what they were offering was better than the OEL offer from the Royal Bank's point of view. OEL had no equal information with regard to the 922 offer when they started their negotiations in good faith that culminated in a signed offer on March 8th. Accordingly, the process from March 8th to April 5th lacking in fairness and equity was through no fault of the Receivers.

THE LAW

44 I consider first whether or not the contract between OEL and the Receiver should be approved by the court. In light of my decision in that regard, I do not have to consider the question of the 922 offer being accepted or the third alternative of directing the Receiver as to the Receiver's further activities.

45 A body of case law has developed with regard to the court's approval of sales by court appointed receivers. A secured creditor has other options. He could appoint a private receiver. That gives the secured creditor such as the Royal Bank a freedom of action but the bank would bear the consequences of doing so directly. By having a court appointed receiver the bank reduces the risk of a suit by a debtor with regard to an allegation of an improvident realization of assets and is relieved from legal liability for failure to close a transaction. Also the bank reduces the possibility of unfavourable publicity but the *quid pro quo* is that the creditor has a degree of loss of control when the court supervises. The process of a sale by a court appointed receiver has a unique vulnerability. In the intervening time between the contract by the receiver and the court approval there is a window of opportunity to be used by unsuccessful bidders or by creditors or by others to improve on the offer. The case law attempts to balance the process and the credibility of the process against the interest of the creditors and provides that while the interests of the creditors is always the primary consideration of the receiver and the court, it is not the only consideration. The courts have consistently held that they will also consider the fairness and the effectiveness of the process and the role of the receiver.

46 In the case of *Crown Trust Co. et al. v. Rosenberg et al.* (1986) 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526, Mr. Justice Anderson considered the bidding process with regard to a bid that was some \$15 million higher than the group of bids that the receiver had recommended be accepted. He stated at p.531:

The duties of the court I conceive to be the following, and I do not put them in any order of priority:

- I. It is to consider whether the Receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently
- II. The court should consider the interests of all parties, plaintiffs and defendants alike
- III. The court must consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which the offers are obtained
- IV. The court should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process

In that case Anderson J. refused to allow the bidder to intervene notwithstanding that his bid appeared to be some \$15 million higher than the group of bids that were accepted. He found that the \$15 million was not a significant increase in light of the total amount involved. In my view the activities of the receiver in this case comply with all four of the duties of the

court as defined by Justice Anderson in the *Crown Trust* case.

47 The argument put forth by Mr. Berkow on behalf of the 922 offer is supported by the decision of the *British Columbia Development Corporation v. Spun Cast Industries limited et al.* 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) at p.28. Justice Berger held that when everyone with a financial stake in the assets sought approval of the sale the court does not have a roving commission to decide what is best for investors and businessmen when they have agreed among themselves what course of action they should follow.

48 A leading case with regard to this issue and one often referred to is the case of *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia et al.* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1. In that case the court's decision was unanimous, however, the decision delivered by Hart J.A. and agreed with by Pace J.A. included the following:

... Here we are dealing with a receiver appointed at the instance of one major creditor, who chose to insert in the contract of sale a provision making it subject to the approval of the court. This, in my opinion, shows an intention on behalf of the parties to invoke the normal equitable doctrines which place the court in the position of looking to the interests of all persons concerned before giving its blessing to a particular transaction submitted for approval. In these circumstances the court would not consider itself bound by the contract entered into in good faith by the receiver but would have to look to the broader picture to see that that contract was for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. When there was evidence that a higher price was readily available for the property the chambers judge was, in my opinion, justified in exercising his discretion as he did. otherwise he could have deprived the creditors of a substantial sum of money. (p.10).

49 On the other hand, Macdonald J.A. while agreeing in the result saw the matter somewhat differently and stated at p.11.

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard - this would be an intolerable situation. once a receiver puts a deadline on bids then he and other interested parties are entitled to assume that bids received after such deadline are not relevant. The receiver can safely accept the highest bid received before the deadline expires and enter into a binding agreement of sale subject to court approval. Such approval as above mentioned should not be refused simply because some person after the close of bids makes a higher offer.

There are, of course, many reasons why a court might not approve an agreement of purchase and sale, viz., where the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; or, where the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids or that inadequate notice of sale by bid was given (where the receiver sells property by the bid method); or, where it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner. Court approval must involve the delicate balancing of competing interests and not simply a consideration of the interests of the creditors. It is for such reason that I hold the view that court approval should not be withheld simply because a higher bid has been received after the expiration of the deadline for submitting bids.

50 On a thorough examination of the relevant case law, I am of the view that the Ontario courts have more consistently followed Macdonald J.A.'s reasoning.

51 In the case of *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal and Mammoth Developments Ltd. and Bolero Management Ltd.* (1985), the Alberta Court of Appeal while refusing to upset a trial judge's finding that the receiver had acted improvidently stated at p.6 of its oral decision:

We think that the proper exercise of judicial discretion in these circumstances should be limited, in the first instance, to an enquiry whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and not acted improvidently.

52 In *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 Saunders J. stated at p.246:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned *primarily* with protecting the interest of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A *secondary* but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity. (Emphasis added).

Saunders J. then adopts the statements that I have quoted from the judgment of Macdonald J.A. in the *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* case, *supra*, and added;

While those remarks may have been made in the context of a bidding situation rather than a private sale, I consider them to be equally applicable to a negotiation process leading to a private sale. Where the court is concerned with the disposition of property, *the purpose of appointing a receiver is to have the receiver do the work that the court would otherwise have to do.*

The submissions on behalf of Leung and the creditors who are opposing approval boil down to this: that if, subsequent to a court-appointed receiver making a contract subject to court approval, a higher and better offer is submitted, the court should not approve what the receiver has done. There may be circumstances where the court would give effect to such a submission. If, for example, in this case there had been a second offer of a substantially higher amount, then the court would have to take that offer into consideration *in assessing whether the receiver had properly carried out his function of endeavouring to obtain the best price for the property.* Also, if there were circumstances which indicated a defect in the sale process as ordered by the court, such as unfairness to a potential purchaser, that might be a reason for withholding approval of the sale.

In this case the price offered by Leung, in my opinion, is not so much greater as to put in question the efforts of the receiver . . .

(Emphasis added).

53 In my view the words of Saunders J. are applicable to the case at bar. The 922 offer is not so much greater as to put in question the efforts of the Receiver in obtaining the OEL offer. Had the 922 offer, for example, been \$18 million (the original price in the Letter of Intent of Air Canada), then this might have indicated that the Receiver had not properly canvassed the market but such is not the case.

54 In the case of *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd. (1986)*, 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237, Saunders J. enunciated the same principles. In that case he was considering a bid made on the application for approval of the sale to another purchaser. He stated at p.242:

As counsel for Noevir pointed out, one or more preferred creditors would benefit to the extent of at least \$36,000 and perhaps as much as over \$100,000 if the final Noevir offer were to be accepted and the most optimistic view of the realization of the inventory occurred.

I must conclude that the final Noevir offer when compared with the numbered company offer is better for the creditors of the bankrupt to a significant extent. The matter then, as I see it, resolves into two issues:

1. Should the appeal be allowed because the Noevir offer is significantly better than the offer accepted by the trustee from the numbered company; or
2. If not, should the appeal be allowed because the process which resulted in the contract between the trustee and the numbered company was unfair to Noevir?

And further at p.243:

This does not mean that a court should ignore a new and higher bid made after acceptance where there has been no unfairness in the process. The interests of the creditors, while not the only consideration, are the prime consideration. If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate. In such a case the proper course might be to refuse approval and to ask the trustee to recommence the process.

55 The 922 offer is superior but the difference is not of such a magnitude as to warrant the disruption of the process.

56 In the *Crown Trust v. Rosenberg* case, *supra*, Anderson J. in considering a higher bid than that approved by the receiver made statements that appear to be equally applicable to the case at bar when he stated at p.547:

The Larco offer is the highest bid. The difference between it and the recommended offers is substantial in absolute amount but not material in proportion or relation to the over-all amounts involved in the transaction. *The difference is not such as to create any inference that the Disposition Strategy and its application by the Receiver was inadequate or unsuccessful.* (Emphasis added).

Applying that reasoning to the present case, the process having been determined to have been appropriate, the difference between the CCFL offer and the OEL offer is only marginal and the difference is not such as to create an inference that the disposition strategy of the Receiver was inadequate or unsuccessful.

57 Anderson J. further stated:

In essence the position of the Receiver was this: having before it the Larco offer with the concerns about it which it entertained, having before it the offers which it now recommends which occasioned no such concerns, considering that in relative terms the difference in return was not material, the Receiver elected to recommend the somewhat lower offers which were not attended by troublesome concerns against the higher one which was. In my view the Receiver acted reasonably in doing so.

Those words are equally applicable to the Receiver's decision on March 8th where he had before it the OEL offer which had not been fully negotiated and reduced to an acceptable agreement and the 922 offer which contained provisions which were not acceptable and beyond the control of the Receiver.

58 At p.550 Anderson J. stated:

It is equally clear, in my view, though perhaps not so clearly enunciated, that it is only in an exceptional case that the court will intervene and proceed contrary to the Receiver's recommendations if satisfied, as I am, that the Receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly and not arbitrarily.

And further on the same page:

... In all of those cases the courts have recognized that they are not making a decision in a vacuum; that they were concerned with the process not only as it affected the case at bar, but as it stood to be effected in situations of a similar nature in the future. In what was called by MacDonald J.A. in *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia et al.* (1981), 45 N.S.R. (2d) 3039, 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 86 A.P.R. 303, "the delicate balance of competing interests". that is a relevant and material one.

59 Anderson J. further commented on the balancing of these criteria when he said at p.551:

Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment on the elements then available to it. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them

Plainly, each case must be decided upon its own facts, and with a view to producing a proper result within the legal framework to which I have made reference. Such policy considerations as I have just enunciated are: as they were said to be by Saunders J., secondary, but they are none the less relevant and material.

60 In the case of *Canadian Commercial Bank et al. v. Pilum Investments Limited*, (unreported, released January 14, 1987), Anderson J. again considered a similar situation and repeated very much of the reasoning that he had followed in the *Crown Trust* case and recited some of his reasoning in that case and further stated at p.10:

I add one thing arising out of the circumstances of this case. The court, upon the motion for approval, ought not to be asked to review the entire stewardship of the receiver from the inception of the receivership, and if asked to do so, should decline.

61 That reasoning commends itself to the circumstances of the case at bar. As of March 1st, CCFL and Air Canada had all the information that they needed and any allegations of unfairness in the negotiating process by the Receiver had disappeared. They created a situation as of March 8th, where the Receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

62 In the case of *Re Selkirk* (1987), 64 C.B.r. (N.S.) 140 McRae J. stated at p.142:

The court will not lightly withhold approval of a sale by the receiver, particularly in a case such as this where the receiver is given rather wide discretionary authority as per the order of Mr. Justice Trainor and, of course, where the receiver is an officer of this court. Only in a case where there seems to be some unfairness in the process of the sale or where there are substantially higher offers which would tend to show that the sale was improvident will the court withhold approval. It is important that the court recognize the commercial exigencies that would flow if prospective purchasers are allowed to wait until the sale is in court for approval before submitting their final offer. This is something that must be discouraged.

63 In a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in the matter of the *Winding Up Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.W-10 and in the matter of Northland Bank between Touche Ross Limited (Applicant/Respondent) and Mauricio Kuperman et al.* an unreported decision released April 21, 1989, Kuperman had entered into an agreement with the receiver subject to court approval to purchase certain property in Grande Prairie for \$4.58 million. Between the date of the signing and the date when court approval was sought there were some remarkable developments affecting Grande Prairie. Proctor and Gamble announced that it expected to spend \$365 million in the expansion of its existing pulp mill that would result in 900 new direct or indirect jobs in the community. Also, the price of oil increased from \$15 U.S. a barrel to \$18 U.S. a barrel. Both factors materially affected the value of real estate in the Grande Prairie area. Before court approval the liquidator received a further offer from Osgoode Properties for \$4.75 million which the liquidator also accepted. Kuperman then revised his offer under protest to \$4.8 million. The judge in the lower court then decided that there should be an opportunity given to the two bidders to tender and Kuperman made a tender again under protest for \$5,257,000 which was approved by the court, the other tender of Osgoode Properties having been for a lower amount. On appeal the court remarked that Kuperman was bound by his first agreement and the court confirmed the first agreement and price notwithstanding the impact on the creditors by the reduction of the price. The court stated at the bottom of p.4:

It is certainly true that the principal function of the court is to obtain as high a price as possible in a liquidation as in a receivership. Nevertheless, where, as in this case, a process is set up with the consent of the major creditors to have a sale procedure which will normally result in the highest price being obtained, it is not reasonable that court discretion should be withheld or that an auction sale should be carried on by the court.

64 In the present case the Royal Bank who had originally obtained the court appointment of the Receiver was made aware of the process throughout and tacitly approved it. The Royal Bank knew the terms of the letter of Intent in February 1991 and made no comment although that letter set out the very terms of the OEL offer which it now opposes. To quote from the decision of the Manitoba Court of appeal in the *Northland Bank* case at p.6:

In my opinion the discretion to be exercised by a judge under s.35(1) of the *Winding Up Act* in approving or disapproving of a sale made by a liquidator must be exercised fairly. The discretion cannot be used as a means of getting a higher price due to changed circumstances. If the court is satisfied with the process (and here the court itself set up the process or approved of the process), then the discretion should be exercised in favour of the sale *where the price was not improvident at the material time.* (Emphasis added).

65 For all of the reasons stated the application of the Receiver is granted and the agreement with OEL is approved by the

court. The application of CCFL is dismissed. If the parties cannot agree on the question of costs, written submissions in that regard may be made.

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KeyCite treatment

Most Negative Treatment: Recently added (treatment not yet designated)

Most Recent Recently added (treatment not yet designated): [Henenghaixin Corp v. Long Run Exploration Ltd](#) | 2025 ABCA 58, 2025 CarswellAlta 350 | (Alta. C.A., Feb 20, 2025)

2020 SCC 10, 2020 CSC 10
Supreme Court of Canada

9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp.

2020 CarswellQue 3772, 2020 CarswellQue 3773, 2020 SCC 10, 2020 CSC 10, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 521, 1 B.L.R. (6th) 1, 317 A.C.W.S. (3d) 532, 444 D.L.R. (4th) 373, 78 C.B.R. (6th) 1

9354-9186 Québec inc. and 9354-9178 Québec inc. (Appellants) and Callidus Capital Corporation, International Game Technology, Deloitte LLP, Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, Francis Proulx and François Pelletier (Respondents) and Ernst & Young Inc., IMF Bentham Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Limited), Bentham IMF Capital Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Capital (Canada) Limited), Insolvency Institute of Canada and Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals (Interveners)

IMF Bentham Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Limited) and Bentham IMF Capital Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Capital (Canada) Limited) (Appellants) and Callidus Capital Corporation, International Game Technology, Deloitte LLP, Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, Francis Proulx and François Pelletier (Respondents) and Ernst & Young Inc., 9354-9186 Québec inc., 9354-9178 Québec inc., Insolvency Institute of Canada and Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals (Interveners)

Wagner C.J.C., Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer JJ.

Heard: January 23, 2020

Judgment: May 8, 2020

Docket: 38594

Proceedings: reasons in full to [9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp. \(2020\)](#), [2020 CarswellQue 237](#), [2020 CarswellQue 236](#), Abella J., Côté J., Karakatsanis J., Kasirer J., Moldaver J., Rowe J., Wagner C.J.C. (S.C.C.); reversing *Arrangement relatif à 9354-9186 Québec inc. (Bluberi Gaming Technologies Inc.)* (2019), [2019 QCCA 171](#), [EYB 2019-306890](#), [2019 CarswellQue 94](#), Dumas J.C.A. (ad hoc), Dutil J.C.A., Schragger J.C.A. (C.A. Que.)

Counsel: Jean-Philippe Groleau, Christian Lachance, Gabriel Lavery Lepage, Hannah Toledano, for Appellants / Interveners, 9354-9186 Québec inc. and 9354-9178 Québec inc.

Neil A. Peden, for Appellants / Interveners IMF Bentham Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Limited) and Bentham IMF Capital Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Capital (Canada) Limited)

Geneviève Cloutier, Clifton P. Prophet, for Respondent, Callidus Capital Corporation

Jocelyn Perreault, Noah Zucker, François Alexandre Toupin, for Respondents, International Game Technology, Deloitte LLP, Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, Francis Proulx and François Pelletier

Joseph Reynaud, Nathalie Nouvet, for Intervener, Ernst & Young Inc.

Sylvain Rigaud, Arad Mojtahedi, Saam Pousht-Mashhad, for Interveners, Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.3 Arrangements](#)

[XIX.3.c Miscellaneous](#)

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Miscellaneous

Debtor sought protection under [Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act \(CCAA\)](#) — Debtor brought application seeking authorization of funding agreement and requested placement of super-priority charge in favour of lender — After its first plan of arrangement was rejected, secured creditor submitted second plan and sought authorization to vote on it — Supervising judge dismissed secured creditor's application, holding that secured creditor was acting with improper purpose — After reviewing terms of proposed financing, supervising judge found it met criteria set out by courts — Finally, supervising judge imposed super-priority charge on debtor's assets in favour of lender — Secured creditor appealed supervising judge's order — Court of Appeal allowed appeal, finding that exercise of judge's discretion was not founded in law nor on proper treatment of facts — Debtor and lender, supported by monitor, appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — By seeking authorization to vote on second version of its own plan, secured creditor was attempting to circumvent creditor democracy [CCAA](#) protects — By doing so, secured creditor acted contrary to expectation that parties act with due diligence in insolvency proceeding and was properly barred from voting on second plan — Supervising judge considered proposed financing to be fair and reasonable and correctly determined that it was not plan of arrangement — Therefore, supervising judge's order should be reinstated.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Arrangements — Divers

Débitrice s'est placée sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — Débitrice a déposé une requête visant à obtenir l'autorisation de conclure un accord de financement et a demandé l'autorisation de grever son actif d'une charge super-prioritaire en faveur du prêteur — Après que son premier plan d'arrangement ait été rejeté, la créancière garantie a soumis un deuxième plan et a demandé l'autorisation de voter sur ce plan — Juge surveillant a rejeté la demande de la créancière garantie, estimant que la créancière garantie agissait dans un but illégitime — Après en avoir examiné les modalités, le juge surveillant a conclu que le financement proposé respectait le critère établi par les tribunaux — Enfin, le juge surveillant a ordonné que les actifs de la débitrice soient grevés d'une charge super-prioritaire en faveur du prêteur — Créancière garantie a interjeté appel de l'ordonnance du juge surveillant — Cour d'appel a accueilli l'appel, estimant que l'exercice par le juge de son pouvoir discrétionnaire n'était pas fondé en droit, non plus qu'il ne reposât sur un traitement approprié des faits — Débitrice et le prêteur, appuyés par le contrôleur, ont formé un pourvoi devant la Cour suprême du Canada — Pourvoi accueilli — En cherchant à obtenir l'autorisation de voter sur la deuxième version de son propre plan, la créancière garantie tentait de contourner la démocratie entre les créanciers que défend la LACC — Ce faisant, la créancière garantie agissait manifestement à l'encontre de l'attente selon laquelle les parties agissent avec diligence dans les procédures d'insolvabilité et a été à juste titre empêchée de voter sur le nouveau plan — Juge surveillant a estimé que le financement proposé était juste et raisonnable et a eu raison de conclure que le financement ne constituait pas un plan d'arrangement — Par conséquent, l'ordonnance du juge surveillant devrait être rétablie.

The debtor manufactured, distributed, installed, and serviced electronic casino gaming machines. The debtor sought financing from a secured creditor, the debt being secured in part by a share pledge agreement. Over the following years, the debtor lost significant amounts of money, and the secured creditor continued to extend credit. Eventually, the debtor sought protection under the [Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act \(CCAA\)](#). In its petition, the debtor alleged that its liquidity issues were the result of the secured creditor taking de facto control of the corporation and dictating a number of purposefully detrimental business decisions in order to deplete the corporation's equity value with a view to owning the debtor's business and, ultimately, selling it. The debtor's petition succeeded, and an initial order was issued. The debtor then entered into an asset purchase agreement with the secured creditor whereby the secured creditor would obtain all of the debtor's assets in exchange for extinguishing almost the entirety of its secured claim against the debtor. The agreement would also permit the debtor to retain claims for damages against the creditor arising from its alleged involvement in the debtor's financial

difficulties. The asset purchase agreement was approved by the supervising judge. The debtor brought an application seeking authorization of a proposed third-party litigation funding agreement (LFA) and the placement of a super-priority charge in favour of the lender. The secured creditor submitted a plan of arrangement along with an application seeking the authorization to vote with the unsecured creditors.

The supervising judge dismissed the secured creditor's application, holding that the secured creditor should not be allowed to vote on its own plan because it was acting with an improper purpose. He noted that the secured creditor's first plan had been rejected and this attempt to vote on the new plan was an attempt to override the result of the first vote. Under the circumstances, given that the secured creditor's conduct was contrary to the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence, allowing the secured creditor to vote would be both unfair and unreasonable. Since the new plan had no reasonable prospect of success, the supervising judge declined to submit it to a creditors' vote. The supervising judge determined that the LFA did not need to be submitted to a creditors' vote because it was not a plan of arrangement. After reviewing the terms of the LFA, the supervising judge found it met the criteria for approval of third-party litigation funding set out by the courts. Finally, the supervising judge imposed the litigation financing charge on the debtor's assets in favour of the lender. The secured creditor appealed the supervising judge's order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the exercise of the judge's discretion was not founded in law nor on a proper treatment of the facts so that irrespective of the standard of review applied, appellate intervention was justified. In particular, the Court of Appeal identified two errors. First, the Court of Appeal was of the view that the supervising judge erred in finding that the secured creditor had an improper purpose in seeking to vote on its plan. The Court of Appeal relied heavily on the notion that creditors have a right to vote in their own self-interest. Second, the Court of Appeal concluded that the supervising judge erred in approving the LFA as interim financing because, in its view, the LFA was not connected to the debtor's commercial operations. In light of this perceived error, the Court of Appeal substituted its view that the LFA was a plan of arrangement and, as a result, should have been submitted to a creditors' vote. The debtor and the lender, supported by the monitor, appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Held: The appeal was allowed.

Per Wagner C.J.C., Moldaver J. (Abella, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer JJ. concurring): [Section 11 of the CCAA](#) empowers a judge to make any order that the judge considers appropriate in the circumstances. A high degree of deference is owed to discretionary decisions made by judges supervising [CCAA](#) proceedings. As such, appellate intervention will only be justified if the supervising judge erred in principle or exercised their discretion unreasonably. This deferential standard of review accounts for the fact that supervising judges are steeped in the intricacies of the [CCAA](#) proceedings they oversee.

A creditor can generally vote on a plan of arrangement or compromise that affects its rights, subject to any specific provisions of the [CCAA](#) that may restrict its voting rights, or a proper exercise of discretion by the supervising judge to constrain or bar the creditor's right to vote. One such constraint arises from [s. 11 of the CCAA](#), which provides supervising judges with the discretion to bar a creditor from voting where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose. For example, a creditor acts for an improper purpose where the creditor is seeking to exercise its voting rights in a manner that frustrates, undermines, or runs counter to the objectives of the [CCAA](#). Supervising judges are best placed to determine whether the power to bar a creditor from voting should be exercised. Here, the supervising judge made no error in exercising his discretion to bar the secured creditor from voting on its plan. The supervising judge was intimately familiar with the debtor's [CCAA](#) proceedings and noted that, by seeking an authorization to vote on a second version of its own plan, the first one having been rejected, the secured creditor was attempting to strategically value its security to acquire control over the outcome of the vote and thereby circumvent the creditor democracy the [CCAA](#) protects. By doing so, the secured creditor acted contrary to the expectation that parties act with due diligence in an insolvency proceeding. Hence, the secured creditor was properly barred from voting on the second plan.

Interim financing is a flexible tool that may take on a range of forms, and third-party litigation funding may be one such form. Ultimately, whether proposed interim financing should be approved is a question that the supervising judge is best placed to answer. Here, there was no basis upon which to interfere with the supervising judge's exercise of his discretion to approve the LFA as interim financing. The supervising judge considered the LFA to be fair and reasonable, drawing guidance from the principles relevant to approving similar agreements in the class action context. While the supervising judge did not canvass each of the factors set out in [s. 11.2\(4\) of the CCAA](#) individually before reaching his conclusion, this was not itself an error. It was apparent that the supervising judge was focused on the fairness at stake to all parties, the specific objectives

of the CCAA, and the particular circumstances of this case when he approved the LFA as interim financing. The supervising judge correctly determined that the LFA was not a plan of arrangement because it did not propose any compromise of the creditors' rights. The super-priority charge he granted to the lender did not convert the LFA into a plan of arrangement by subordinating creditors' rights. Therefore, he did not err in the exercise of his discretion, no intervention was justified and the supervising judge's order should be reinstated.

La débitrice fabriquait, distribuait, installait et entretenait des appareils de jeux électroniques pour casino. La débitrice a demandé du financement à la créancière garantie que la débitrice a garanti partiellement en signant une entente par laquelle elle mettait en gage ses actions. Au cours des années suivantes, la débitrice a perdu d'importantes sommes d'argent et la créancière garantie a continué de lui consentir du crédit. Finalement, la débitrice s'est placée sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC). Dans sa requête, la débitrice a fait valoir que ses problèmes de liquidité découlaient du fait que la créancière garantie exerçait un contrôle de facto à l'égard de son entreprise et lui dictait un certain nombre de décisions d'affaires dans l'intention de lui nuire et de réduire la valeur de ses actions dans le but de devenir propriétaire de l'entreprise de la débitrice et ultimement de la vendre. La requête de la débitrice a été accordée et une ordonnance initiale a été émise. La débitrice a alors signé une convention d'achat d'actifs avec la créancière garantie en vertu de laquelle la créancière garantie obtiendrait l'ensemble des actifs de la débitrice en échange de l'extinction de la presque totalité de la créance garantie qu'elle détenait à l'encontre de la débitrice. Cette convention prévoyait également que la débitrice se réservait le droit de réclamer des dommages-intérêts à la créancière garantie en raison de l'implication alléguée de celle-ci dans ses difficultés financières. Le juge surveillant a approuvé la convention d'achat d'actifs. La débitrice a déposé une requête visant à obtenir l'autorisation de conclure un accord de financement du litige par un tiers (AFL) et l'autorisation de grever son actif d'une charge super-prioritaire en faveur du prêteur. La créancière garantie a soumis un plan d'arrangement et une requête visant à obtenir l'autorisation de voter avec les créanciers chirographaires.

Le juge surveillant a rejeté la demande de la créancière garantie, estimant que la créancière garantie ne devrait pas être autorisée à voter sur son propre plan puisqu'elle agissait dans un but illégitime. Il a fait remarquer que le premier plan de la créancière garantie avait été rejeté et que cette tentative de voter sur le nouveau plan était une tentative de contourner le résultat du premier vote. Dans les circonstances, étant donné que la conduite de la créancière garantie était contraire à l'opportunité, à la bonne foi et à la diligence requises, lui permettre de voter serait à la fois injuste et déraisonnable. Comme le nouveau plan n'avait aucune possibilité raisonnable de recevoir l'aval des créanciers, le juge surveillant a refusé de le soumettre au vote des créanciers. Le juge surveillant a décidé qu'il n'était pas nécessaire de soumettre l'AFL au vote des créanciers parce qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'un plan d'arrangement. Après en avoir examiné les modalités, le juge surveillant a conclu que l'AFL respectait le critère d'approbation applicable en matière de financement d'un litige par un tiers établi par les tribunaux. Enfin, le juge surveillant a ordonné que les actifs de la débitrice soient grevés de la charge liée au financement du litige en faveur du prêteur. La créancière garantie a interjeté appel de l'ordonnance du juge surveillant.

La Cour d'appel a accueilli l'appel, estimant que l'exercice par le juge de son pouvoir discrétionnaire n'était pas fondé en droit, non plus qu'il ne reposât sur un traitement approprié des faits, de sorte que, peu importe la norme de contrôle appliquée, il était justifié d'intervenir en appel. En particulier, la Cour d'appel a relevé deux erreurs. D'une part, la Cour d'appel a conclu que le juge surveillant a commis une erreur en concluant que la créancière garantie a agi dans un but illégitime en demandant l'autorisation de voter sur son plan. La Cour d'appel s'appuyait grandement sur l'idée que les créanciers ont le droit de voter en fonction de leur propre intérêt. D'autre part, la Cour d'appel a conclu que le juge surveillant a eu tort d'approuver l'AFL en tant qu'accord de financement provisoire parce qu'à son avis, il n'était pas lié aux opérations commerciales de la débitrice. À la lumière de ce qu'elle percevait comme une erreur, la Cour d'appel a substitué son opinion selon laquelle l'AFL était un plan d'arrangement et que pour cette raison, il aurait dû être soumis au vote des créanciers. La débitrice et le prêteur, appuyés par le contrôleur, ont formé un pourvoi devant la Cour suprême du Canada.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Wagner, J.C.C., Moldaver, J. (Abella, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer, JJ., souscrivant à leur opinion) : L'article 11 de la LACC confère au juge le pouvoir de rendre toute ordonnance qu'il estime indiquée dans les circonstances. Les décisions discrétionnaires des juges chargés de la supervision des procédures intentées sous le régime de la LACC commandent un degré élevé de déférence. Ainsi, les cours d'appel ne seront justifiées d'intervenir que si le juge surveillant a commis une erreur de principe ou exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire de manière déraisonnable. Cette norme déférente de contrôle tient compte du fait que le juge surveillant possède une connaissance intime des procédures intentées sous le régime de la LACC dont il assure la supervision.

En général, un créancier peut voter sur un plan d'arrangement ou une transaction qui a une incidence sur ses droits, sous réserve des dispositions de la LACC qui peuvent limiter son droit de voter, ou de l'exercice justifié par le juge surveillant de son pouvoir discrétionnaire de limiter ou de supprimer ce droit. Une telle limite découle de l'art. 11 de la LACC, qui confère au juge surveillant le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'empêcher le créancier de voter lorsqu'il agit dans un but illégitime. Par exemple, un créancier agit dans un but illégitime lorsque le créancier cherche à exercer ses droits de vote de manière à contrecarrer, à miner les objectifs de la LACC ou à aller à l'encontre de ceux-ci. Le juge surveillant est mieux placé que quiconque pour déterminer s'il doit exercer le pouvoir d'empêcher le créancier de voter. En l'espèce, le juge surveillant n'a commis aucune erreur en exerçant son pouvoir discrétionnaire pour empêcher la créancière garantie de voter sur son plan. Le juge surveillant connaissait très bien les procédures fondées sur la LACC relatives à la débitrice et a fait remarquer que, en cherchant à obtenir l'autorisation de voter sur la deuxième version de son propre plan, la première ayant été rejetée, la créancière garantie tentait d'évaluer stratégiquement la valeur de sa sûreté afin de prendre le contrôle du vote et ainsi contourner la démocratie entre les créanciers que défend la LACC. Ce faisant, la créancière garantie agissait manifestement à l'encontre de l'attente selon laquelle les parties agissent avec diligence dans les procédures d'insolvabilité. Ainsi, la créancière garantie a été à juste titre empêchée de voter sur le nouveau plan.

Le financement temporaire est un outil souple qui peut revêtir différentes formes, et le financement d'un litige par un tiers peut constituer l'une de ces formes. Au bout du compte, la question de savoir s'il y a lieu d'approuver le financement temporaire projeté est une question à laquelle le juge surveillant est le mieux placé pour répondre. En l'espèce, il n'y avait aucune raison d'intervenir dans l'exercice par le juge surveillant de son pouvoir discrétionnaire d'approuver l'AFL à titre de financement temporaire. Se fondant sur les principes applicables à l'approbation d'accords semblables dans le contexte des recours collectifs, le juge surveillant a estimé que l'AFL était juste et raisonnable. Bien que le juge surveillant n'ait pas examiné à fond chacun des facteurs énoncés à l'art. 11.2(4) de la LACC de façon individuelle avant de tirer sa conclusion, cela ne constituait pas une erreur en soi. Il était manifeste que le juge surveillant a mis l'accent sur l'équité envers toutes les parties, les objectifs précis de la LACC et les circonstances particulières de la présente affaire lorsqu'il a approuvé l'AFL à titre de financement temporaire. Le juge surveillant a eu raison de conclure que l'AFL ne constituait pas un plan d'arrangement puisqu'il ne proposait aucune transaction visant les droits des créanciers. La charge super-prioritaire qu'il a accordée au prêteur ne convertissait pas l'AFL en plan d'arrangement en subordonnant les droits des créanciers. Par conséquent, il n'a pas commis d'erreur dans l'exercice de sa discrétion, aucune intervention n'était justifiée et l'ordonnance du juge surveillant devrait être rétablie.

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APPEAL by debtor from judgment reported at *Arrangement relatif à 9354-9186 Québec inc. (Bluberi Gaming Technologies Inc.)* (2019), EYB 2019-306890, 2019 CarswellQue 94, 2019 QCCA 171 (C.A. Que.), finding that debtor's scheme amounted to plan of arrangement and that funding request should be submitted to creditors for approval.

POURVOI formé par la débitrice à l'encontre d'une décision publiée à *Arrangement relatif à 9354-9186 Québec inc. (Bluberi Gaming Technologies Inc.)* (2019), EYB 2019-306890, 2019 CarswellQue 94, 2019 QCCA 171 (C.A. Que.), ayant conclu que la proposition de la débitrice constituait un plan d'arrangement et que la demande de financement devrait être soumise aux créanciers pour approbation.

Wagner C.J.C., Moldaver J. (Abella, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe and Kasirer JJ. concurring):

I. Overview

1 These appeals arise in the context of an ongoing proceeding instituted under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA"), in which substantially all of the assets of the debtor companies have been liquidated. The proceeding was commenced well over four years ago. Since then, a single supervising judge has been responsible for its oversight. In this capacity, he has made numerous discretionary decisions.

2 Two of the supervising judge’s decisions are in issue before us. Each raises a question requiring this Court to clarify the nature and scope of judicial discretion in *CCAA* proceedings. The first is whether a supervising judge has the discretion to bar a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement where they determine that the creditor is acting for an improper purpose. The second is whether a supervising judge can approve third party litigation funding as interim financing, pursuant to s. 11.2 of the *CCAA*.

3 For the reasons that follow, we would answer both questions in the affirmative, as did the supervising judge. To the extent the Court of Appeal disagreed and went on to interfere with the supervising judge’s discretionary decisions, we conclude that it was not justified in doing so. In our respectful view, the Court of Appeal failed to treat the supervising judge’s decisions with the appropriate degree of deference. In the result, as we ordered at the conclusion of the hearing, these appeals are allowed and the supervising judge’s order reinstated.

II. Facts

4 In 1994, Mr. Gérald Duhamel founded Bluberi Gaming Technologies Inc., which is now one of the appellants, 9354-9186 Québec inc. The corporation manufactured, distributed, installed, and serviced electronic casino gaming machines. It also provided management systems for gambling operations. Its sole shareholder has at all material times been Bluberi Group Inc., which is now another of the appellants, 9354-9178 Québec inc. Through a family trust, Mr. Duhamel controls Bluberi Group Inc. and, as a result, Bluberi Gaming (collectively, “Bluberi”).

5 In 2012, Bluberi sought financing from the respondent, Callidus Capital Corporation (“Callidus”), which describes itself as an “asset-based or distressed lender” (R.F., at para. 26). Callidus extended a credit facility of approximately \$24 million to Bluberi. This debt was secured in part by a share pledge agreement.

6 Over the next three years, Bluberi lost significant amounts of money, and Callidus continued to extend credit. By 2015, Bluberi owed approximately \$86 million to Callidus — close to half of which Bluberi asserts is comprised of interest and fees.

A. Bluberi’s Institution of *CCAA* Proceedings and Initial Sale of Assets

7 On November 11, 2015, Bluberi filed a petition for the issuance of an initial order under the *CCAA*. In its petition, Bluberi alleged that its liquidity issues were the result of Callidus taking *de facto* control of the corporation and dictating a number of purposefully detrimental business decisions. Bluberi alleged that Callidus engaged in this conduct in order to deplete the corporation’s equity value with a view to owning Bluberi and, ultimately, selling it.

8 Over Callidus’s objection, Bluberi’s petition succeeded. The supervising judge, Michaud J., issued an initial order under the *CCAA*. Among other things, the initial order confirmed that Bluberi was a “debtor company” within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Act; stayed any proceedings against Bluberi or any director or officer of Bluberi; and appointed Ernst & Young Inc. as monitor (“Monitor”).

9 Working with the Monitor, Bluberi determined that a sale of its assets was necessary. On January 28, 2016, it proposed a sale solicitation process, which the supervising judge approved. That process led to Bluberi entering into an asset purchase agreement with Callidus. The agreement contemplated that Callidus would obtain all of Bluberi’s assets in exchange for extinguishing almost the entirety of its secured claim against Bluberi, which had ballooned to approximately \$135.7 million. Callidus would maintain an undischarged secured claim of \$3 million against Bluberi. The agreement would also permit Bluberi to retain claims for damages against Callidus arising from its alleged involvement in Bluberi’s financial difficulties (“Retained Claims”).¹ Throughout these proceedings, Bluberi has asserted that the Retained Claims should amount to over \$200 million in damages.

10 The supervising judge approved the asset purchase agreement, and the sale of Bluberi’s assets to Callidus closed in February 2017. As a result, Callidus effectively acquired Bluberi’s business, and has continued to operate it as a going concern.

11 Since the sale, the Retained Claims have been Bluberi's sole remaining asset and thus the sole security for Callidus's \$3 million claim.

B. The Initial Competing Plans of Arrangement

12 On September 11, 2017, Bluberi filed an application seeking the approval of a \$2 million interim financing credit facility to fund the litigation of the Retained Claims and other related relief. The lender was a joint venture numbered company incorporated as 9364-9739 Québec inc. This interim financing application was set to be heard on September 19, 2017.

13 However, one day before the hearing, Callidus proposed a plan of arrangement ("First Plan") and applied for an order convening a creditors' meeting to vote on that plan. The First Plan proposed that Callidus would fund a \$2.5 million (later increased to \$2.63 million) distribution to Bluberi's creditors, except itself, in exchange for a release from the Retained Claims. This would have fully satisfied the claims of Bluberi's former employees and those creditors with claims worth less than \$3000; creditors with larger claims were to receive, on average, 31 percent of their respective claims.

14 The supervising judge adjourned the hearing of both applications to October 5, 2017. In the meantime, Bluberi filed its own plan of arrangement. Among other things, the plan proposed that half of any proceeds resulting from the Retained Claims, after payment of expenses and Bluberi's creditors' claims, would be distributed to the unsecured creditors, as long as the net proceeds exceeded \$20 million.

15 On October 5, 2017, the supervising judge ordered that the parties' plans of arrangement could be put to a creditors' vote. He ordered that both parties share the fees and expenses related to the presentation of the plans of arrangement at a creditors' meeting, and that a party's failure to deposit those funds with the Monitor would bar the presentation of that party's plan of arrangement. Bluberi elected not to deposit the necessary funds, and, as a result, only Callidus's First Plan was put to the creditors.

C. Creditors' Vote on Callidus's First Plan

16 On December 15, 2017, Callidus submitted its First Plan to a creditors' vote. The plan failed to receive sufficient support. [Section 6\(1\) of the CCAA](#) provides that, to be approved, a plan must receive a "double majority" vote in each class of creditors — that is, a majority in *number* of class members, which also represents two-thirds in *value* of the class members' claims. All of Bluberi's creditors, besides Callidus, formed a single voting class of unsecured creditors. Of the 100 voting unsecured creditors, 92 creditors (representing \$3,450,882 of debt) voted in favour, and 8 voted against (representing \$2,375,913 of debt). The First Plan failed because the creditors voting in favour only held 59.22 percent of the total value being voted, which did not meet the [s. 6\(1\)](#) threshold. Most notably, SMT Hautes Technologies ("SMT"), which held 36.7 percent of Bluberi's debt, voted against the plan.

17 Callidus did not vote on the First Plan — despite the Monitor explicitly stating that Callidus could have "vote[d] ... the portion of its claim, assessed by Callidus, to be an unsecured claim" (Joint R.R., vol. III, at p.188).

D. Bluberi's Interim Financing Application and Callidus's New Plan

18 On February 6, 2018, Bluberi filed one of the applications underlying these appeals, seeking authorization of a proposed third party litigation funding agreement ("LFA") with a publicly traded litigation funder, IMF Bentham Limited or its Canadian subsidiary, Bentham IMF Capital Limited (collectively, "Bentham"). Bluberi's application also sought the placement of a \$20 million super-priority charge in favour of Bentham on Bluberi's assets ("Litigation Financing Charge").

19 The LFA contemplated that Bentham would fund Bluberi's litigation of the Retained Claims in exchange for receiving a portion of any settlement or award after trial. However, were Bluberi's litigation to fail, Bentham would lose all of its invested funds. The LFA also provided that Bentham could terminate the litigation of the Retained Claims if, acting

reasonably, it were no longer satisfied of the merits or commercial viability of the litigation.

20 Callidus and certain unsecured creditors who voted in favour of its plan (who are now respondents and style themselves the “Creditors’ Group”) contested Bluberi’s application on the ground that the LFA was a plan of arrangement and, as such, had to be submitted to a creditors’ vote.²

21 On February 12, 2018, Callidus filed the other application underlying these appeals, seeking to put another plan of arrangement to a creditors’ vote (“New Plan”). The New Plan was essentially identical to the First Plan, except that Callidus increased the proposed distribution by \$250,000 (from \$2.63 million to \$2.88 million). Further, Callidus filed an amended proof of claim, which purported to value the security attached to its \$3 million claim at *nil*. Callidus was of the view that this valuation was proper because Bluberi had no assets other than the Retained Claims. On this basis, Callidus asserted that it stood in the position of an unsecured creditor, and sought the supervising judge’s permission to vote on the New Plan with the other unsecured creditors. Given the size of its claim, if Callidus were permitted to vote on the New Plan, the plan would necessarily pass a creditors’ vote. Bluberi opposed Callidus’s application.

22 The supervising judge heard Bluberi’s interim financing application and Callidus’s application regarding its New Plan together. Notably, the Monitor supported Bluberi’s position.

III. Decisions Below

A. *Quebec Superior Court (2018 QCCS 1040 (C.S. Que.)) (Michaud J.)*

23 The supervising judge dismissed Callidus’s application, declining to submit the New Plan to a creditors’ vote. He granted Bluberi’s application, authorizing Bluberi to enter into a litigation funding agreement with Bentham on the terms set forth in the LFA and imposing the Litigation Financing Charge on Bluberi’s assets.

24 With respect to Callidus’s application, the supervising judge determined Callidus should not be permitted to vote on the New Plan because it was acting with an “improper purpose” (para. 48). He acknowledged that creditors are generally entitled to vote in their own self-interest. However, given that the First Plan — which was almost identical to the New Plan — had been defeated by a creditors’ vote, the supervising judge concluded that Callidus’s attempt to vote on the New Plan was an attempt to override the result of the first vote. In particular, he wrote:

Taking into consideration the creditors’ interest, the Court accepted, in the fall of 2017, that Callidus’ Plan be submitted to their vote with the understanding that, as a secured creditor, Callidus would not cast a vote. However, under the present circumstances, it would serve an improper purpose if Callidus was allowed to vote on its own plan, especially when its vote would very likely result in the New Plan meeting the two thirds threshold for approval under the *CCAA*.

As pointed out by SMT, the main unsecured creditor, Callidus’ attempt to vote aims only at cancelling SMT’s vote which prevented Callidus’ Plan from being approved at the creditors’ meeting.

It is one thing to let the creditors vote on a plan submitted by a secured creditor, it is another to allow this secured creditor to vote on its own plan in order to exert control over the vote for the sole purpose of obtaining releases. [paras. 45-47]

25 The supervising judge concluded that, in these circumstances, allowing Callidus to vote would be both “unfair and unreasonable” (para. 47). He also observed that Callidus’s conduct throughout the *CCAA* proceedings “lacked transparency” (at para. 41) and that Callidus was “solely motivated by the [pending] litigation” (para. 44). In sum, he found that Callidus’s conduct was contrary to the “requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence”, and ordered that Callidus would not be permitted to vote on the New Plan (para. 48, citing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter *Century Services*], at para. 70).

26 Because Callidus was not permitted to vote on the New Plan and SMT had unequivocally stated its intention to vote against it, the supervising judge concluded that the plan had no reasonable prospect of success. He therefore declined to

submit it to a creditors' vote.

27 With respect to Bluberi's application, the supervising judge considered three issues relevant to these appeals: (1) whether the LFA should be submitted to a creditors' vote; (2) if not, whether the LFA ought to be approved by the court; and (3) if so, whether the \$20 million Litigation Financing Charge should be imposed on Bluberi's assets.

28 The supervising judge determined that the LFA did not need to be submitted to a creditors' vote because it was not a plan of arrangement. He considered a plan of arrangement to involve "an arrangement or compromise between a debtor and its creditors" (para. 71, citing *Crystallex International Corp., Re*, 2012 ONCA 404, 293 O.A.C. 102 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 92 ("Crystallex")). In his view, the LFA lacked this essential feature. He also concluded that the LFA did not need to be accompanied by a plan, as Bluberi had stated its intention to file a plan in the future.

29 After reviewing the terms of the LFA, the supervising judge found it met the criteria for approval of third party litigation funding set out in *Musicians' Pension Fund of Canada (Trustee of) v. Kinross Gold Corp.*, 2013 ONSC 4974, 117 O.R. (3d) 150 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 41, and *Hayes v. Saint John (City)*, 2016 NBQB 125 (N.B. Q.B.), at para. 4 (CanLII). In particular, he considered Bentham's percentage of return to be reasonable in light of its level of investment and risk. Further, the supervising judge rejected Callidus and the Creditors' Group's argument that the LFA gave too much discretion to Bentham. He found that the LFA did not allow Bentham to exert undue influence on the litigation of the Retained Claims, noting similarly broad clauses had been approved in the *CCAA* context (para. 82, citing *Schenk v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc.*, 2015 ONSC 3215, 74 C.P.C. (7th) 332 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 23).

30 Finally, the supervising judge imposed the Litigation Financing Charge on Bluberi's assets. While significant, the supervising judge considered the amount to be reasonable given: the amount of damages that would be claimed from Callidus; Bentham's financial commitment to the litigation; and the fact that Bentham was not charging any interim fees or interest (i.e., it would only profit in the event of successful litigation or settlement). Put simply, Bentham was taking substantial risks, and it was reasonable that it obtain certain guarantees in exchange.

31 Callidus, again supported by the Creditors' Group, appealed the supervising judge's order, impleading Bentham in the process.

B. Quebec Court of Appeal (2019 QCCA 171 (C.A. Que.)) (Dutil and Schragger J.J.A. and Dumas J. (ad hoc))

32 The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that "[t]he exercise of the judge's discretion [was] not founded in law nor on a proper treatment of the facts so that irrespective of the standard of review applied, appellate intervention [was] justified" (para. 48 CanLII). In particular, the court identified two errors of relevance to these appeals.

33 First, the court was of the view that the supervising judge erred in finding that Callidus had an improper purpose in seeking to vote on its New Plan. In its view, Callidus should have been permitted to vote. The court relied heavily on the notion that creditors have a right to vote in their own self-interest. It held that any judicial discretion to preclude voting due to improper purpose should be reserved for the "clearest of cases" (para. 62, referring to *Blackburn Developments Ltd., Re*, 2011 BCSC 1671, 27 B.C.L.R. (5th) 199 (B.C. S.C.), at para. 45). The court was of the view that Callidus's transparent attempt to obtain a release from Bluberi's claims against it did not amount to an improper purpose. The court also considered Callidus's conduct prior to and during the *CCAA* proceedings to be incapable of justifying a finding of improper purpose.

34 Second, the court concluded that the supervising judge erred in approving the LFA as interim financing because, in its view, the LFA was not connected to Bluberi's commercial operations. The court concluded that the supervising judge had both "misconstrued in law the notion of interim financing and misapplied that notion to the factual circumstances of the case" (para. 78).

35 In light of this perceived error, the court substituted its view that the LFA was a plan of arrangement and, as a result, should have been submitted to a creditors' vote. It held that "[a]n arrangement or proposal can encompass both a compromise of creditors' claims as well as the process undertaken to satisfy them" (para. 85). The court considered the LFA to be a plan of arrangement because it affected the creditors' share in any eventual litigation proceeds, would cause them to wait for the outcome of any litigation, and could potentially leave them with nothing at all. Moreover, the court held that Bluberi's

scheme “as a whole”, being the prosecution of the Retained Claims and the LFA, should be submitted as a plan to the creditors for their approval (para. 89).

36 Bluberi and Bentham (collectively, “appellants”), again supported by the Monitor, now appeal to this Court.

IV. Issues

37 These appeals raise two issues:

(1) Did the supervising judge err in barring Callidus from voting on its New Plan on the basis that it was acting for an improper purpose?

(2) Did the supervising judge err in approving the LFA as interim financing, pursuant to [s. 11.2 of the CCAA](#)?

V. Analysis

A. Preliminary Considerations

38 Addressing the above issues requires situating them within the contemporary Canadian insolvency landscape and, more specifically, the [CCAA](#) regime. Accordingly, before turning to those issues, we review (1) the evolving nature of [CCAA](#) proceedings; (2) the role of the supervising judge in those proceedings; and (3) the proper scope of appellate review of a supervising judge’s exercise of discretion.

(1) The Evolving Nature of CCAA Proceedings

39 The [CCAA](#) is one of three principal insolvency statutes in Canada. The others are the [Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 \(“BIA”\)](#), which covers insolvencies of both individuals and companies, and the [Winding-up and Restructuring Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11 \(“WURA”\)](#), which covers insolvencies of financial institutions and certain other corporations, such as insurance companies ([WURA, s. 6\(1\)](#)). While both the [CCAA](#) and the [BIA](#) enable reorganizations of insolvent companies, access to the [CCAA](#) is restricted to debtor companies facing total claims in excess of \$5 million ([CCAA, s. 3\(1\)](#)).

40 Together, Canada’s insolvency statutes pursue an array of overarching remedial objectives that reflect the wide ranging and potentially “catastrophic” impacts insolvency can have ([Indalex Ltd., Re, 2013 SCC 6, \[2013\] 1 S.C.R. 271 \(S.C.C.\)](#), at para. 1). These objectives include: providing for timely, efficient and impartial resolution of a debtor’s insolvency; preserving and maximizing the value of a debtor’s assets; ensuring fair and equitable treatment of the claims against a debtor; protecting the public interest; and, in the context of a commercial insolvency, balancing the costs and benefits of restructuring or liquidating the company (J. P. Sarra, “The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada’s Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency Law”, in J. P. Sarra and B. Romaine, eds., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2016* (2017), 9, at pp. 9-10; J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act* 2nd ed. (2013), at pp. 4-5 and 14; Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, *Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act* (2003), at pp. 9-10; R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2nd ed. 2015), at pp. 4-5).

41 Among these objectives, the [CCAA](#) generally prioritizes “avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company” ([Century Services](#), at para. 70). As a result, the typical [CCAA](#) case has historically involved an attempt to facilitate the reorganization and survival of the pre-filing debtor company in an operational state — that is, as a going concern. Where such a reorganization was not possible, the alternative course of action was seen as a liquidation through either a receivership or under the [BIA](#) regime. This is precisely the outcome that was sought in [Century Services](#) (see para. 14).

42 That said, the *CCAA* is fundamentally insolvency legislation, and thus it also “has the simultaneous objectives of maximizing creditor recovery, preservation of going-concern value where possible, preservation of jobs and communities affected by the firm’s financial distress ... and enhancement of the credit system generally” (Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, at p. 14; see also *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Limited*, 2017 ONCA 1014, 139 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 103). In pursuit of those objectives, *CCAA* proceedings have evolved to permit outcomes that do not result in the emergence of the pre-filing debtor company in a restructured state, but rather involve some form of liquidation of the debtor’s assets under the auspices of the Act itself (Sarra, “The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada’s Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency Law”, at pp. 19-21). Such scenarios are referred to as “liquidating CCAAs”, and they are now commonplace in the *CCAA* landscape (see *Third Eye Capital Corporation v. Ressources Dianor Inc./Dianor Resources Inc.*, 2019 ONCA 508, 435 D.L.R. (4th) 416 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 70).

43 Liquidating CCAAs take diverse forms and may involve, among other things: the sale of the debtor company as a going concern; an “en bloc” sale of assets that are capable of being operationalized by a buyer; a partial liquidation or downsizing of business operations; or a piecemeal sale of assets (B. Kaplan, “Liquidating CCAAs: Discretion Gone Awry?”, in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law* (2008), 79, at pp. 87-89). The ultimate commercial outcomes facilitated by liquidating CCAAs are similarly diverse. Some may result in the continued operation of the business of the debtor under a different going concern entity (e.g., the liquidations in *Indalex* and *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), while others may result in a sale of assets and inventory with no such entity emerging (e.g., the proceedings in *Target Canada Co., Re*, 2015 ONSC 303, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 7 and 31). Others still, like the case at bar, may involve a going concern sale of most of the assets of the debtor, leaving residual assets to be dealt with by the debtor and its stakeholders.

44 *CCAA* courts first began approving these forms of liquidation pursuant to the broad discretion conferred by the Act. The emergence of this practice was not without criticism, largely on the basis that it appeared to be inconsistent with the *CCAA* being a “restructuring statute” (see, e.g., *Royal Bank v. Fracmaster Ltd.*, 1999 ABCA 178, 244 A.R. 93 (Alta. C.A.), at paras. 15-16, aff’g 1999 ABQB 379, 11 C.B.R. (4th) 204 (Alta. Q.B.), at paras. 40-43; A. Nocilla, “The History of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act and the Future of Re-Structuring Law in Canada” (2014), 56 *Can. Bus. L.J.* 73, at pp. 88-92).

45 However, since s. 36 of the *CCAA* came into force in 2009, courts have been using it to effect liquidating CCAAs. Section 36 empowers courts to authorize the sale or disposition of a debtor company’s assets outside the ordinary course of business.³ Significantly, when the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce recommended the adoption of s. 36, it observed that liquidation is not necessarily inconsistent with the remedial objectives of the *CCAA*, and that it may be a means to “raise capital [to facilitate a restructuring], eliminate further loss for creditors or focus on the solvent operations of the business” (p. 147). Other commentators have observed that liquidation can be a “vehicle to restructure a business” by allowing the business to survive, albeit under a different corporate form or ownership (Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, at p. 169; see also K. P. McElcheran, *Commercial Insolvency in Canada* (4th ed. 2019), at p. 311). Indeed, in *Indalex*, the company sold its assets under the *CCAA* in order to preserve the jobs of its employees, despite being unable to survive as their employer (see para. 51).

46 Ultimately, the relative weight that the different objectives of the *CCAA* take on in a particular case may vary based on the factual circumstances, the stage of the proceedings, or the proposed solutions that are presented to the court for approval. Here, a parallel may be drawn with the *BIA* context. In *Orphan Well Association v. Grant Thornton Ltd.*, 2019 SCC 5, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 150 (S.C.C.), at para. 67, this Court explained that, as a general matter, the *BIA* serves two purposes: (1) the bankrupt’s financial rehabilitation and (2) the equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s assets among creditors. However, in circumstances where a debtor corporation will never emerge from bankruptcy, only the latter purpose is relevant (see para. 67). Similarly, under the *CCAA*, when a reorganization of the pre-filing debtor company is not a possibility, a liquidation that preserves going-concern value and the ongoing business operations of the pre-filing company may become the predominant remedial focus. Moreover, where a reorganization or liquidation is complete and the court is dealing with residual assets, the objective of maximizing creditor recovery from those assets may take centre stage. As we will explain, the architecture of the *CCAA* leaves the case-specific assessment and balancing of these remedial objectives to the supervising judge.

(2) The Role of a Supervising Judge in CCAA Proceedings

47 One of the principal means through which the *CCAA* achieves its objectives is by carving out a unique supervisory role for judges (see Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at pp. 18-19). From beginning to end, each *CCAA* proceeding is overseen by a single supervising judge. The supervising judge acquires extensive knowledge and insight into the stakeholder dynamics and the business realities of the proceedings from their ongoing dealings with the parties.

48 The *CCAA* capitalizes on this positional advantage by supplying supervising judges with broad discretion to make a variety of orders that respond to the circumstances of each case and “meet contemporary business and social needs” (*Century Services*, at para. 58) in “real-time” (para. 58, citing R. B. Jones, “The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law”, in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 484). The anchor of this discretionary authority is s. 11, which empowers a judge “to make any order that [the judge] considers appropriate in the circumstances”. This section has been described as “the engine” driving the statutory scheme (*Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 36).

49 The discretionary authority conferred by the *CCAA*, while broad in nature, is not boundless. This authority must be exercised in furtherance of the remedial objectives of the *CCAA*, which we have explained above (see *Century Services*, at para. 59). Additionally, the court must keep in mind three “baseline considerations” (at para. 70), which the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating: (1) that the order sought is appropriate in the circumstances, and (2) that the applicant has been acting in good faith and (3) with due diligence (para. 69).

50 The first two considerations of appropriateness and good faith are widely understood in the *CCAA* context. Appropriateness “is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*” (para. 70). Further, the well-established requirement that parties must act in good faith in insolvency proceedings has recently been made express in s. 18.6 of the *CCAA*, which provides:

Good faith

18.6 (1) Any interested person in any proceedings under this Act shall act in good faith with respect to those proceedings.

Good faith — powers of court

(2) If the court is satisfied that an interested person fails to act in good faith, on application by an interested person, the court may make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

(See also *BIA*, s. 4.2; *Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No. 1*, S.C. 2019, c. 29, ss. 133 and 140.)

51 The third consideration of due diligence requires some elaboration. Consistent with the *CCAA* regime generally, the due diligence consideration discourages parties from sitting on their rights and ensures that creditors do not strategically manoeuvre or position themselves to gain an advantage (*Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at p. 31). The procedures set out in the *CCAA* rely on negotiations and compromise between the debtor and its stakeholders, as overseen by the supervising judge and the monitor. This necessarily requires that, to the extent possible, those involved in the proceedings be on equal footing and have a clear understanding of their respective rights (see McElcheran, at p. 262). A party’s failure to participate in *CCAA* proceedings in a diligent and timely fashion can undermine these procedures and, more generally, the effective functioning of the *CCAA* regime (see, e.g., *North American Tungsten Corp. v. Global Tungsten and Powders Corp.*, 2015 BCCA 390, 377 B.C.A.C. 6 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 21-23; *BA Energy Inc., Re*, 2010 ABQB 507, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 24 (Alta. Q.B.); *HSBC Bank Canada v. Bear Mountain Master Partnership*, 2010 BCSC 1563, 72 C.B.R. (4th) 276 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]), at para. 11; *Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. 360networks Corp.*, 2007 BCCA 14, 279 D.L.R. (4th) 701 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 51-52, in which the courts seized on a party’s failure to act diligently).

52 We pause to note that supervising judges are assisted in their oversight role by a court appointed monitor whose qualifications and duties are set out in the *CCAA* (see ss. 11.7, 11.8 and 23 to 25). The monitor is an independent and impartial expert, acting as “the eyes and the ears of the court” throughout the proceedings (*Essar*, at para. 109). The core of the monitor’s role includes providing an advisory opinion to the court as to the fairness of any proposed plan of arrangement

and on orders sought by parties, including the sale of assets and requests for interim financing (see *CCAA*, s. 23(1)(d) and (i); Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at pp-566 and 569).

(3) Appellate Review of Exercises of Discretion by a Supervising Judge

53 A high degree of deference is owed to discretionary decisions made by judges supervising *CCAA* proceedings. As such, appellate intervention will only be justified if the supervising judge erred in principle or exercised their discretion unreasonably (see *Grant Forest Products Inc. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank*, 2015 ONCA 570, 387 D.L.R. (4th) 426 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 98; *Bridging Finance Inc. v. Béton Brunet 2001 inc.*, 2017 QCCA 138, 44 C.B.R. (6th) 175 (C.A. Que.), at para. 23). Appellate courts must be careful not to substitute their own discretion in place of the supervising judge's (*New Skeena Forest Products Inc., Re*, 2005 BCCA 192, 39 B.C.L.R. (4th) 338 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 20).

54 This deferential standard of review accounts for the fact that supervising judges are steeped in the intricacies of the *CCAA* proceedings they oversee. In this respect, the comments of Tysoe J.A. in *Edgewater Casino Inc., Re*, 2009 BCCA 40, 308 D.L.R. (4th) 339 (B.C. C.A.) (*Re Edgewater Casino Inc.*), at para. 20, are apt:

... one of the principal functions of the judge supervising the *CCAA* proceeding is to attempt to balance the interests of the various stakeholders during the reorganization process, and it will often be inappropriate to consider an exercise of discretion by the supervising judge in isolation of other exercises of discretion by the judge in endeavoring to balance the various interests. ... *CCAA* proceedings are dynamic in nature and the supervising judge has intimate knowledge of the reorganization process. The nature of the proceedings often requires the supervising judge to make quick decisions in complicated circumstances.

55 With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the issues on appeal.

B. Callidus Should Not Be Permitted to Vote on Its New Plan

56 A creditor can generally vote on a plan of arrangement or compromise that affects its rights, subject to any specific provisions of the *CCAA* that may restrict its voting rights (e.g., s. 22(3)), or a proper exercise of discretion by the supervising judge to constrain or bar the creditor's right to vote. We conclude that one such constraint arises from s. 11 of the *CCAA*, which provides supervising judges with the discretion to bar a creditor from voting where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose. Supervising judges are best-placed to determine whether this discretion should be exercised in a particular case. In our view, the supervising judge here made no error in exercising his discretion to bar Callidus from voting on the New Plan.

(1) Parameters of Creditors' Right to Vote on Plans of Arrangement

57 Creditor approval of any plan of arrangement or compromise is a key feature of the *CCAA*, as is the supervising judge's oversight of that process. Where a plan is proposed, an application may be made to the supervising judge to order a creditors' meeting to vote on the proposed plan (*CCAA*, ss. 4 and 5). The supervising judge has the discretion to determine whether to order the meeting. For the purposes of voting at a creditors' meeting, the debtor company may divide the creditors into classes, subject to court approval (*CCAA*, s. 22(1)). Creditors may be included in the same class if "their interests or rights are sufficiently similar to give them a commonality of interest" (*CCAA*, s. 22(2); see also L. W. Houlden, G. B. Morawetz and J. P. Sarra, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada* (4th ed. (loose-leaf)), vol. 4, at §149). If the requisite "double majority" in each class of creditors — again, a majority in *number* of class members, which also represents two-thirds in *value* of the class members' claims — vote in favour of the plan, the supervising judge may sanction the plan (*ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 34; see *CCAA*, s. 6). The supervising judge will conduct what is commonly referred to as a "fairness hearing" to determine, among other things, whether the plan is fair and reasonable (Wood, at pp. 490-92; see also Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at p. 529; Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra at §45). Once sanctioned by the supervising judge, the plan is binding on each class of creditors that participated in the vote (*CCAA*, s. 6(1)).

58 Creditors with a provable claim against the debtor whose interests are affected by a proposed plan are usually entitled to vote on plans of arrangement (Wood, at p. 470). Indeed, there is no express provision in the *CCAA* barring such a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement, including a plan it sponsors.

59 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the appellants submit that a purposive interpretation of s. 22(3) of the *CCAA* reveals that, as a general matter, a creditor should be precluded from voting on its own plan. Section 22(3) provides:

Related creditors

(3) A creditor who is related to the company may vote against, but not for, a compromise or arrangement relating to the company.

The appellants note that s. 22(3) was meant to harmonize the *CCAA* scheme with s. 54(3) of the *BIA*, which provides that “[a] creditor who is related to the debtor may vote against but not for the acceptance of the proposal.” The appellants point out that, under s. 50(1) of the *BIA*, only debtors can sponsor plans; as a result, the reference to “debtor” in s. 54(3) captures *all* plan sponsors. They submit that if s. 54(3) captures all plan sponsors, s. 22(3) of the *CCAA* must do the same. On this basis, the appellants ask us to extend the voting restriction in s. 22(3) to apply not only to creditors who are “related to the company”, as the provision states, but to any creditor who sponsors a plan. They submit that this interpretation gives effect to the underlying intention of both provisions, which they say is to ensure that a creditor who has a conflict of interest cannot “dilute” or overtake the votes of other creditors.

60 We would not accept this strained interpretation of s. 22(3). Section 22(3) makes no mention of conflicts of interest between creditors and plan sponsors generally. The wording of s. 22(3) only places voting restrictions on creditors who are “related to the [debtor] company”. These words are “precise and unequivocal” and, as such, must “play a dominant role in the interpretive process” (*Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. R.*, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.), at para. 10). In our view, the appellants’ analogy to the *BIA* is not sufficient to overcome the plain wording of this provision.

61 While the appellants are correct that s. 22(3) was enacted to harmonize the treatment of related parties in the *CCAA* and *BIA*, its history demonstrates that it is not a general conflict of interest provision. Prior to the amendments incorporating s. 22(3) into the *CCAA*, the *CCAA* clearly allowed creditors to put forward a plan of arrangement (see Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra, at §33, *Red Cross; 1078385 Ontario Ltd., Re* (2004), 206 O.A.C. 17 (Ont. C.A.)). In contrast, under the *BIA*, only debtors could make proposals. Parliament is presumed to have been aware of this obvious difference between the two statutes (see *ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board)*, 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140 (S.C.C.), at para. 59; see also *Third Eye Capital Corporation*, at para. 57). Despite this difference, Parliament imported, with necessary modification, the wording of the *BIA* related creditor provision into the *CCAA*. Going beyond this language entails accepting that Parliament failed to choose the right words to give effect to its intention, which we do not.

62 Indeed, Parliament did not mindlessly reproduce s. 54(3) of the *BIA* in s. 22(3) of the *CCAA*. Rather, it made two modifications to the language of s. 54(3) to bring it into conformity with the language of the *CCAA*. First, it changed “proposal” (a defined term in the *BIA*) to “compromise or arrangement” (a term used throughout the *CCAA*). Second, it changed “debtor” to “company”, recognizing that companies are the only kind of debtor that exists in the *CCAA* context.

63 Our view is further supported by Industry Canada’s explanation of the rationale for s. 22(3) as being to “reduce the ability of *debtor companies* to organize a restructuring plan that confers additional benefits to *related parties*” (Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, *Bill C-12: Clause by Clause Analysis*, cl. 71, s. 22 (emphasis added); see also Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, at p. 151).

64 Finally, we note that the *CCAA* contains other mechanisms that attenuate the concern that a creditor with conflicting legal interests with respect to a plan it proposes may distort the creditors’ vote. Although we reject the appellants’ interpretation of s. 22(3), that section still bars creditors who are related to the debtor company from voting in favour of *any* plan. Additionally, creditors who do not share a sufficient commonality of interest may be forced to vote in separate classes (s. 22(1) and (2)), and, as we will explain, a supervising judge may bar a creditor from voting where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose.

(2) Discretion to Bar a Creditor From Voting in Furtherance of an Improper Purpose

65 There is no dispute that the *CCAA* is silent on when a creditor who is otherwise entitled to vote on a plan can be barred from voting. However, *CCAA* supervising judges are often called upon “to sanction measures for which there is no explicit authority in the *CCAA*” (*Century Services*, at para. 61; see also para. 62). In *Century Services*, this Court endorsed a “hierarchical” approach to determining whether jurisdiction exists to sanction a proposed measure: “courts [must] rely first on an interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* text before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a *CCAA* proceeding” (para. 65). In most circumstances, a purposive and liberal interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* will be sufficient “to ground measures necessary to achieve its objectives” (para. 65).

66 Applying this approach, we conclude that jurisdiction exists under s. 11 of the *CCAA* to bar a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement or compromise where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose.

67 Courts have long recognized that s. 11 of the *CCAA* signals legislative endorsement of the “broad reading of *CCAA* authority developed by the jurisprudence” (*Century Services*, at para. 68). Section 11 states:

General power of court

11 Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

On the plain wording of the provision, the jurisdiction granted by s. 11 is constrained only by restrictions set out in the *CCAA* itself, and the requirement that the order made be “appropriate in the circumstances”.

68 Where a party seeks an order relating to a matter that falls within the supervising judge’s purview, and for which there is no *CCAA* provision conferring more specific jurisdiction, s. 11 necessarily is the provision of first resort in anchoring jurisdiction. As Blair J.A. put it in *Stelco*, s. 11 “for the most part supplants the need to resort to inherent jurisdiction” in the *CCAA* context (para. 36).

69 Oversight of the plan negotiation, voting, and approval process falls squarely within the supervising judge’s purview. As indicated, there are no specific provisions in the *CCAA* which govern when a creditor who is otherwise eligible to vote on a plan may nonetheless be barred from voting. Nor is there any provision in the *CCAA* which suggests that a creditor has an absolute right to vote on a plan that cannot be displaced by a proper exercise of judicial discretion. However, given that the *CCAA* regime contemplates creditor participation in decision-making as an integral facet of the workout regime, creditors should only be barred from voting where the circumstances demand such an outcome. In other words, it is necessarily a discretionary, circumstance-specific inquiry.

70 Thus, it is apparent that s. 11 serves as the source of the supervising judge’s jurisdiction to issue a discretionary order barring a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement. The exercise of this discretion must further the remedial objectives of the *CCAA* and be guided by the baseline considerations of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence. This means that, where a creditor is seeking to exercise its voting rights in a manner that frustrates, undermines, or runs counter to those objectives — that is, acting for an “improper purpose” — the supervising judge has the discretion to bar that creditor from voting.

71 The discretion to bar a creditor from voting in furtherance of an improper purpose under the *CCAA* parallels the similar discretion that exists under the *BIA*, which was recognized in *Laserworks Computer Services Inc., Re*, 1998 NSCA 42, 165 N.S.R. (2d) 296 (N.S. C.A.). In *Laserworks Computer Services Inc.*, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal concluded that the discretion to bar a creditor from voting in this way stemmed from the court’s power, inherent in the scheme of the *BIA*, to supervise “[e]ach step in the bankruptcy process” (at para. 41), as reflected in ss. 43(7), 108(3), and 187(9) of the Act. The court explained that s. 187(9) specifically grants the power to remedy a “substantial injustice”, which arises “when the *BIA* is used for an improper purpose” (para. 54). The court held that “[a]n improper purpose is any purpose collateral to the purpose for which the bankruptcy and insolvency legislation was enacted by Parliament” (para. 54).

72 While not determinative, the existence of this discretion under the *BIA* lends support to the existence of similar discretion under the *CCAA* for two reasons.

73 First, this conclusion would be consistent with this Court’s recognition that the *CCAA* “offers a more flexible mechanism with *greater* judicial discretion” than the *BIA* (*Century Services*, at para. 14 (emphasis added)).

74 Second, this Court has recognized the benefits of harmonizing the two statutes to the extent possible. For example, in *Indalex*, the Court observed that “in order to avoid a race to liquidation under the *BIA*, courts will favour an interpretation of the *CCAA* that affords creditors analogous entitlements” to those received under the *BIA* (para. 51; see also *Century Services*, at para. 24; *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2015 ONCA 681, 391 D.L.R. (4th) 283 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 34-46). Thus, where the statutes are capable of bearing a harmonious interpretation, that interpretation ought to be preferred “to avoid the ills that can arise from [insolvency] ‘statute-shopping’” (*Kitchener Frame Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 234, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274, at para. 78; see also para. 73). In our view, the articulation of “improper purpose” set out in *Laserworks Computer Services Inc.* — that is, any purpose collateral to the purpose of insolvency legislation — is entirely harmonious with the nature and scope of judicial discretion afforded by the *CCAA*. Indeed, as we have explained, this discretion is to be exercised in accordance with the *CCAA*’s objectives as an insolvency statute.

75 We also observe that the recognition of this discretion under the *CCAA* advances the basic fairness that “permeates Canadian insolvency law and practice” (Sarra, “The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada’s Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency Law”, at p. 27; see also *Century Services*, at paras. 70 and 77). As Professor Sarra observes, fairness demands that supervising judges be in a position to recognize and meaningfully address circumstances in which parties are working against the goals of the statute:

The Canadian insolvency regime is based on the assumption that creditors and the debtor share a common goal of maximizing recoveries. The substantive aspect of fairness in the insolvency regime is based on the assumption that all involved parties face real economic risks. Unfairness resides where only some face these risks, while others actually benefit from the situation If the *CCAA* is to be interpreted in a purposive way, the courts must be able to recognize when people have conflicting interests and are working actively against the goals of the statute.

(“The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada’s Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency Law”, at p. 30)

In this vein, the supervising judge’s oversight of the *CCAA* voting regime must not only ensure strict compliance with the Act, but should further its goals as well. We are of the view that the policy objectives of the *CCAA* necessitate the recognition of the discretion to bar a creditor from voting where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose.

76 Whether this discretion ought to be exercised in a particular case is a circumstance-specific inquiry that must balance the various objectives of the *CCAA*. As this case demonstrates, the supervising judge is best-positioned to undertake this inquiry.

(3) *The Supervising Judge Did Not Err in Prohibiting Callidus From Voting*

77 In our view, the supervising judge’s decision to bar Callidus from voting on the New Plan discloses no error justifying appellate intervention. As we have explained, discretionary decisions like this one must be approached from the appropriate posture of deference. It bears mentioning that, when he made this decision, the supervising judge was intimately familiar with Bluberi’s *CCAA* proceedings. He had presided over them for over 2 years, received 15 reports from the Monitor, and issued approximately 25 orders.

78 The supervising judge considered the whole of the circumstances and concluded that Callidus’s vote would serve an improper purpose (paras. 45 and 48). We agree with his determination. He was aware that, prior to the vote on the First Plan, Callidus had chosen not to value *any* of its claim as unsecured and later declined to vote at all — despite the Monitor explicitly inviting it to do so⁴. The supervising judge was also aware that Callidus’s First Plan had failed to receive the other creditors’ approval at the creditors’ meeting of December 15, 2017, and that Callidus had chosen not to take the opportunity to amend or increase the value of its plan at that time, which it was entitled to do (see *CCAA*, ss. 6 and 7; Monitor, I.F., at

para. 17). Between the failure of the First Plan and the proposal of the New Plan — which was identical to the First Plan, save for a modest increase of \$250,000 — none of the factual circumstances relating to Bluberi’s financial or business affairs had materially changed. However, Callidus sought to value the *entirety* of its security at *nil* and, on that basis, sought leave to vote on the New Plan as an unsecured creditor. If Callidus were permitted to vote in this way, the New Plan would certainly have met the s. 6(1) threshold for approval. In these circumstances, the inescapable inference was that Callidus was attempting to strategically value its security to acquire control over the outcome of the vote and thereby circumvent the creditor democracy the *CCAA* protects. Put simply, Callidus was seeking to take a “second kick at the can” and manipulate the vote on the New Plan. The supervising judge made no error in exercising his discretion to prevent Callidus from doing so.

79 Indeed, as the Monitor observes, “[o]nce a plan of arrangement or proposal has been submitted to the creditors of a debtor for voting purposes, to order a second creditors’ meeting to vote on a substantially similar plan would not advance the policy objectives of the *CCAA*, nor would it serve and enhance the public’s confidence in the process or otherwise serve the ends of justice” (I.F., at para. 18). This is particularly the case given that the cost of having another meeting to vote on the New Plan would have been upwards of \$200,000 (see supervising judge’s reasons, at para. 72).

80 We add that Callidus’s course of action was plainly contrary to the expectation that parties act with due diligence in an insolvency proceeding — which, in our view, includes acting with due diligence in valuing their claims and security. At all material times, Bluberi’s Retained Claims have been the sole asset securing Callidus’s claim. Callidus has pointed to nothing in the record that indicates that the value of the Retained Claims has changed. Had Callidus been of the view that the Retained Claims had no value, one would have expected Callidus to have valued its security accordingly prior to the vote on the First Plan, if not earlier. Parenthetically, we note that, irrespective of the timing, an attempt at such a valuation may well have failed. This would have prevented Callidus from voting as an unsecured creditor, even in the absence of Callidus’s improper purpose.

81 As we have indicated, discretionary decisions attract a highly deferential standard of review. Deference demands that review of a discretionary decision begin with a proper characterization of the basis for the decision. Respectfully, the Court of Appeal failed in this regard. The Court of Appeal seized on the supervising judge’s somewhat critical comments relating to Callidus’s goal of being released from the Retained Claims and its conduct throughout the proceedings as being incapable of grounding a finding of improper purpose. However, as we have explained, these considerations did not drive the supervising judge’s conclusion. His conclusion was squarely based on Callidus’ attempt to manipulate the creditors’ vote to ensure that its New Plan would succeed where its First Plan had failed (see supervising judge’s reasons, at paras. 45-48). We see nothing in the Court of Appeal’s reasons that grapples with this decisive impropriety, which goes far beyond a creditor merely acting in its own self-interest.

82 In sum, we see nothing in the supervising judge’s reasons on this point that would justify appellate intervention. Callidus was properly barred from voting on the New Plan.

83 Before moving on, we note that the Court of Appeal addressed two further issues: whether Callidus is “related” to Bluberi within the meaning of s. 22(3) of the *CCAA*; and whether, if permitted to vote, Callidus should be ordered to vote in a separate class from Bluberi’s other creditors (see *CCAA*, s. 22(1) and (2)). Given our conclusion that the supervising judge did not err in barring Callidus from voting on the New Plan on the basis that Callidus was acting for an improper purpose, it is unnecessary to address either of these issues. However, nothing in our reasons should be read as endorsing the Court of Appeal’s analysis of them.

C. Bluberi’s LFA Should Be Approved as Interim Financing

84 In our view, the supervising judge made no error in approving the LFA as interim financing pursuant to s. 11.2 of the *CCAA*. Interim financing is a flexible tool that may take on a range of forms. As we will explain, third party litigation funding may be one such form. Whether third party litigation funding should be approved as interim financing is a case-specific inquiry that should have regard to the text of s. 11.2 and the remedial objectives of the *CCAA* more generally.

(1) Interim Financing and Section 11.2 of the CCAA

85 Interim financing, despite being expressly provided for in s. 11.2 of the *CCAA*, is not defined in the Act. Professor Sarra has described it as “refer[ring] primarily to the working capital that the debtor corporation requires in order to keep operating during restructuring proceedings, as well as to the financing to pay the costs of the workout process” (*Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, at p. 197). Interim financing used in this way — sometimes referred to as “debtor-in-possession” financing — protects the going-concern value of the debtor company while it develops a workable solution to its insolvency issues (p. 197; *Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re* (1999), 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at paras. 7, 9 and 24; *Boutiques San Francisco inc., Re* [2003 CarswellQue 13882 (C.S. Que.)], 2003 CanLII 36955, at para. 32). That said, interim financing is not limited to providing debtor companies with immediate operating capital. Consistent with the remedial objectives of the *CCAA*, interim financing at its core enables the preservation and realization of the value of a debtor’s assets.

86 Since 2009, s. 11.2(1) of the *CCAA* has codified a supervising judge’s discretion to approve interim financing, and to grant a corresponding security or charge in favour of the lender in the amount the judge considers appropriate:

Interim financing

11.2 (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company’s property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

87 The breadth of a supervising judge’s discretion to approve interim financing is apparent from the wording of s. 11.2(1). Aside from the protections regarding notice and pre-filing security, s. 11.2(1) does not mandate any standard form or terms.⁵ It simply provides that the financing must be in an amount that is “appropriate” and “required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement”.

88 The supervising judge may also grant the lender a “super-priority charge” that will rank in priority over the claims of any secured creditors, pursuant to s. 11.2(2):

Priority — secured creditors

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

89 Such charges, also known as “priming liens”, reduce lenders’ risks, thereby incentivizing them to assist insolvent companies (Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, *Archived — Bill C-55: clause by clause analysis*, last updated December 29, 2016 (online), cl. 128, s. 11.2; Wood, at p. 387). As a practical matter, these charges are often the only way to encourage this lending. Normally, a lender protects itself against lending risk by taking a security interest in the borrower’s assets. However, debtor companies under *CCAA* protection will often have pledged all or substantially all of their assets to other creditors. Accordingly, without the benefit of a super-priority charge, an interim financing lender would rank behind those other creditors (McElcheran, at pp. 298-99). Although super-priority charges do subordinate secured creditors’ security positions to the interim financing lender’s — a result that was controversial at common law — Parliament has indicated its general acceptance of the trade-offs associated with these charges by enacting s. 11.2(2) (see M. B. Rotsztein and A. Dostal, “Debtor-In-Possession Financing”, in S. Ben-Ishai and A. Duggan, eds., *Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: Bill C-55, Statute c. 47 and Beyond* (2007), 227, at pp. 228-229 and 240-50). Indeed, this balance was expressly considered by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce that recommended codifying interim financing in the *CCAA* (pp. 100-4).

90 Ultimately, whether proposed interim financing should be approved is a question that the supervising judge is best-placed to answer. The *CCAA* sets out a number of factors that help guide the exercise of this discretion. The inclusion of these factors in s. 11.2 was informed by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce’s view that they would help meet the “fundamental principles” that have guided the development of Canadian insolvency law, including

“fairness, predictability and efficiency” (p. 103; see also Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, cl. 128, s. 11.2). In deciding whether to grant interim financing, the supervising judge is to consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors:

Factors to be considered

- (4) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,
- (a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;
 - (b) how the company’s business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
 - (c) whether the company’s management has the confidence of its major creditors;
 - (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;
 - (e) the nature and value of the company’s property;
 - (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
 - (g) the monitor’s report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

(*CCAA*, s. 11.2(4))

91 Prior to the coming into force of the above provisions in 2009, courts had been using the general discretion conferred by s. 11 to authorize interim financing and associated super-priority charges (*Century Services*, at para. 62). Section 11.2 largely codifies the approaches those courts have taken (Wood, at p. 388; McElcheran, at p. 301). As a result, where appropriate, guidance may be drawn from the pre-codification interim financing jurisprudence.

92 As with other measures available under the *CCAA*, interim financing is a flexible tool that may take different forms or attract different considerations in each case. Below, we explain that third party litigation funding may, in appropriate cases, be one such form.

(2) Supervising Judges May Approve Third Party Litigation Funding as Interim Financing

93 Third party litigation funding generally involves “a third party, otherwise unconnected to the litigation, agree[ing] to pay some or all of a party’s litigation costs, in exchange for a portion of that party’s recovery in damages or costs” (R. K. Agarwal and D. Fenton, “Beyond Access to Justice: Litigation Funding Agreements Outside the Class Actions Context” (2017), 59 *Can. Bus. L. J.* 65, at p. 65). Third party litigation funding can take various forms. A common model involves the litigation funder agreeing to pay a plaintiff’s disbursements and indemnify the plaintiff in the event of an adverse cost award in exchange for a share of the proceeds of any successful litigation or settlement (see *Dugal v. Manulife Financial Corp.*, 2011 ONSC 1785, 105 O.R. (3d) 364 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Musicians’ Pension Fund of Canada (Trustee of)*).

94 Outside of the *CCAA* context, the approval of third party litigation funding agreements has been somewhat controversial. Part of that controversy arises from the potential of these agreements to offend the common law doctrines of champerty and maintenance.⁶ The tort of maintenance prohibits “officious intermeddling with a lawsuit which in no way belongs to one” (L. N. Klar et al., *Remedies in Tort* (loose-leaf), vol. 1, by L. Berry, ed., at p. 14-11, citing *Langtry v. Dumoulin* (1885), 7 O.R. 644 (Ont. Div. Ct.), at p. 661). Champerty is a species of maintenance that involves an agreement to share in the proceeds or otherwise profit from a successful suit (*McIntyre Estate v. Ontario (Attorney General)* (2002), 218 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 26).

95 Building on jurisprudence holding that *contingency fee* arrangements are not champertous where they are not

motivated by an improper purpose (e.g., *McIntyre Estate*), lower courts have increasingly come to recognize that *litigation funding* agreements are also not *per se* champertous. This development has been focussed within class action proceedings, where it arose as a response to barriers like adverse cost awards, which were stymieing litigants' access to justice (see *Dugal*, at para. 33; *Marcotte c. Banque de Montréal*, 2015 QCCS 1915 (C.S. Que.), at paras. 43-44 (CanLII); *Houle v. St. Jude Medical Inc.*, 2017 ONSC 5129, 9 C.P.C. (8th) 321 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 52, aff'd 2018 ONSC 6352, 429 D.L.R. (4th) 739 (Ont. Div. Ct.); see also *Stanway v. Wyeth Canada Inc.*, 2013 BCSC 1585, 56 B.C.L.R. (5th) 192 (B.C. S.C.), at para. 13). The jurisprudence on the approval of third party litigation funding agreements in the class action context — and indeed, the parameters of their legality generally — is still evolving, and no party before this Court has invited us to evaluate it.

96 That said, insofar as third party litigation funding agreements are not *per se* illegal, there is no principled basis upon which to restrict supervising judges from approving such agreements as interim financing in appropriate cases. We acknowledge that this funding differs from more common forms of interim financing that are simply designed to help the debtor “keep the lights on” (see *Royal Oak*, at paras. 7 and 24). However, in circumstances like the case at bar, where there is a single litigation asset that could be monetized for the benefit of creditors, the objective of maximizing creditor recovery has taken centre stage. In those circumstances, litigation funding furthers the basic purpose of interim financing: allowing the debtor to realize on the value of its assets.

97 We conclude that third party litigation funding agreements may be approved as interim financing in *CCAA* proceedings when the supervising judge determines that doing so would be fair and appropriate, having regard to all the circumstances and the objectives of the Act. This requires consideration of the specific factors set out in s. 11.2(4) of the *CCAA*. That said, these factors need not be mechanically applied or individually reviewed by the supervising judge. Indeed, not all of them will be significant in every case, nor are they exhaustive. Further guidance may be drawn from other areas in which third party litigation funding agreements have been approved.

98 The foregoing is consistent with the practice that is already occurring in lower courts. Most notably, in *Crystallex*, the Ontario Court of Appeal approved a third party litigation funding agreement in circumstances substantially similar to the case at bar. *Crystallex* involved a mining company that had the right to develop a large gold deposit in Venezuela. *Crystallex* eventually became insolvent and (similar to *Bluberi*) was left with only a single significant asset: a US\$3.4 billion arbitration claim against Venezuela. After entering *CCAA* protection, *Crystallex* sought the approval of a third party litigation funding agreement. The agreement contemplated that the lender would advance substantial funds to finance the arbitration in exchange for, among other things, a percentage of the net proceeds of any award or settlement. The supervising judge approved the agreement as interim financing pursuant to s. 11.2. The Court of Appeal unanimously found no error in the supervising judge's exercise of discretion. It concluded that s. 11.2 “does not restrict the ability of the supervising judge, where appropriate, to approve the grant of a charge securing financing before a plan is approved that may continue after the company emerges from *CCAA* protection” (para. 68).

99 A key argument raised by the creditors in *Crystallex* — and one that *Callidus* and the Creditors' Group have put before us now — was that the litigation funding agreement at issue was a plan of arrangement and not interim financing. This was significant because, if the agreement was in fact a plan, it would have had to be put to a creditors' vote pursuant to ss. 4 and 5 of the *CCAA* prior to receiving court approval. The court in *Crystallex* rejected this argument, as do we.

100 There is no definition of plan of arrangement in the *CCAA*. In fact, the *CCAA* does not refer to plans at all — it only refers to an “arrangement” or “compromise” (see ss. 4 and 5). The authors of *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada* offer the following general definition of these terms, relying on early English case law:

A “compromise” presupposes some dispute about the rights compromised and a settling of that dispute on terms that are satisfactory to the debtor and the creditor. An agreement to accept less than 100¢ on the dollar would be a compromise where the debtor disputes the debt or lacks the means to pay it. “Arrangement” is a broader word than “compromise” and is not limited to something analogous to a compromise. It would include any scheme for reorganizing the affairs of the debtor: *Re Guardian Assur. Co.*, [1917] 1 Ch. 431, 61 Sol. Jo 232, [1917] H.B.R. 113 (C.A.); *Re Refund of Dues under Timber Regulations*, [1935] A.C. 185 (P.C.).

(Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra, at §33)

101 The apparent breadth of these terms notwithstanding, they do have some limits. More recent jurisprudence suggests that they require, at minimum, some compromise of creditors' rights. For example, in *Crystallex* the litigation funding agreement at issue (known as the Tenor DIP facility) was held not to be a plan of arrangement because it did not "compromise the terms of [the creditors'] indebtedness or take away ... their legal rights" (para. 93). The Court of Appeal adopted the following reasoning from the lower court's decision, with which we substantially agree:

A "plan of arrangement" or a "compromise" is not defined in the *CCAA*. It is, however, to be an arrangement or compromise between a debtor and its creditors. The Tenor DIP facility is not on its face such an arrangement or compromise between *Crystallex* and its creditors. Importantly the rights of the noteholders are not taken away from them by the Tenor DIP facility. The noteholders are unsecured creditors. Their rights are to sue to judgment and enforce the judgment. If not paid, they have a right to apply for a bankruptcy order under the *BIA*. Under the *CCAA*, they have the right to vote on a plan of arrangement or compromise. None of these rights are taken away by the Tenor DIP.

(*Crystallex International Corp., Re*, 2012 ONSC 2125, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 50)

102 Setting out an exhaustive definition of plan of arrangement or compromise is unnecessary to resolve these appeals. For our purposes, it is sufficient to conclude that plans of arrangement require at least some compromise of creditors' rights. It follows that a third party litigation funding agreement aimed at extending financing to a debtor company to realize on the value of a litigation asset does not necessarily constitute a plan of arrangement. We would leave it to supervising judges to determine whether, in the particular circumstances of the case before them, a particular third party litigation funding agreement contains terms that effectively convert it into a plan of arrangement. So long as the agreement does not contain such terms, it may be approved as interim financing pursuant to s. 11.2 of the *CCAA*.

103 We add that there may be circumstances in which a third party litigation funding agreement may contain or incorporate a plan of arrangement (e.g., if it contemplates a plan for distribution of litigation proceeds among creditors). Alternatively, a supervising judge may determine that, despite an agreement itself not being a plan of arrangement, it should be packaged with a plan and submitted to a creditors' vote. That said, we repeat that third party litigation funding agreements are not necessarily, or even generally, plans of arrangement.

104 None of the foregoing is seriously contested before us. The parties essentially agree that third party litigation funding agreements *can* be approved as interim financing. The dispute between them focusses on whether the supervising judge erred in exercising his discretion to approve the LFA in the absence of a vote of the creditors, either because it was a plan of arrangement or because it should have been accompanied by a plan of arrangement. We turn to these issues now.

(3) *The Supervising Judge Did Not Err in Approving the LFA*

105 In our view, there is no basis upon which to interfere with the supervising judge's exercise of his discretion to approve the LFA as interim financing. The supervising judge considered the LFA to be fair and reasonable, drawing guidance from the principles relevant to approving similar agreements in the class action context (para. 74, citing *Musicians' Pension Fund of Canada (Trustee of)*, at para. 41; *Hayes*, at para. 4). In particular, he canvassed the terms upon which Bentham and Bluberi's lawyers would be paid in the event the litigation was successful, the risks they were taking by investing in the litigation, and the extent of Bentham's control over the litigation going forward (paras. 79 and 81). The supervising judge also considered the unique objectives of *CCAA* proceedings in distinguishing the LFA from ostensibly similar agreements that had not received approval in the class action context (paras. 81-82, distinguishing *Houle*). His consideration of those objectives is also apparent from his reliance on *Crystallex*, which, as we have explained, involved the approval of interim financing in circumstances substantially similar to the case at bar (see paras. 67 and 71). We see no error in principle or unreasonableness to this approach.

106 While the supervising judge did not canvass each of the factors set out in s. 11.2(4) of the *CCAA* individually before reaching his conclusion, this was not itself an error. A review of the supervising judge's reasons as a whole, combined with a recognition of his manifest experience with Bluberi's *CCAA* proceedings, leads us to conclude that the factors listed in s. 11.2(4) concern matters that could not have escaped his attention and due consideration. It bears repeating that, at the time of his decision, the supervising judge had been seized of these proceedings for well over two years and had the benefit of the

Monitor’s assistance. With respect to each of the s. 11.2(4) factors, we note that:

- the judge’s supervisory role would have made him aware of the potential length of Bluberi’s *CCAA* proceedings and the extent of creditor support for Bluberi’s management (s. 11.2(4)(a) and (c)), though we observe that these factors appear to be less significant than the others in the context of this particular case (see para. 96);
- the LFA itself explains “how the company’s business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings” (s. 11.2(4)(b));
- the supervising judge was of the view that the LFA would enhance the prospect of a viable plan, as he accepted (1) that Bluberi intended to submit a plan and (2) Bluberi’s submission that approval of the LFA would assist it in finalizing a plan “with a view towards achieving maximum realization” of its assets (at para. 68, citing 9354-9186 Québec inc. and 9354-9178 Québec inc.’s application, at para. 99; s. 11.2(4)(d));
- the supervising judge was apprised of the “nature and value” of Bluberi’s property, which was clearly limited to the Retained Claims (s. 11.2(4)(e));
- the supervising judge implicitly concluded that the creditors would not be materially prejudiced by the Litigation Financing Charge, as he stated that “[c]onsidering the results of the vote [on the First Plan], and given the particular circumstances of this matter, *the only potential recovery* lies with the lawsuit that the Debtors will launch” (at para. 91 (emphasis added); s. 11.2(4)(f)); and
- the supervising judge was also well aware of the Monitor’s reports, and drew from the most recent report at various points in his reasons (see, e.g., paras. 64-65 and fn. 1; s. 11.2(4)(g)). It is worth noting that the Monitor supported approving the LFA as interim financing.

107 In our view, it is apparent that the supervising judge was focussed on the fairness at stake to all parties, the specific objectives of the *CCAA*, and the particular circumstances of this case when he approved the LFA as interim financing. We cannot say that he erred in the exercise of his discretion. Although we are unsure whether the LFA was as favourable to Bluberi’s creditors as it might have been — to some extent, it does prioritize Bentham’s recovery over theirs — we nonetheless defer to the supervising judge’s exercise of discretion.

108 To the extent the Court of Appeal held otherwise, we respectfully do not agree. Generally speaking, our view is that the Court of Appeal again failed to afford the supervising judge the necessary deference. More specifically, we wish to comment on three of the purported errors in the supervising judge’s decision that the Court of Appeal identified.

109 First, it follows from our conclusion that LFAs can constitute interim financing that the Court of Appeal was incorrect to hold that approving the LFA as interim financing “transcended the nature of such financing” (para. 78).

110 Second, in our view, the Court of Appeal was wrong to conclude that the LFA was a plan of arrangement, and that *Crystallex* was distinguishable on its facts. The Court of Appeal held that the LFA and associated super-priority Litigation Financing Charge formed a plan because they subordinated the rights of Bluberi’s creditors to those of Bentham.

111 We agree with the supervising judge that the LFA is not a plan of arrangement because it does not propose any compromise of the creditors’ rights. To borrow from the Court of Appeal in *Crystallex*, Bluberi’s litigation claim is akin to a “pot of gold” (para. 4). Plans of arrangement determine how to distribute that pot. They do not generally determine what a debtor company should do to fill it. The fact that the creditors may walk away with more or less money at the end of the day does not change the nature or existence of their rights to access the pot once it is filled, nor can it be said to “compromise” those rights. When the “pot of gold” is secure — that is, in the event of any litigation or settlement — the net funds will be distributed to the creditors. Here, if the Retained Claims generate funds in excess of Bluberi’s total liabilities, the creditors will be paid in full; if there is a shortfall, a plan of arrangement or compromise will determine how the funds are distributed. Bluberi has committed to proposing such a plan (see supervising judge’s reasons, at para. 68, distinguishing *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.*, 2008 BCCA 327, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (B.C. C.A.)).

112 This is the very same conclusion that was reached in *Crystallex* in similar circumstances:

The facts of this case are unusual: there is a single “pot of gold” asset which, if realized, will provide significantly more than required to repay the creditors. The supervising judge was in the best position to balance the interests of all stakeholders. I am of the view that the supervising judge’s exercise of discretion in approving the Tenor DIP Loan was reasonable and appropriate, despite having the effect of constraining the negotiating position of the creditors.

... While the approval of the Tenor DIP Loan affected the Noteholders’ leverage in negotiating a plan, and has made the negotiation of a plan more complex, it did not compromise the terms of their indebtedness or take away any of their legal rights. It is accordingly not an arrangement, and a creditor vote was not required. [paras. 82 and 93]

113 We disagree with the Court of Appeal that *Crystallex* should be distinguished on the basis that it involved a single option for creditor recovery (i.e., the arbitration) while this case involves two (i.e., litigation of the Retained Claims and Callidus’s New Plan). Given the supervising judge’s conclusion that Callidus could not vote on the New Plan, that plan was not a viable alternative to the LFA. This left the LFA and litigation of the Retained Claims as the “only potential recovery” for Bluberi’s creditors (supervising judge’s reasons, at para. 91). Perhaps more significantly, even if there were multiple options for creditor recovery in either *Crystallex* or this case, the mere presence of those options would not necessarily have changed the character of the third party litigation funding agreements at issue or converted them into plans of arrangement. The question for the supervising judge in each case is whether the agreement before them ought to be approved as interim financing. While other options for creditor recovery may be relevant to that discretionary decision, they are not determinative.

114 We add that the Litigation Financing Charge does not convert the LFA into a plan of arrangement by “subordinat[ing]” creditors’ rights (C.A. reasons, at para. 90). We accept that this charge would have the effect of placing secured creditors like Callidus behind in priority to Bentham. However, this result is expressly provided for in s. 11.2 of the *CCAA*. This “subordination” does not convert statutorily authorized interim financing into a plan of arrangement. Accepting this interpretation would effectively extinguish the supervising judge’s authority to approve these charges without a creditors’ vote pursuant to s. 11.2(2).

115 Third, we are of the view that the Court of Appeal was wrong to decide that the supervising judge should have submitted the LFA together with a plan to the creditors for their approval (para. 89). As we have indicated, whether to insist that a debtor package their third party litigation funding agreement with a plan is a discretionary decision for the supervising judge to make.

116 Finally, at the appellants’ insistence, we point out that the Court of Appeal’s suggestion that the LFA is somehow “akin to an equity investment” was unhelpful and potentially confusing (para. 90). That said, this characterization was clearly *obiter dictum*. To the extent that the Court of Appeal relied on it as support for the conclusion that the LFA was a plan of arrangement, we have already explained why we believe the Court of Appeal was mistaken on this point.

VI. Conclusion

117 For these reasons, at the conclusion of the hearing we allowed these appeals and reinstated the supervising judge’s order. Costs were awarded to the appellants in this Court and the Court of Appeal.

*Appeal allowed.
Pourvoi accueilli.*

Footnotes

¹ Bluberi does not appear to have filed this claim yet (see 2018 QCCS 1040 (C.S. Que.), at para. 10 (CanLII)).

² Notably, the Creditors’ Group advised Callidus that it would lend its support to the New Plan. It also asked Callidus to reimburse any legal fees incurred in association with that support. At the same time, the Creditors’ Group did not undertake to vote in any particular way, and confirmed that each of its members would assess all available alternatives individually.

- ³ We note that while s. 36 now codifies the jurisdiction of a supervising court to grant a sale and vesting order, and enumerates factors to guide the court's discretion to grant such an order, it is silent on when courts ought to approve a liquidation under the *CCAA* as opposed to requiring the parties to proceed to liquidation under a receivership or the *BIA* regime (see Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at pp. 167-68; A. Nocilla, "Asset Sales Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Failure of Section 36" (2012) 52 *Can. Bus. L.J.* 226, at pp. 243-44 and 247). This issue remains an open question and was not put to this Court in either *Indalex* or these appeals.
- ⁴ It bears noting that the Monitor's statement in this regard did not decide whether Callidus would ultimately have been entitled to vote on the First Plan. Because Callidus did not even attempt to vote on the First Plan, this question was never put to the supervising judge.
- ⁵ A further exception has been codified in the 2019 amendments to the *CCAA*, which create s. 11.2(5) (see *Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No. 1*, s. 138). This section provides that at the time an initial order is sought, "no order shall be made under subsection [11.2](1) unless the court is also satisfied that the terms of the loan are limited to what is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period". This provision does not apply in this case, and the parties have not relied on it. However, it may be that it restricts the ability of supervising judges to approve LFAs as interim financing at the time of granting an Initial Order.
- ⁶ The extent of this controversy varies by province. In Ontario, champertous agreements are forbidden by statute (see *An Act respecting Champerty*, R.S.O. 1897, c. 327). In Quebec, concerns associated with champerty and maintenance do not arise as acutely because champerty and maintenance are not part of the law as such (see *Pole Lite Itée c. Banque Nationale du Canada*, 2006 QCCA 557, [2006] R.J.Q. 1009 (C.A. Que.); G. Michaud, "New Frontier: The Emergence of Litigation Funding in the Canadian Insolvency Landscape" in J. P. Sarra et al., eds., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2018* (2019), 221, at p. 231).