2024 Hfx No. 531463

SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C., c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OR ARRANGEMENT OF SALTWIRE NETWORK INC., THE HALIFAX HERALD LIMITED, HEADLINE PROMOTIONAL PRODUCTS LIMITED, TITAN SECURITY & INVESTIGATION INC., BRACE CAPITAL LIMITED AND BRACE HOLDINGS LIMITED

BETWEEN:

Fiera Private Debt Fund III LP and Fiera Private Date Fund V LP,
each by their general partner, Fiera Private Debt GP Inc.

Applicants

-and-

Saltwire Network Inc., The Halifax Herald Limited, Headline Promotional Products Limited, Titan Security & Investigation Inc., Brace Capital Limited and Brace Holdings Limited

Respondents

BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES

CHAITONS LLP
5000 Yonge Street, 10th Floor
Toronto, ON M2N 7E9

George Benchetrit
Tel: 416.218.1141
Email: george@chaitons.com

Lawyers for the Monitor

BURCHELL WICKWIRE BRYSON LLP
1801 Hollis Street, Suite 1800
Halifax, NS B3J 3N4

Marc Dunning
Tel: 902.482.7017
Email: mdunning@bwbllp.ca

Lawyers for the Monitor (Local Counsel)

TO: The Service List

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SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C., c. C-36, AS AMENDED

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Respondents

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TAB 1

DATE: 20011010
DOCKET: M27743

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

McMURTRY C.J.O., FINLAYSON and AUSTIN JJ.A.

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CONSUMERS PACKAGING INC., CONSUMERS INTERNATIONAL INC. and 164489 CANADA INC.

) Peter F.C. Howard, Patrick O'Kelly and
) Craig Martin, for Ardagh PLC
)
) Robert S. Harrison and Carole J. Hunter,
) for the *Ad Hoc* Noteholders Committee
)
) Daniel V. MacDonald and Paul G.
) Macdonald for Consumers Packaging
) Inc., Consumers International Inc. and
) 164489 Canada Inc.
)
) L. Joseph Latham and Elizabeth Moore,
) for the Toronto-Dominion Bank
) Syndicate
)
) Lily I. Harmer, for the United
) Steelworkers of America
)
) Marc Lavigne, for Anchor Glass
) Container Corp.
)
) Dale Denis, for Owens-Illinois, Inc.
)
) Terrence J. O'Sullivan, for KPMG Inc.
) (Court-appointed monitor)
)

) Heard: September 27, 2001

On appeal from the order of Justice James M. Farley dated August 31, 2001.

BY THE COURT:

[1] Ardagh PLC ("Ardagh"), seeks leave to appeal and if leave is granted appeals the Order of The Honourable Mr. Justice Farley dated August 31, 2001 which approved a sale of certain assets of Consumers Packaging Inc. and Consumers International Inc. and 164489 Canada Inc. (hereinafter collectively "Consumers") to Owens-Illinois, Inc. ("Owens-Illinois").

[2] Consumers had filed for protection under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "CCAA") on May 23, 2001 and Farley J. made an initial order on that date approving an amendment and forbearance agreement between Consumers and its institutional lenders and arranging interim credit. KPMG Inc. was appointed Monitor under s. 11.7 of the CCAA. On June 18, 2001 Farley J. authorized Consumers through an Independent Restructuring Committee and its Chief Restructuring Officer to fix a date upon which interested third parties were to submit firm, fully financed offers to purchase all or any part of Consumers' business. Both Ardagh and Owens-Illinois participated in the bid process. The Independent Restructuring Committee, the Chief Restructuring Officer and the Monitor agreed on behalf of Consumers that Owens-Illinois was the preferred bid. On the sale approval motion heard August 31, 2001, Farley J. found as a fact that Consumers was "quite sick" and "financially fragile" and that there "exists a material risk that [Consumers] will be destabilized by a withdrawal of funding by the [consortium of lenders] which have been continuously adamant about a September 2001 deadline for pay out."

[3] On the evidence before us, the Owens-Illinois bid approved by Farley J. on August 31, 2001 was the result of a fair and open process developed by Consumers and its professional advisors and carried out, after May 23, 2001, under the supervision of the court and with the participation of Ardagh. The Owens-Illinois bid provides more cash to Consumers' creditors than a proposal from Ardagh, has the least completion risk, is not conditional on financing, is likely to close in a reasonable period of time, is made by a credible purchaser (the largest glass bottle manufacturing company in the world) and will result in the continuation of Consumers' Canadian business, the retention of a vast majority of Consumers' 2,400 Canadian employees and the assumption by the purchaser of significant obligations under Consumers' employee pension plan. It is supported by all parties before this court with the exception of Ardagh.

[4] The respondents on this motion submit that the restructuring proposals put forward by Ardagh were not backed by financing commitments, required further due diligence by Ardagh and its lenders, could not be completed in a timely way, offered less by way of recovery to Consumers' creditors and were no more than proposals to negotiate. It appears to have been the unanimous view of the Monitor, Consumers' Independent Restructuring Committee and Consumers' Chief Restructuring Officer that Ardagh's proposals were not viable and would, if pursued, result in the liquidation of Consumers, resulting in lower return to creditors, loss of jobs and cessation of business operations. This view was accepted by Farley J. who stated in his endorsement approving the Owens-Illinois bid that it was the "only presently viable option better than a liquidation with substantially reduced realization of value".

[5] In our opinion, leave to appeal should not be granted. The authorities are clear that, due to the nature of CCAA proceedings, leave to appeal from orders made in the course of such proceedings should be granted sparingly: see *Algoma Steel Inc. (Re)*, a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal, delivered May 25, 2001, [2001] O.J. No. 1943 at p. 3. Leave to appeal should not be granted where, as in the present case, granting leave would be prejudicial to the prospects of restructuring the business for the benefit of the stakeholders as a whole, and hence would be contrary to the spirit and objectives of the CCAA. The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA. There is a real and substantial risk that granting leave to appeal in the present case will result in significant prejudice to Consumers and its stakeholders, in light of the significant time and financial constraints currently faced by Consumers. Both Farley J. and KPMG Inc., the court-appointed Monitor in the CCAA proceedings, have concluded that the Owens-Illinois bid represents the only presently viable option available to Consumers, which would be better than a liquidation.

[6] The transactions contemplated by the Owens-Illinois bid are expected to close on September 28, 2001. If the Owens-Illinois bid does not close before the end of September, 2001, it is uncertain if, and for how long, Consumers would be able to continue its operations. The financial institutions that are prepared to finance these transactions have appeared before this court and have advised, both before and throughout the CCAA proceedings, that they will not fund the operations of Consumers beyond the end of September, the time at which Consumers' credit requirements seasonally increase on an annual basis. There is no evidence on the record, and certainly none from Ardagh, as to the manner in which the operations of Consumers would be funded until the Ardagh proposal contained in its bid, if successful, could be implemented.

[7] Further, despite its protestations to the contrary, it is evident that Ardagh is a disappointed bidder that obtained its security interest in the assets of Consumers in order to participate in their restructuring and obtain a controlling equity position in the restructured entity. There is authority from this court that an unsuccessful bidder has no standing to appeal or to seek leave to appeal. As a general rule, unsuccessful bidders do not have standing to challenge a motion to approve a sale to another bidder (or to appeal from an order approving the sale) because the unsuccessful bidders "have no legal or proprietary right as technically they are not affected by the order": see the statement of Farley J., dealing with a receiver's motion to approve a sale, that is quoted with approval by O'Connor J.A. of this court in *Skyepharma plc v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 234 at 238 (C.A.). O'Connor J.A. went on to say at p. 242:

> There is a sound policy reason for restricting, to the extent possible, the involvement of prospective purchasers in sale approval motions. There is often a measure of urgency to complete court approved sales. This case is a good example. When unsuccessful purchasers become involved, there is a potential for greater delay and additional uncertainty. This potential may, in some situations, create commercial leverage in the hands [of] a disappointed would be purchaser which could be counterproductive to the best interests of those for whose benefit the sale is intended.

[8] The position of Ardagh is not advanced by the fact that it did not challenge the order of Farley J. of June 18, 2001 which set out the parameters for the bidding. Instead it participated in the bidding process which it now attacks as being *ultra vires* the CCAA.

[9] Finally, while we do not propose to become involved in the merits of the appeal, we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose and flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered.

[10] Accordingly, leave to appeal is refused with costs.

Released: OCT 10 2001
RRM

Signed: "R.R. McMurtry C.J.O."

“G.D. Finlayson J.A.”

“Austin J.A.”

TAB 2

COURT FILE NO.: 09-CL-7950
DATE: 20090723

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

RE: **IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF NORTEL NETWORKS CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, NORTEL NETWORKS GLOBAL CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

APPLICANTS

APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

BEFORE: **MORAWETZ J.**

COUNSEL: **Derrick Tay and Jennifer Stam, for Nortel Networks Corporation, et al**

Lyndon Barnes and Adam Hirsh, for the Board of Directors of Nortel Networks Corporation and Nortel Networks Limited

J. Carfagnini and J. Pasquariello, for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor

M. Starnino, for the Superintendent of Financial Services and Administrator of PBGF

S. Philpott, for the Former Employees

K. Zych, for Noteholders

Pamela Huff and Craig Thorburn, for MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P.

David Ward, for UK Pension Protection Fund

Leanne Williams, for Flextronics Inc.

Alex MacFarlane, for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

Arthur O. Jacques and Tom McRae, for Felske & Sylvain (de facto Continuing Employees' Committee)

Robin B. Schwill and Matthew P. Gottlieb, for Nortel Networks UK Limited

A. Kauffman, for Export Development Canada

D. Ullman, for Verizon Communications Inc.

G. Benchetrit, for IBM

HEARD & DECIDED: JUNE 29, 2009

ENDORSEMENT

INTRODUCTION

[1] On June 29, 2009, I granted the motion of the Applicants and approved the bidding procedures (the "Bidding Procedures") described in the affidavit of Mr. Riedel sworn June 23, 2009 (the "Riedel Affidavit") and the Fourteenth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "Monitor") (the "Fourteenth Report"). The order was granted immediately after His Honour Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court") approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

[2] I also approved the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 (the "Sale Agreement") among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens Networks" or the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks, Inc. ("NNI") and certain of their affiliates, as vendors (collectively the "Sellers") in the form attached as Appendix "A" to the Fourteenth Report and I also approved and accepted the Sale Agreement for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

[3] An order was also granted sealing confidential Appendix "B" to the Fourteenth Report containing the schedules and exhibits to the Sale Agreement pending further order of this court.

[4] The following are my reasons for granting these orders.

[5] The hearing on June 29, 2009 (the “Joint Hearing”) was conducted by way of video conference with a similar motion being heard by the U.S. Court. His Honor Judge Gross presided over the hearing in the U.S. Court. The Joint Hearing was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which had previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

[6] The Sale Agreement relates to the Code Division Multiple Access (“CMDA”) business Long-Term Evolution (“LTE”) Access assets.

[7] The Sale Agreement is not insignificant. The Monitor reports that revenues from CDMA comprised over 21% of Nortel’s 2008 revenue. The CDMA business employs approximately 3,100 people (approximately 500 in Canada) and the LTE business employs approximately 1,000 people (approximately 500 in Canada). The purchase price under the Sale Agreement is $650 million.

BACKGROUND

[8] The Applicants were granted CCAA protection on January 14, 2009. Insolvency proceedings have also been commenced in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and France.

[9] At the time the proceedings were commenced, Nortel’s business operated through 143 subsidiaries, with approximately 30,000 employees globally. As of January 2009, Nortel employed approximately 6,000 people in Canada alone.

[10] The stated purpose of Nortel’s filing under the CCAA was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. The Monitor reported that a thorough strategic review of the company’s assets and operations would have to be undertaken in consultation with various stakeholder groups.

[11] In April 2009, the Monitor updated the court and noted that various restructuring alternatives were being considered.

[12] On June 19, 2009, Nortel announced that it had entered into the Sale Agreement with respect to its assets in its CMDA business and LTE Access assets (collectively, the “Business”) and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business units. Mr. Riedel in his affidavit states that Nortel has spent many months considering various restructuring alternatives before determining in its business judgment to pursue “going concern” sales for Nortel’s various business units.

[13] In deciding to pursue specific sales processes, Mr. Riedel also stated that Nortel’s management considered:

(a) the impact of the filings on Nortel’s various businesses, including deterioration in sales; and

(b) the best way to maximize the value of its operations, to preserve jobs and to continue businesses in Canada and the U.S.

[14] Mr. Riedel notes that while the Business possesses significant value, Nortel was faced with the reality that:

(a) the Business operates in a highly competitive environment;

(b) full value cannot be realized by continuing to operate the Business through a restructuring; and

(c) in the absence of continued investment, the long-term viability of the Business would be put into jeopardy.

[15] Mr. Riedel concluded that the proposed process for the sale of the Business pursuant to an auction process provided the best way to preserve the Business as a going concern and to maximize value and preserve the jobs of Nortel employees.

[16] In addition to the assets covered by the Sale Agreement, certain liabilities are to be assumed by the Purchaser. This issue is covered in a comprehensive manner at paragraph 34 of the Fourteenth Report. Certain liabilities to employees are included on this list. The assumption of these liabilities is consistent with the provisions of the Sale Agreement that requires the Purchaser to extend written offers of employment to at least 2,500 employees in the Business.

[17] The Monitor also reports that given that certain of the U.S. Debtors are parties to the Sale Agreement and given the desire to maximize value for the benefit of stakeholders, Nortel determined and it has agreed with the Purchaser that the Sale Agreement is subject to higher or better offers being obtained pursuant to a sale process under s. 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the Sale Agreement shall serve as a "stalking horse" bid pursuant to that process.

[18] The Bidding Procedures provide that all bids must be received by the Seller by no later than July 21, 2009 and that the Sellers will conduct an auction of the purchased assets on July 24, 2009. It is anticipated that Nortel will ultimately seek a final sales order from the U.S. Court on or about July 28, 2009 and an approval and vesting order from this court in respect of the Sale Agreement and purchased assets on or about July 30, 2009.

[19] The Monitor recognizes the expeditious nature of the sale process but the Monitor has been advised that given the nature of the Business and the consolidation occurring in the global market, there are likely to be a limited number of parties interested in acquiring the Business.

[20] The Monitor also reports that Nortel has consulted with, among others, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "UCC") and the bondholder group regarding the Bidding Procedures and is of the view that both are supportive of the timing of this sale process. (It is noted that the UCC did file a limited objection to the motion relating to certain aspects of the Bidding Procedures.)

[21] Given the sale efforts made to date by Nortel, the Monitor supports the sale process outlined in the Fourteenth Report and more particularly described in the Bidding Procedures.

[22] Objections to the motion were filed in the U.S. Court and this court by MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P. (collectively, "MatlinPatterson") as well the UCC.

[23] The objections were considered in the hearing before Judge Gross and, with certain limited exceptions, the objections were overruled.

ISSUES AND DISCUSSION

[24] The threshold issue being raised on this motion by the Applicants is whether the CCAA affords this court the jurisdiction to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise or arrangement and a creditor vote. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the secondary issue is whether this sale should authorize the Applicants to sell the Business.

[25] The Applicants submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence that this court has the jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve the sales process and that the requested order should be granted in these circumstances.

[26] Counsel to the Applicants submitted a detailed factum which covered both issues.

[27] Counsel to the Applicants submits that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to preserve the going concern value of debtors companies and that the court's jurisdiction extends to authorizing sale of the debtor's business, even in the absence of a plan or creditor vote.

[28] The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

[29] The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest". *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5^{th}) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused [2008] SCCA 337. ("ATB Financial").

[30] The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

(a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the CCAA;

(b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and

(c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to "fill in the gaps" of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 43; *Re PSINet Ltd.* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 5, *ATB Financial, supra*, at paras. 43-52.

[31] However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

> Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

[32] In support of the court's jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that Nortel seeks to invoke the "overarching policy" of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Re Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc*. (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

[33] Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or "the whole economic community":

> The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 167 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc*. (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

[34] Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor's stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

[35] Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the best interests of stakeholders generally. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, *Re PSINet, supra*, *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, *Re Stelco Inc*. (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 1, *Re Tiger Brand Knitting Co*. (2005) 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315, *Re Caterpillar*

Financial Services Ltd. v. Hardrock Paving Co. (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 and *Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3rd) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

[36] In *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

> The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.
>
> …we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra, at paras. 5, 9.*

[37] Similarly, in *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved by creditors. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, at paras. 43, 45.

[38] Similarly, in *PSINet Limited, supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

> [If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees. *Re PSINet Limited, supra*, at para. 3.

[39] In *Re Stelco Inc*., *supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

> I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring – and if a restructuring of the "old company" is not

> feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra*, at para. 1.

[40] I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

[41] Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Re Boutique San Francisco Inc*. (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (Quebec S. C.), *Re Winnipeg Motor Express Inc*. (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44, and *Re Calpine Canada Energy Limited* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.

[42] Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan "will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale…be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp*. (2008), 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C.C.A.) ("*Cliffs Over Maple Bay*"), the court was faced with a debtor who had no active business but who nonetheless sought to stave off its secured creditor indefinitely. The case did not involve any type of sale transaction but the Court of Appeal questioned whether a court should authorize the sale under the CCAA without requiring the matter to be voted upon by creditors.

[43] In addressing this matter, it appears to me that the British Columbia Court of Appeal focussed on whether the court should grant the requested relief and not on the question of whether a CCAA court has the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

[44] I do not disagree with the decision in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. However, it involved a situation where the debtor had no active business and did not have the support of its stakeholders. That is not the case with these Applicants.

[45] The *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* decision has recently been the subject of further comment by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Asset Engineering L.P. v. Forest and Marine Financial Limited Partnership* (2009) B.C.C.A. 319.

[46] At paragraphs 24 - 26 of the *Forest and Marine* decision, Newbury J.A. stated:

> 24. In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*, the debtor company was a real estate developer whose one project had failed. The company had been dormant for some time. It applied for CCAA protection but described its proposal for restructuring in vague terms that amounted essentially to a plan to "secure sufficient funds" to complete the stalled project (Para. 34). This court, per Tysoe J.A., ruled that although the

> Act can apply to single-project companies, its purposes are unlikely to be engaged in such instances, since mortgage priorities are fully straight forward and there will be little incentive for senior secured creditors to compromise their interests (Para. 36). Further, the Court stated, the granting of a stay under s. 11 is "not a free standing remedy that the court may grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a "restructuring"…Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the CCAA, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the CCAA's fundamental purpose". That purpose has been described in Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.):
>
>> The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allow a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. [at 580]
>
> 25. The Court was not satisfied in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* that the "restructuring" contemplated by the debtor would do anything other than distribute the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation of its business. The debtor had no intention of proposing a plan of arrangement, and its business would not continue following the execution of its proposal – thus it could not be said the purposes of the statute would be engaged…
>
> 26. In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself which fills a "niche" in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The "fundamental purpose" of the Act – to preserve the *status quo* while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned – will be furthered by granting a stay so that the <u>means</u> contemplated by the Act – a compromise or arrangement – can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary…

[47] It seems to me that the foregoing views expressed in *Forest and Marine* are not inconsistent with the views previously expressed by the courts in Ontario. The CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and a sale by the debtor which preserves its business as a going concern is, in my view, consistent with those objectives.

[48] I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

[49] I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

(a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?

(b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?

(c) do any of the debtors' creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?

(d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

[50] It is the position of the Applicants that Nortel's proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

[51] Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

(a) Nortel has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;

(b) in the exercise of its business judgment, Nortel has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;

(c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;

(d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;

(e) the auction process will serve to ensure Nortel receives the highest possible value for the Business;

(f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the best interests of Nortel and its stakeholders; and

(g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

[52] The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

[53] Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that Nortel will return to court to seek approval of the most favourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3rd) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

DISPOSITION

[54] The Applicants are part of a complicated corporate group. They carry on an active international business. I have accepted that an important factor to consider in a CCAA process is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern. I am satisfied having considered the factors referenced at [49], as well as the facts summarized at [51], that the Applicants have met this test. I am therefore satisfied that this motion should be granted.

[55] Accordingly, I approve the Bidding Procedures as described in the Riedel Affidavit and the Fourteenth Report of the Monitor, which procedures have been approved by the U.S. Court.

[56] I am also satisfied that the Sale Agreement should be approved and further that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted for the purposes of conducting the “stalking horse” bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, without limitation the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

[57] Further, I have also been satisfied that Appendix B to the Fourteenth Report contains information which is commercially sensitive, the dissemination of which could be detrimental to the stakeholders and, accordingly, I order that this document be sealed, pending further order of the court.

[58] In approving the Bidding Procedures, I have also taken into account that the auction will be conducted prior to the sale approval motion. This process is consistent with the practice of this court.

[59] Finally, it is the expectation of this court that the Monitor will continue to review ongoing issues in respect of the Bidding Procedures. The Bidding Procedures permit the Applicants to waive certain components of qualified bids without the consent of the UCC, the bondholder group and the Monitor. However, it is the expectation of this court that, if this situation arises, the Applicants will provide advance notice to the Monitor of its intention to do so.

MORAWETZ J.

Heard and Decided: June 29, 2009

Reasons Released: July 23, 2009

TAB 3

CITATION: PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc. (Re), 2012 ONSC 3367
COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-9656-00CL
DATE: 20120609

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

COMMERCIAL LIST

RE: IN THE MATTER OF the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended;

AND IN THE MATTER OF a plan of compromise or arrangement of PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc. and 2163279 Ontario Inc., Applicants

BEFORE: D. M. Brown J.

COUNSEL: S. Babe and I. Aversa, for the Applicants

M. Wasserman and J. MacDonald, for the Monitor, PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc.

J. Porter and A. Shepherd, for 2320714 Ontario Inc., the DIP Lender

B. O'Neill, for Castcan Investments (secured creditor)

R. M. Slattery, for Royal Bank of Canada (secured creditor)

M. Laugesen and G. Finlayson, for the Successful Bidder, DashRx, LLC

C. Besant, for Walgreen Co.

A. Scotchmer, for Lanworks Inc.

P. Saunders, a shareholder, for himself and other shareholders

B. Jaffe, for Merge, a potential bidder

S-A. Wilson, for Dan Brintnell, a shareholder

HEARD: June 5 and 6, 2012

REASONS FOR DECISION

I. Request for sale approval, vesting and distribution orders under the *CCAA*

[1] PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc. and 2163279 Ontario Inc. move under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* for orders approving the agreement of purchase and

sale between the Applicants and DashRx, LLC ("DashRx") dated May 29, 2012 (the "Purchase Agreement"), vesting the Purchased Assets in DashRx and distributing the sale proceeds, together with certain other related orders, including the termination of this *CCAA* proceeding.

[2] At the continuation of the hearing on June 6, 2012, I granted the requested orders. These are my reasons for so doing.

II. The proposed sale

A. The sales and investor solicitation process

[3] The Applicants are healthcare technology companies which were developing an automated pharmacy dispensing platform. They were in the pre-commercialization phase of operations and encountered financing difficulties. The Initial Order under the *CCAA* was made by Morawetz J. on March 23, 2012; it appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. as Monitor.

[4] The subsequent history of this matter is set out my previous Reasons.[1]

[5] On May 14, 2012, I approved a sale and investor solicitation process ("SISP"). The Applicants developed the SISP with the assistance of the Monitor, the Monitor's agent, PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate Finance Inc. ("PwCCF") and the DIP Lender. The SISP sought to maximize stakeholder value either through (i) a going concern sale of the Applicants' business and assets or (ii) new investment and a plan of compromise or arrangement. The SISP set out the procedural and substantive requirements for a qualified purchase or investment bid (a "Qualified Bid").

[6] A feature of the approved SISP was the DIP Lender's "stalking horse" bid under which the DIP Lender would pay the Stalking Horse Price by a release of the DIP Indebtedness and the assumption of the outstanding senior secured claims. The terms of the Stalking Horse Bid were not required to be emulated in other Qualified Bids; the Stalking Horse Bid served to set a floor price in the SISP. The Stalking Horse Agreement was posted in the Applicants' data-room.

[7] The SISP was conducted by the Applicants with the support and assistance of the Monitor. Under the terms of the SISP, bids were due by 12:00 p.m. on May 24, 2012. Two bids, including the DashRx bid, were received before the Bid Deadline, and one further bid was received on May 24, 2012, but after the Bid Deadline. These three bids were reviewed in a series of meetings held by the Applicants, the DIP Lender, the Monitor and their counsel on May 24 and May 25, 2012.

[1] April 20, 2012 (2012 ONSC 2423); May 5, 2012 (2012 ONSC 2714); May 8 (2012 ONSC 2778); May 14, 2012 (2012 ONSC 2840); May 28, 2012 (2012 ONSC 3147).

[8] In a Confidential Appendix to its Seventh Report the Monitor described the financial terms of each bid and disclosed the materials filed by each bidder, as well as the written communications with each bidder.

B. The Unsuccessful Bids

[9] As described in detail in the evidence, the bid submitted by Unsuccessful Bidder 1 was received the evening of May 24, but provided no cash consideration to the Applicants. On the evening of May 25, 2012, Applicants' counsel sent a letter to Unsuccessful Bidder 1 advising that its bid was not a Qualified Bid and that certain additional details would need to be provided before it could be considered a Qualified Bid. Unsuccessful Bidder 1 did not respond to the request for clarification and its bid was not treated as a Qualified Bid.

[10] By letter dated May 23 Unsuccessful Bidder 2 offered to buy PCAS for cash. On May 23 the Applicants wrote to Unsuccessful Bidder 2 about how it would need to alter its bid to satisfy the requirements for a Qualified Bid in the SISP. Notwithstanding follow-up communications, Unsuccessful Bidder 2 did not respond to the Applicants' inquiries until Sunday, May 27, 2012 and it did not provide any material new information. The bid by Unsuccessful Bidder 2 therefore was not treated as a Qualified Bid under the SISP.

C. The Successful Bid

The purchaser

[11] DashRx is a Delaware limited liability corporation formed by a large, California-based investment fund to purchase the assets of the Applicants. The fund's Investment Manager has approximately US$500 million in assets under management, almost exclusively in the health care and pharmaceutical sectors.

[12] On May 24, 2012, prior to the bid deadline, DashRx submitted a version of the Purchase Agreement. It was the only bid received in the form of a formal asset purchase agreement. DashRx also remitted a cash deposit to the Monitor.

[13] The Investment Manager had been performing due diligence and engaging in talks with the Applicants for several months prior to the commencement of the *CCAA* proceedings with an aim to investing in or purchasing PCAS. A major U.S. retail pharmacy chain, Walgreen Co. is participating in the Successful Bid as a substantial investor in DashRx. Walgreen was the potential large U.S. customer identified in previous evidence in this proceeding.

[14] The Monitor requested that it be allowed to reveal the name of the Investment Manager; the latter expressed a strong preference that its identity not be disclosed. Against that background the Monitor reported that it had requested independent evidence of the financial position of the Investment Manager:

> [T]he Monitor has received additional information regarding the Investment Manager and is satisfied that the Purchaser should have the financial wherewithal to close the

transaction. The Purchaser and Walgreens have shown their commitment by jointly paying the deposit and agreeing to fund the operating needs of the Company to June 6, 2012 (with a cap of $250,000). The Monitor also notes that Walgreens' participation provides another source of financial support to the Purchaser.

[15] By May 27, 2012, following further negotiations and an enhancement of the DashRx bid to permit some recovery for unsecured creditors, the material terms of the DashRx Purchase Agreement were settled to a point that the Applicants, in consultation with the DIP Lender and the Monitor, were prepared to recognize the Purchase Agreement as a Qualified Bid, as a bid superior to the Stalking Horse Bid, and to identify it as the Successful Bid under the SISP, subject to final negotiation of the APA.

[16] The Purchase Agreement was finalized, executed and delivered by the parties on June 1, 2012. DashRx committed to provide $250,000 to fund the Applicants' operations from May 31, 2012 until closing on June 6. That funding was received on May 31, 2012.

Purchased and Excluded Assets

[17] Under the Purchase Agreement the purchaser will acquire Purchased Assets on an "as is, where is" basis. Certain tax credit entitlements are treated as Excluded Assets.

The purchase price and consideration

[18] The consideration payable under the Purchase Agreement is a combination of the assumption of secured liabilities, cash, and the issuance of secured and unsecured convertible promissory notes to the Applicants' creditors, including unsecured creditors. The Applicants do not expect that there will be any surplus proceeds from the transaction for PCAS shareholders.

[19] The cash portion of the purchase price is designated for:

(i) distribution in payment of all statutory priority claims, comprised of approximately $235,000 in accrued and unpaid vacation pay;

(ii) distribution to the DIP Lender to be used by the DIP Lender:

a. first, to obtain the consent of the Senior Secured Creditors, RBC and Castcan, to the discharge of their security interests and charges over the Purchased Assets and to obtain their consent for the issuance of an approval and vesting order in respect of the Sale Agreement; and,

b. as to the balance, in partial satisfaction of the DIP Indebtedness;

(iii) payment of the amounts payable under the court-approved key employee retention plan; and

(iv) payment of $100,000 to the Applicants, in trust for a trustee in bankruptcy to be appointed in respect of the Applicants, and the other direct and indirect subsidiaries of PCAS, to pay for the costs of administering their anticipated bankruptcies

[20] The non-cash portion of the purchase price in the transaction will be comprised of:

(i) the assumption of the secured obligations to IBM;

(ii) interest-bearing promissory notes issued in favour of the DIP Lender, secured against the assets of DashRx and ranking junior only to the secured assumed obligations to IBM ("Secured Note"); and,

(iii) interest-bearing unsecured promissory notes issued to the Applicants, in trust, for the pool of unsecured creditors of the Applicants ("Unsecured Note").

[21] At the commencement of the hearing on June 5 one unsecured creditor, Lanworks, raised concerns about the lack of transparency regarding the terms of the Unsecured Notes. The details of the terms of the Notes had been placed in the Monitor's Confidential Appendix. Prior to the resumption of the hearing on June 6 Lanworks was provided with information about the terms of the Unsecured Note, as a result of which Lanworks indicated that it neither consented to nor opposed the orders sought. The terms of the Secured and Unsecured Notes were finalized by the time of the continuation of the hearing on June 6.

Proposed releases

[22] In its Seventh Report the Monitor noted that under the terms of the Purchase Agreement certain claims against former employees of the Applicants were included in the Purchased Assets and the Agreement required the Applicants to deliver a broad release in favour of the Purchaser and related parties. The Monitor observed that the releases were negotiated as part of the comprehensive arrangements in respect of the transactions contemplated by the Agreement.

Proposed occupancy agreements

[23] A condition of the Sale Agreement was that PCAS provided DashRx with post-Closing occupancy and access to the Applicants' leased premises at 2440 Winston Park Drive. DashRx will pay all rent and other occupancy costs and will indemnify the Applicants. The Applicants are seeking approval of, and authorization to enter into, an occupancy agreement with DashRx.

III. The proposed distribution of sale proceeds

[24] The Applicants seek an order under which the sale proceeds would be distributed to the following persons or groups:

(i) To use $235,315 to satisfy statutory priority claims relating to employee accrued and unpaid vacation pay claims;

(ii) To pay the cash component of the purchase price to the DIP Lender to be used by the DIP Lender (i) to obtain the consent of the secured creditors, RBC and Castcan Investments Inc., to discharge their security interests and charges over the Purchased Assets and (ii) as to the balance, to make partial repayment of the DIP Lending Facility;

(iii)To distribute $261,000 to the beneficiaries of the KERP Charge; and,

(iv)To pay $100,000 to PwC, the proposed Trustee in Bankruptcy, for fees in connection with the anticipated bankruptcies of the Applicants.

Payment to the DIP Lender

[25] The only parties claiming interests in priority to the DIP Lender are IBM, RBC and Castcan. The Purchaser will assume the liability for IBM. As to RBC and Castcan, at the time the DIP Lending Facility was put in place the DIP Lender negotiated a Pari Passu Agreement with RBC and Castcan. An issue arose concerning the validity of the security taken by Castcan in respect of certain assets, specifically Harmonized Sales Tax Refunds (the "HST Refunds"). I will discuss that issue in more detail below. For present purposes, suffice it to say that the Applicants propose that upon paying out the claims of the Senior Secured Creditors from the cash proceeds received on Closing, the DIP Lender will be subrogated to and/or take an assignment of the Senior Secured Creditor's claims. The Applicants are expected to receive sizable tax credit entitlements within a matter of weeks. Those entitlements are Excluded Assets under the Purchase Agreement. As a result, any claims on them will not be vested out by operation of the proposed Approval and Vesting Order.

[26] Against this background the Applicants seek an order authorizing and directing them, and any Trustee, to distribute to the DIP Lender amounts equal to any specified tax credit entitlements received. Such distributions would enable the DIP Lender to recoup part of the purchase price it will flow through to one of the Senior Secured Creditors – Castcan - on Closing.

[27] If the aggregate amount of all tax credit entitlements received by the Applicants/Trustee post-Closing and distributed to the DIP Lender end up being less than the aggregate amount that the DIP Lender paid to RBC and Castcan out of the cash proceeds of the Transaction on Closing, then the DIP Lender will be issued an Additional Secured Note to cover the difference. The amount of the Additional Secured Note will come out of the pool of funds otherwise set aside for the unsecured creditors of the Applicants. The Unsecured Note therefore will be less than the total pool of possible proceeds for unsecured creditors, and an additional Unsecured Note will be issued to the Trustee for the benefit of the unsecured creditors once the face amount of the Additional Secured Note is known.

[28] Although the DIP Indebtedness is not being paid out in full on Closing, the DIP Lender has consented to the payments of cash on account of the KERP and the future costs of bankruptcy estate administration.

[29] Under the Initial Order the Directors' Charge ranked ahead of the KERP Charge. The Applicants asked the Court to terminate the Directors' Charge. Those benefiting from the Directors' Charge did not oppose that request.

KERP employees

[30] The KERP originally benefitted twenty employees and allowed for a total maximum allocation of $500,000. The KERP was to be paid in the following installments: (i) 20% upon the raising of $8,000,000 for funding the DIP Facility, and PCAS receiving the authorization of this Court to borrow up to or in excess of that amount; (ii) 20% at the midway mark of the SISP; and, (iii) the balance of 60% upon the earliest of (i) the closing of a sale of all or substantially all of the assets, property and undertaking of the Applicants, or (ii) Court approval and sanction of a plan of arrangement or compromise in the *CCAA* Proceedings.

[31] The commitment under the DIP Facility never reached $8 million, so the initial payment was not made. The second scheduled 20% payment was made on May 25, 2012. Payment of the 60% balance will be made from the cash proceeds on closing. Due to attrition, only sixteen employees remain in the KERP. The final 60% installment payable from the transaction proceeds will total $242,100, resulting in total KERP payments of $322,800.

IV. Positions of the Parties

[32] The Senior Secured Creditors supported the orders sought by the Applicants. The Monitor recommended that the Court grant the orders. As noted, one unsecured creditor, Lanworks, sought to obtain further information and, on so doing, advised that it neither consented to nor opposed the orders sought. No other creditors appeared on the return of the motion.

[33] The hearing of the motion started at 4:45 p.m. on June 5, 2012. At that time Mr. Peter Saunders, a shareholder, stated that he appeared on behalf of himself and other shareholders. He read a statement which expressed concern about the bidding process, and Mr. Saunders indicated that he and other shareholders would be meeting with counsel at 8:00 a.m. on June 6. Over the opposition of the Applicants and the Purchaser, I adjourned the hearing to June 6 at 10:00 a.m.

[34] On June 6 Mr. Saunders returned, but without counsel. Ms. Wilson appeared for the first time on behalf of another shareholder, Mr. Dan Brintnell, and asked to make submissions. Also, Mr. Jaffe appeared on behalf of a potential bidder, Merge, which had not participated in the SISP and asked for leave to submit an offer. What then transpired was described in the following portions of my handwritten endorsement of June 6:

This is the continuation of the approval/vesting/distribution motion commenced yesterday @ 4:45 p.m. At yesterday's hearing I asked questions of counsel for the applicants, Monitor and DIP lender on certain points and was provided answers.

…

Yesterday Mr. Peter Saunders, a shareholder, on behalf of himself and some other SHs, read a statement dated June 5/12 expressing concern about the bidding process. Mr. Saunders indicated they would be meeting counsel today @ 8 a.m. I adj'd the matter to 10 a.m. today to facilitate that meeting. This morning Mr. Saunders advised that counsel was unable to meet them; they plan to meet this afternoon. Mr. Saunders indicated that their counsel would like a 5-day adjm't of this motion.

I will not grant the requested adjm't. By reasons dated May 14/12 I approved the SISP. By reasons dated May 28 I granted an extension of the stay until June 6. Both Reasons made clear the urgent nature of the SISP in the particular circumstances of these companies. No appeal was taken from, nor stay sought in respect of, either order. The public portion of the present motion materials provide detailed information about the conduct of the SISP and the bids. The portions sought to be sealed meet the test in *Sierra Club*. From previous motions I am aware that the applicants have communicated frequently with shareholders; the Monitor has posted all materials on its website.

I am satisfied in the circumstances reasonable notice of this motion and the SISP has been given to all affected parties. The shareholders have not previously participated; that was their choice. It is unreasonable for them to seek to adjourn matters at this stage. The applicants run out of money tomorrow; the shareholders offer no concrete alternative.

After writing these Reasons, on my return to Court, I was advised by counsel for Merge that they only learned of the sale process on May 30 and now wish to tender an Offer. I did not accept the Offer. The SISP was an open and transparent process. The OCA in *Soundair* spoke about the need to maintain the integrity of a court-approved sale process.[2] I am not prepared to accept an offer at this late stage. I note [that] Merge did not have counsel at yesterday's hearing.

Ms. Wilson appeared for a SH, Dan Brintnell. After obtaining instructions, Ms. Wilson advised she had no further submissions.

[2] *Royal Bank v. Soundair* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.). See in particular the Reasons of Galligan J.A. at pp. 7d to 10c.

V. Analysis of the proposed sale transaction

A. Guiding legal principles

[35] In most circumstances resort is made to the *CCAA* to “permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets” and to create “conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all”. The reality, however, is that “reorganizations of differing complexity require different legal mechanisms.” This has led courts to recognize that the *CCAA* may be used to sell substantially all of the assets of a debtor company to preserve it as a going concern under new ownership, or to wind-up or liquidate it.[3]

[36] The portions of section 36 of the *CCAA* relevant to this proposed sale to a non-related person are as follows:

> 36. (1) A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.
>
> (2) A company that applies to the court for an authorization is to give notice of the application to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.
>
> (3) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,
>
> > (*a*) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
> >
> > (*b*) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
> >
> > (*c*) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
> >
> > (*d*) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
> >
> > (*e*) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and

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[3] See the cases summarized in *First Leaside Wealth Management Inc. (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 1299, para. 32.

(*f*) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

(6) The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

(7) The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments that would have been required under paragraphs 6(4)(*a*) and (5)(*a*) if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement.

B. Consideration of the factors

Was notice of the application given to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition?

[37] The applicants have satisfied this requirement. The Purchaser will assume the liability owing to IBM Canada. The other two secured creditors, RBC and Castcan, support the proposed transaction.

The reasonableness of the process leading to the proposed sale

[38] The SISP was approved by this Court by order made May 14, 2012. In my Reasons of that date I stated:

> Given the extensive efforts to date by management of the applicants to solicit interest in the business and given the liquidity crunch facing the applicants, I was satisfied that the proposed SISP would result, in the specific circumstances of this case, in a fair, transparent and commercially efficacious process which should allow a sufficient opportunity for interested parties to come forward with a superior offer and thereby optimize the chances of securing the best possible price for the assets up for sale or the best possible investment in the continuing operations of the applicants. For those reasons I approved the SISP.[4]

[39] Although the applicants took the lead in running the SISP, the evidence disclosed that the Monitor was involved in all stages of the process.

[40] Before the commencement of these *CCAA* proceedings, members of the PCAS Board of Directors had engaged in separate dialogues with a significant number of parties who were interested in either investing in the DIP Lender to provide financing to the Applicants,

[4] 2012 ONSC 2840, para. 19.

purchasing the assets of the Applicants, or buying PCAS. During the SISP PCAS, with the assistance of PwCCF and the Monitor, (i) ran an electronic due diligence data-room, (ii) identified 184 potential bidders from around the globe and contacted 164 of them, (iii) developed a "teaser" which was circulated to 121 of the identified parties, as well as a confidential information memorandum which was posted to the data room and sent to the all of the 18 interested parties who had executed a non-disclosure agreement, (iv) conducted site tours at its Premises, with the Monitor in attendance, for seven potential bidders, (v) developed a non-reliance letter for Qualified Bidders to sign in order to be able to review third-party review of the PCAS technology prepared for the Board and facilitated meetings with the authors of the Technology Review at the request of two potential bidders.

[41] In its Sixth Report dated May 28, 2012 the Monitor described in detail the steps taken up until that point of time in conducting the SISP. The Monitor provided updated information in its Seventh Report dated June 1, 2012. In its Confidential Appendix to the Seventh Report the Monitor presented detailed, un-redacted information about the bids which were tendered, the resulting communications with the bidders, and its comparative evaluation of the bids.

[42] I am satisfied that the SISP run by the Applicants, with the extensive involvement of the Monitor, complied with the terms of the SISP approved in my May 14 Order.

[43] As mentioned, on the continuation of the approval hearing on June 6 counsel appeared for a potential bidder, Merge, seeking to submit an offer on behalf of his client. In *Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair*, in the context of an approval motion for a sale by a court-appointed receiver, Galligan J. considered the approach which a court should take where a second offer was made after a receiver had entered into an agreement of purchase and sale. He cited two judgments by Saunders J. which had held that the court should consider the second offer, if constituting a “substantially higher bid”,[5] and Galligan J.A. continued:

> What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered bona fide into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.
>
> If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted the sale properly. In such

[5] *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.); *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.)

> circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.[6]

[44] In the present case I departed from the process described in the *Soundair* case and declined to accept Merge's offer for consideration. The facts in *Soundair* are quite distinguishable. In the *Soundair* case the second bidder had secured a court order permitting it to make an offer. By contrast, in the present case the court had approved a SISP which set a May 24, 2012 bid deadline. All other bids complied, or came very close to complying, with that court-approved deadline. Merge contended that it did not learn of the bidding process until May 30, a week after the bid deadline. The prompt posting of all court orders on the Monitor's website, when combined with Merge's delays in pursuing an offer after learning of this proceeding make it completely unreasonable for Merge to expect that a court would grant it leave to submit an offer for consideration. The court-approved SISP would be stood on its head were that allowed.

[45] Moreover, as was apparent from the Monitor's detailed narration of the consideration given to the bids which were filed on or just after the court-approved bid deadline, time was spent during the SISP process for discussions amongst the Applicants, the Monitor and the bidders to ascertain whether their bids constituted Qualified Bids. The stay of proceedings in this case was set to expire on June 6, the date Merge came forth in court with its offer. The only cash available for Applicants' operations through to June 6 was the advance of $250,000 by the Purchaser to the Applicants on May 31. The Applicants stated that they would be out of funds by day's end on June 6 or early on June 7. Consequently, there was no realistic prospect that any offer tendered on June 6 could receive a measured consideration while the companies continued to operate.

[46] Finally, Merge did not tender its offer at the commencement of the approval motion on June 5. Its counsel made no submissions that day nor signed the counsel sheet. The only reason I adjourned the hearing to June 6 was to afford some shareholders a brief opportunity to consult with counsel. I made it clear on the record on June 5 that hearing from those shareholders was the only order of business for June 6. Merge did not come forth until the resumption of the hearing on June 6. In those circumstances it was difficult to treat Merge's proffer of a bid as a serious one.

[47] In sum, the compliance of the Applicants with the court-approved SISP and the unreasonableness of the timing of Merge's offer led me to conclude that the process leading to the proposed sale was reasonable.

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[6] *Soundair, supra*., pp. 9h-10c.

Did the Monitor approve the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition?

[48] In its Fifth Report dated May 11, 2012 the Monitor recommended approving the SISP.

Did the Monitor file with the court a report stating that in its opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy?

[49] In its Seventh Report the Monitor set out at some length its views about the proposed sale transaction:

> The Monitor is of the view that the transaction contemplated by the APA meets the factors set out in section 36(3) of the *CCAA*. As previously described in the Fifth Report and the Sixth Report, the Monitor is of the view that an expedited SISP was likely the only viable process to maximize the value of the Company for the benefit of its stakeholders given the Company's dire liquidity situation.
>
> The APA provides for a going concern sale of the Company's business that maintains some Canadian operations and should allow for some continued employment.
>
> The Company and the DIP Lender developed the SISP in consultation with Monitor and, in the Monitor's view, the Company implemented a fair, transparent and efficient SISP in the circumstances in accordance with the Orders of this Court and the Court's reasons for decision dated May 14, 2012. Given the Company's liquidity situation, the necessity of implementing an expedited SISP and the bids received, it is the Monitor's view that the price obtained for the Company's assets is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. In addition, as reported in the Second Report, the Monitor is of the view that it is unlikely that a Trustee would have been able to appropriately take possession, market and sell the technology, intellectual property and other assets of the Company as a result of the Company having effectively no cash, limited accounts receivable and few unencumbered assets available to be monetized quickly in liquidation.

The Monitor recommended approving the Successful Bid.

To what extent were the creditors consulted?

[50] The record disclosed that discussions had taken place with the secured creditors. Appropriate notice was given by the Applicants of all steps taken to seek approval of the DIP Lending Facility, the various extensions of the stay and approval of the SISP. As noted, only one unsecured creditor appeared at the approval hearing and its information questions were answered.

What are the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties?

[51] As summarized by the Monitor in its Seventh Report:

> The APA does not provide for any recovery for the Company's shareholders. The APA provides as follows:
>
> > a) statutory priority claims are paid in full in cash.
> >
> > b) The beneficiaries of the KERP are to be paid in full and in cash.
> >
> > c) The claim of the DIP Lender will be partially satisfied through a combination of cash and interest bearing secured notes convertible at maturity into cash or common shares of the Purchaser.
> >
> > d) The Company's unsecured creditors will receive their pro rata share of a pool of interest bearing unsecured notes convertible at maturity into cash or common shares of the Purchaser.
> >
> > e) The Company will assume the Assumed Liability [IBM].
>
> In addition, the APA also provides funding for a bankruptcy of the Company or a continuation of the CCAA Proceedings in respect of the Company. As described in further detail below, it is anticipated that the Company will be assigned into bankruptcy and that the entitlement of the unsecured creditors to the unsecured convertible notes will be determined through the statutory claims process provided under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ... It is anticipated that one unsecured note will be provided to a trustee in bankruptcy to be appointed in respect of the Company.

Is the consideration to be received for the assets reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value?

[52] In its Seventh Report the Monitor expressed its view that “the price obtained for the Company’s assets is fair and reasonable in the circumstances”. In the *Soundair* case Galligan J.A. stated:

> At the outset, I think that the fact that the OEL offer was the only acceptable one available to the receiver on March 8, 1991, after ten months of trying to sell the airline, is strong evidence that the price in it was reasonable.[7]

So, too, in this case. Although no valuation was filed in respect of the companies’ assets, the evidence filed on previous motions disclosed that the applicants had made efforts for many months prior to initiating *CCAA* proceedings to secure further investment in or the sale of the companies. The state of the companies, and the potential business opportunity they offered, were extensively known. Notwithstanding the short SISP, the Monitor reported that contact was

[7] *Soundair, supra.*, p. 8g.

made with a large number of potentially interested parties. Only three bids resulted. Of those three, two were not treated as Qualified Bids. The record, especially the Monitor's Confidential Appendix, supported the selection of the DashRx offer as the Successful Bid. Against the backdrop of those efforts, I concluded that the proposed purchase price was fair and reasonable.

Does the proposed transaction satisfy the requirements of section 36(7) of the *CCCA*?

[53] The applicants did not sponsor a pension plan for its employees. With the payment of the statutory priority claims from the proceeds of sale, obligations under section 6(5)(a) of the *CCAA* will be satisfied.

C. Conclusion

[54] In sum, the proposed Purchase Agreement met the specific factors enumerated in section 36(3) of the *CCAA* and, when looked at as a whole in the particular circumstances of this case, represented a fair and reasonable transaction.[8] For those reasons I authorized the proposed Purchase Agreement and granted the vesting order which was sought.

VI. Analysis of the proposed distribution

[55] The distribution of the sale proceeds proposed by the Applicants, and supported by the Monitor, was straight-forward, save for one issue – the validity of Castcan's security in respect of HST Refunds.

A. The Castcan security issue described

[56] In its Seventh Report the Monitor described the Pari Passu Agreement which the DIP Lender had negotiated with two secured creditors, RBC and Castcan, at the time of putting in place the DIP Lending Facility:

> The Monitor has been advised that the DIP Lender entered into an agreement with Castcan and others, whereby the DIP Lender agreed that its claims against the Company would be subordinate to the claims of Castcan (the "Pari Passu Agreement"). Pursuant to the Pari Passu Agreement, Castcan has the right to be repaid in full before the DIP Lender receives any consideration for the amounts it advanced under the DIP Facility… The Monitor has been advised that the DIP Lender has agreed that its position will also be subordinate to RBC, as provided for in the Initial Order.
>
> Although the Purchaser was willing to assume the liabilities owed to RBC and Castcan, they both advised that they were not willing to become creditors of the Purchaser and wanted to be paid in cash in full on closing. In order to accommodate the secured

[8] *White Birch Paper Holding Company*, 2010 QCCS 4915, paras. 48 and 49.

> creditors' requests, the DIP Lender has agreed to pay RBC and Castcan in full in cash from the amount payable to the DIP Lender pursuant to the terms of the APA. As a result of that payment, the DIP Lender will be subrogated to or take an assignment of the positions of RBC and Castcan in respect of their validly perfected and secured positions, subject to the lack of clarity in the law in respect of the Castcan Loan and Security discussed below.

[57] The lack of clarity in the law in respect of the Castcan Loan stemmed from the assignment of Crown debts, on a full recourse basis, made in the March 6, 2012 Factor Agreement between Castcan and the Applicants. The Crown debts assigned to Castcan included certain Scientific Research and Experimental Development ("SR&ED") refundable tax credit entitlements, Ontario Innovation Tax Credit ("OITC") refunds and harmonized sales tax ("HST") refunds. The Applicants executed a GSA in favour of Castcan to secure the obligations owing to Castcan, including those under the Factor Agreement.

[58] Counsel to the Monitor provided an opinion that the assignment of the SR&ED Tax Credits and the OITC Tax Credits under the Factor Agreement was valid and the security granted in each GSA in respect of such assignments was valid and enforceable.

[59] Section 67 of the *Financial Administration Act (Canada)*, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11 (the "*FAA*") provides as follows:

> Except as provided in this Act or any other Act of Parliament,
>
> > (a) a Crown debt is not assignable; and
> >
> > (b) no transaction purporting to be an assignment of a Crown debt is effective so as to confer on any person any rights or remedies in respect of that debt.

In light of that section, counsel to the Monitor advised that the HST Refunds might not be assignable and that the security granted in respect of the HST Refunds might not be valid and enforceable because no provision in the *Excise Tax Act* (Canada) or the *FAA* exempted the HST Refunds from section 67 of the *FAA*.

[60] Castcan took the position that certain provisions in the Factor Agreement entitled it, in any event, to receive the HST Refunds. The Monitor commented on part of the argument advanced by Castcan:

> Section 12 of the Factor Agreement provides that if any right or entitlement that, as a matter of law is not assignable, the Company will: (a) co-operate with Castan to provide the benefits of these Non-Assignable Rights to Castcan, including, holding them in trust; (b) enforce any rights of Castcan arising from these Non-Assignable Rights; (c) take all actions to ensure that the value of these Non-Assignable Rights are preserved; and (d) pay over to Castcan all monies collected in respect of these Non-Assignable Rights. One interpretation is that the obligations set out in Section 12 of the Factor Agreement with respect to the HST Refunds are enforceable and are secured by the

> GSAs. Another interpretation is that Section 12 simply gives rise to a claim in equity against the Company and that such an equitable claim may not be secured by the GSAs.
>
> The Monitor is of the view that there is strong argument that Castcan has a claim against the Company for unjust enrichment and, to the extent of such unjust enrichment, a Court may order that a constructive trust applies to the monies advanced by Castcan in respect of the HST Refunds.
>
> Given the provisions of the FAA and existing case law, counsel to the Monitor has advised that it cannot conclude with certainty that the obligations in the Factor Agreement in favour of Castcan with respect to the HST Refunds are secured by the GSAs. Accordingly, the Monitor is of the view that it is unclear whether any payment by the Company to Castcan in respect of the HST Refunds should be made in priority to other creditors.
>
> The Monitor is of the view that the equities clearly favour paying Castcan the full amount owed to it under the Factor Agreement, including the amounts in respect of the HST Refunds. The Monitor notes that Castcan paid $1,000,000 to the Company in good faith on a full recourse basis at a time when the Company was in dire need of liquidity. The vast majority of the amounts paid by Castcan were used to fund the Company's payroll. In the Monitor's view, it would be inequitable for the Company or any of its creditors to get a windfall at the expense of a creditor that provided value to the Company as a result of lack of clarity in the existing law and the wording of the Factor Agreement.

[61] The Applicants proposed that upon paying out the claims of the Senior Secured Creditors from the cash proceeds received on closing, the DIP Lender would be subrogated to and/or take an assignment of the Senior Secured Creditor’s claims. The Applicants also sought an order which provided, in part, that they, or the proposed Trustee, pay to the DIP Lender any tax credit entitlements received in respect of the HST Refund, notwithstanding section 67 of the *FAA*. The Monitor explained the rationale for this request:

> The DIP Lender is of the view that since there is likely no secondary market for the secured convertible notes, the net present value of the secured convertible notes is less than the face value of such notes. As a result, the DIP Lender is taking the position that the consideration it is receiving is insufficient to satisfy the full amount of the DIP Lender's claim against the Company. The DIP Lender is also of the view that the DIP Lender’s Charge should continue to secure the obligations owing to the DIP Lender as a result of its shortfall after distribution of the proceeds to it on closing of the transaction contemplated by the APA. The Monitor supports the DIP Lender’s views.
>
> The DIP Lender is also of the view that the value of the notes should be discounted by an amount that is at least as great as the amount of the HST Refunds in order to permit the proceeds of the HST Refunds once received by the estate to be paid to the DIP Lender on account of its DIP Charge. The Monitor supports the DIP Lender's views

with respect to the DIP Lender's Charge. Accordingly, the Monitor is of the view that the DIP Lender's Charge should remain effective over all of the Excluded Assets until such time as such refunds are received and become proceeds of the estate and the DIP Lender is repaid in full.

The parties with an economic interest in the proceeds of the transaction and the Tax Credit Entitlements have agreed to the arrangement with the DIP Lender described above with respect to the HST Refunds. Such an arrangement will permit the DIP Lender to satisfy its obligations under the Pari Passu Agreement while still receiving the consideration that was agreed to be paid to it pursuant to the APA.

B. Legal analysis

[62] Section 67 of the *FAA* provides that "no transaction purporting to be an assignment of a Crown debt is effective" except as provided in that Act or any other federal Act. In *Mazetti v. Marzetti* the Supreme Court of Canada held that under section 67 "a purported assignment of a Crown debt is rendered absolutely ineffective, as between debtor and creditor, and as between assignor and assignee."[9] The Court of Appeal, in *Profitt v. A.D. Productions Ltd. (Trustee of)*, held that purported assignments of federal sales tax refunds were invalid.[10]

[63] In their factum the Applicants pointed to several cases which they contended might limit the application of the decisions in *Mazetti* and *Profitt.*[11] Castcan had submitted to the Monitor that several provisions of the Factor Agreement operated to give it priority to the HST Refund notwithstanding the *Mazetti* and *Profitt* decisions. I did not need to address those points to decide the motion. Assuming, for purposes of argument, the ineffectiveness of Castcan's security as it related to the HST Refund, that refund would constitute property of the Applicants. Pursuant to the Initial Order the DIP Lender was granted a charge on the "Property" of the Applicants which was defined as the Applicants' "current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof". The "Property" of the applicants included their entitlement to the HST Refund. Accordingly, in the event of a failure of Castcan's security, the DIP Lender would be entitled to the HST Refund.

[64] Section 67 of the *FAA* does not prevent such a result since it only renders ineffective any "*transaction* purporting to be an assignment of a Crown debt". The DIP Lender's Charge created by the Initial Order was not such a "transaction". As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out in *Bank of Montreal v. i Trade Finance Inc.*, rights which result from a court order

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[9] [1994] 2 S.C.R. 765, para. 99.
[10] (2002), 32 C.B.R. (4th) 94 (O.C.A.), para. 28.
[11] *Cargill Ltd. v. Ronald (Trustee of)* (2007), 32 C.B.R. (5th) 169 (Man. C.A.); *McKay & Maxwell, Ltd., Re* (1927), 8 C.B.R. 534 (N.S.S.C.); *Christensen, Re* (1961), 2 C.B.R. (N.S.) 324 (Ont. S.C.); *Front Iron & Metal Co., Re* (1980), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 317 (Ont. S.C.).

are not rights stemming from a "transaction".[12] Section 67 of the *FAA* does not apply to rights created by a court order, including a DIP lending charge granted over all of a company's property pursuant to section 11.2(1) of the *CCAA*.

[65] Since the DIP Lender would be entitled to the HST Refund in the event of a defect in Castcan's security, it was open to the DIP Lender to agree, with Castcan, as a matter of contract, that Castcan should receive full payout as contemplated by the Pari Passu Agreement.

[66] As to the Applicants' request for an order that they, or the proposed Trustee, pay to the DIP Lender any tax credit entitlements received in respect of the HST Refund, I was satisfied that it was appropriate to exercise my discretion under section 11 of the *CCAA* to make such an order. I accepted the Monitor's view that the DIP Lender was entitled to be repaid in full upon the conclusion of the *CCAA* proceedings and that its charge should continue to secure the obligations to it as a result of the shortfall after distribution of the transaction proceeds. The use of the Secured Note to repay the DIP Lender entails a risk that the DIP Lender might not receive full repayment of its DIP Lending Facility. Consequently, I accepted the Monitor's view that it would be appropriate to discount the value of the note by an amount equal to the HST Refund. Such a result promotes, in part, the remedial purposes of the *CCAA* by ensuring that DIP lenders, whose role often is critical to the successful completion of a re-organization, can advance interim financing with the reasonable assurance of receiving repayment of their DIP loans.

[67] As to the distribution of $100,000 of the sales proceeds to fund bankruptcy proceedings involving the Applicants, I accepted the Monitor's view that since no further funds existed to continue the *CCAA* proceedings, a bankruptcy would serve as the most cost effective and efficient way in which to complete the winding-up of the companies' affairs, including establishing a mechanism to determine the quantum for unsecured claims.

[68] For those reasons I approved the distribution of the sale proceeds proposed by the Applicants, as well as the related orders terminating the *CCAA* proceedings upon the Monitor filing its discharge certificate and approving the Monitor's Seventh Report and the activities described therein.

VII. Sealing order

[69] The information contained in the Confidential Appendix to the Monitor's Seventh Report clearly met the criteria for a sealing order set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*.[13] In order to protect the integrity of the SISP and the proposed sales transaction, I granted an order that the appendix be sealed until the completion of the Purchase Agreement transaction.

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[12] [2011] 2 S.C.R. 360, para. 30. See also, *Torstar Corp. v. ITI Information Technology Institute Inc.* (2002), 36 C.B.R. (4th) 114 (N.S.S.C.), paras. 29 and 32.
[13] [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522.

(original signed by)
D. M. Brown J.

Date: June 9, 2012

TAB 4

SUPERIOR COURT
(Commercial division)
The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

CANADA
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
DISTRICT OF MONTREAL

No: 500-11-038474-108

DATE: 15 October 2010

UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF: THE HONOURABLE ROBERT MONGEON, J.S.C.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT AND COMPROMISE OF:

WHITE BIRCH PAPER HOLDING COMPANY
-and-
WHITE BIRCH PAPER COMPANY
-and-
STADACONA GENERAL PARTNER INC.
-and-
BLACK SPRUCE PAPER INC.
-and-
F.F. SOUCY GENERAL PARATNER INC.
-and-
3120772 NOVA SCOTI COMPAPNY
-and-
ARRIMAGE DE GROS CACOUNA INC.
-and-
PAPIER MASSON LTÉE
Petitioners
-and-
ERNST & YOUNG INC.
Monitor
-and-
STADACONA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
-and-
F.F. SOUCY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

JM1838

-and-
F.F. SOUCY INC. & PARTNERS, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Mises-en-cause
-and-
SERVICE D'IMPARTITION INDUSTRIEL INC.
-and-
KSH SOLUTIONS INC.
-and-
BD WHITE BIRCH INVESTMENT LLC
Intervenant
-and-
SIXTH AVENUE INVESTMENT CO. LLC
DUNE CAPITAL LLC
DUNE CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL LTD
Opposing parties

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT GIVEN ORALLY ON SEPTEMBER 24, 2010

BACKGROUND

[1] On 24 February 2010, I issued an Initial Order under the CCAA protecting the assets of the Debtors and Mis-en-cause (the WB Group). Ernst & Young was appointed Monitor.

[2] On the same date, Bear Island Paper Company LLC (Bear Island) filed for protection of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy code before the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

[3] On April 28, 2010, the US Bankruptcy Court issued an order approving a Sale and Investor Solicitation Process ("SISP") for the sale of substantially all of the WB Group's assets. I issued a similar order on April 29, 2010. No one objected to the issuance of the April 29, 2010 order. No appeal was lodged in either jurisdiction.

[4] The SISP caused several third parties to show some interest in the assets of the WG Group and led to the execution of an Asset Sale Agreement (ASA) between the WB Group and BD White Birch Investment LLC ("BDWB"). The ASA is dated August 10, 2010. Under the ASA, BDWB would acquire all of the assets of the Group and would:

a) assume from the Sellers and become obligated to pay the Assumed Liabilities (as defined in the ASA);

b) pay US$90 million in cash;

c) pay the Reserve Payment Amount (as defined);

d) pay all fees and disbursements necessary or incidental for the closing of the transaction; and

e) deliver the Wind Down Amount (as defined).

the whole for a consideration estimated between $150 and $178 million dollars.

[5] BDWB was to acquire the Assets through a Stalking Horse Bid process. Accordingly, Motions were brought before the US Bankruptcy Court and before this Court for orders approving:

a) the ASA

b) BDWB as the stalking horse bidder

c) The Bidding Procedures

[6] On September 1, 2010, the US Bankruptcy Court issued an order approving the foregoing without modifications.

[7] On September 10, 2010, I issued an order approving the foregoing with some modifications (mainly reducing the Break-Up Fee and Expense Reimbursement clauses from an aggregate total sought of US$5 million, down to an aggregate total not to exceed US$3 million).

[8] My order also modified the various key dates of implementation of the above. The date of September 17 was set as the limit to submit a qualified bid under stalking horse bidding procedures, approved by both Courts and the date of September 21st was set as the auction date. Finally, the approval of the outcome of the process was set for September 24, 2010[1].

[9] No appeal was lodged with respect to my decision of September 10, 2010.

[10] On September 17, 2010, Sixth Avenue Investment Co. LLC ("Sixth Avenue") submitted a qualified bid.

[11] On September 21, 2010, the WB Group and the Monitor commenced the auction for the sale of the assets of the group. The winning bid was the bid of BDWB at US$236,052,825.00.

[12] BDWB's bid consists of:

i) US$90 million in cash allocated to the current assets of the WB Group;

[1] See my Order of September 10, 2010.

ii) $4.5 million of cash allocated to the fixed assets;

iii) $78 million in the form of a credit bid under the First Lien Credit Agreement allocated to the WB Group's Canadian fixed assets which are collateral to the First Lien Debt affecting the WB Group;

iv) miscellaneous additional charges to be assumed by the purchaser.

[13] Sixth Avenue's bid was equivalent to the BDWB winning bid less US$500,000.00, that is to say US$235,552,825.00. The major difference between the two bids being that BDWB used credit bidding to the extent of $78 million whilst Sixth Avenue offered an additional $78 million in cash. For a full description of the components of each bid, see the Monitor's Report of September 23, 2010.

[14] The Sixth Avenue bidder and the BDWB bidder are both former lenders of the WB Group regrouped in new entities.

[15] On April 8, 2005, the WB Group entered into a First Lien Credit Agreement with Credit Suisse AG Cayman Islands and Credit Suisse AG Toronto acting as agents for a number of lenders.

[16] As of February 24, 2010, the WB Group was indebted towards the First Lien Lenders under the First Lien Credit Agreement in the approximate amount of $438 million (including interest). This amount was secured by all of the Sellers' fixed assets. The contemplated sale following the auction includes the WB Group's fixed assets and unencumbered assets.

[17] BDWB is comprised of a group of lenders under the First Lien Credit Agreement and hold, in aggregate approximately 65% of the First Lien Debt. They are also "Majority Lenders" under the First Lien Credit Agreement and, as such, are entitled to make certain decisions with respect to t he First Lien Debt including the right to use the security under the First Lien Credit Agreement as tool for credit bidding.

[18] Sixth Avenue is comprised of a group of First Lien Lenders holding a minority position in the First Lien Debt (approximately 10%). They are not "Majority Lenders" and accordingly, they do not benefit from the same advantages as the BDWB group of First Lien Lenders, with respect to the use of the security on the fixed assets of the WB Group, in a credit bidding process[2].

[2] For a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship of BDWB members and Sixth Avenue members as lenders under the original First Lien Credit Agreement of April 8, 2005, see paragraphs 15 to 19 of BDWB's Intervention.

[19] The bidding process took place in New York on September 21, 2010. Only two bidders were involved: the winning bidder (BDWB) and the losing bidder[3] (Sixth Avenue).

[20] In its Intervention, BDWB has analysed all of the rather complex mechanics allowing it to use the system of credit bidding as well as developing reasons why Sixth Avenue could not benefit from the same privilege. In addition to certain arguments developed in the reasons which follow, I also accept as my own BDWB's submissions developed in section (e), paragraphs [40] to [53] of its Intervention as well as the arguments brought forward in paragraphs [54] to [60] validating BDWB's specific right to credit bid in the present circumstances.

[21] Essentially, BDWB establishes its right to credit bid by referring not only to the September 10 Court Order but also by referring to the debt and security documents themselves, namely the First Lien Credit Agreement, the US First Lien Credit Agreement and under the Canadian Security Agreements whereby the "Majority Lender" may direct the "Agents" to support such credit bid in favour of such "Majority Lenders". Conversely, this position is not available to the "Minority Lenders". This reasoning has not been seriously challenged before me.

[22] The Debtors and Mis-en-cause are now asking me to approve the sale of all and/or substantially all the assets of the WB Group to BDWB. The disgruntled bidder asks me to not only dismiss this application but also to declare it the winning bidder or, alternatively, to order a new auction.

[23] On September 24, 2010, I delivered oral reasons in support of the Debtors' Motion to approve the sale. Here is a transcript of these reasons.

<u>REASONS</u> (delivered orally on September 24, 2010)

[24] I am asked by the Petitioners to approve the sale of substantially all the WB Group's assets following a bid process in the form of a "Stalking Horse" bid process which was not only announced in the originating proceedings in this file, I believe back in early 2010, but more specifically as from May/June 2010 when I was asked to authorise the Sale and Investors Solicitation Process (SISP). The SISP order led to the canvassing of proposed bidders, qualified bidders and the eventual submission of a "Stalking Horse" bidder. In this context, a Motion to approve the "Stalking Horse" Bid process to approve the assets sale agreement and to approve a bidding procedure for the sale of substantially all of the assets of the WB Group was submitted and sanctioned by my decision of September 10, 2010.

[25] I note that throughout the implementation of this sale process, all of its various preliminary steps were put in place and approved without any contestation whatsoever

[3] Sometimes referred to as the "bitter bidder" or "disgruntled bidder" See Re: *Abitibi Bowater* [2010] QCCS 1742 (Gascon J.)

by any of the interested stakeholders except for the two construction lien holders KSH[4] and SIII[5] who, for very specific reasons, took a strong position towards the process itself (not that much with the bidding process but with the consequences of this process upon their respective claims.

[26] The various arguments of KSH and SIII against the entire Stalking Horse bid process have now become moot, considering that both BDWB and Sixth Avenue have agreed to honour the construction liens and to assume the value of same (to be later determined).

[27] Today, the Motion of the Debtors is principally contested by a group which was identified as the "Sixth Avenue" bidders and more particularly, identified in paragraph 20 of the Motion now before me. The "Stalking Horse" bidder, of course, is the Black Diamond group identified as "BD White Birch Investment LLC". The Dune Group of companies who are also secured creditors of the WB Group are joining in, supporting the position of Sixth Avenue. Their contestation rests on the argument that the best and highest bid at the auction, which took place in New York on September 21, should not have been identified as the Black Diamond bid. To the contrary, the winning bid should have been, according to the contestants, the "Sixth Avenue" bid which was for a lesser dollar amount ($500,000.00), for a larger cash amount (approximately $78,000,000.00 more cash) and for a different allocation of the purchase price.

[28] Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Monitor, in its report of August 23, supports the "Black Diamond" winning bid and the Monitor recommends to the Court that the sale of the assets of the WB Group be made on that basis.

[29] The main argument of "Sixth Avenue" as averred, sometimes referred to as the "bitter bidder", comes from the fact that the winning bid relied upon the tool of credit bidding to the extent of $78,000,000.00 in arriving at its total offer of $236,052,825.00.

[30] If I take the comments of "Sixth Avenue", the use of credit bidding was not only a surprise, but a rather bad surprise, in that they did not really expect that this would be the way the "Black Diamond" bid would be ultimately constructed. However, the possibility of reverting to credit bidding was something which was always part of the process. I quote from paragraph 7 of the Motion to Approve the Sale of the Assets, which itself quotes paragraph 24 of the SISP Order, stating that:

> **"24. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, including without limitation, the bidding requirements herein, the agent under the White Birch DIP Facility (the "DIP Agent") and the agent to the WB Group's first lien term loan lenders (the First Lien Term Agent"), on behalf of the lenders under White Birch DIP Facility and the WB Group's first lien term loan lenders, respectively, shall be deemed Qualified Bidders and any bid**

[4] KSH Solutions Inc.
[5] Service d'Impartition Industriel Inc.

submitted by such agent on behalf of the respective lenders in respect of all or a portion of the Assets shall be deemed both Phase 1 Qualified Bids and Phase 2 Qualified Bids. The DIP Agent and First Lien Term Agent, on behalf of the lenders under the White Birch DIP Facility and the WB Group's first lien term loan lenders, respectively, shall be permitted in their sole discretion, to credit bid up to the full amount of any allowed secure claims under the White Birch DIP Facility and the first lien term loan agreement, respectively, to the extent permitted under Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code and other applicable law."

[31] The words "and other applicable law" could, in my view, tolerate the inclusion of similar rules of procedure in the province of Quebec.[6]

[32] The possibility of reverting to credit bidding was also mentioned in the bidding procedure sanctioned by my decision of September 10, 2010 as follows and I now quote from paragraph 13 of the Debtors' Motion:

13. "Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the applicable agent under the DIP Credit Agreement and the application agent under the

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[6] The concept of credit bidding is not foreign to Quebec civil law and procedure. See for example articles 689 and 730 of the Quebec code of Civil Procedure which read as follows:

689. The purchase price must be paid within five days, at the expiry of which time interest begins to run. Nevertheless, when the immovable is adjudged to the seizing creditor or any hypothecary creditor who has filed an opposition or whose claim is mentioned in the statement certified by the registrar, he may retain the purchase-money to the extent of the claim until the judgment of distribution is served upon him.

730. A purchaser who has not paid the purchase price must, within ten days after the judgment of homologation is transmitted to him, pay the sheriff the amounts necessary to satisfy the claims which have priority over his own; if he fails to do so, any interested party may demand the resale of the immovable upon him for false bidding.
When the purchaser has fulfilled his obligation, the sheriff must give him a certificate that the purchase price has been paid in full.

See also Denis Ferland and Benoit Emery, 4ème edition, volume 2 (Éditions Yvon Blais (2003)):

"La loi prévoit donc que, lorsque l'immeuble est adjugé au saisissant ou à un créancier hypothécaire qui a fait opposition, ou dont la créance est portée à l'état certifié par l'officier de la publicité des droits, l'adjudicataire peut retenir le prix, y compris le prix minimum annoncé dans l'avis de vente (art. 670, al. 1, e), 688.1 C.p.c.), jusqu'à concurrence de sa créance et tant que ne lui a pas été signifié le jugement de distribution prévu à l'article 730 C.p.c. (art. 689, al 2 C.p.c.). <u>Il n'aura alors à payer, dans les cinq jours suivant la signification de ce jugement, que la différence entre le prix d'adjudication et le montant de sa créance pour satisfaire aux créances préférées à la sienne (art. 730, al. 1 C.p.c.).</u> La Cour d'appel a déclaré, à ce sujet, que puisque le deuxième alinéa de l'article 689 C.p.c. est une exception à la règle du paiement lors de la vente par l'adjudicataire du prix minimal d'adjudication (art. 688.1, al. 1 C.p.c.) et à celle du paiement du solde du prix d'adjudication dans les cinq jours suivants (art. 689, al. 1 C.p.c.), il doit être interprété de façon restrictive. Le sens du mot «créance», contenu dans cet article, ne permet alors à l'adjudicataire de retenir que la partie de sa créance qui est colloquée ou susceptible de l'être, tout en tenant compte des priorités établies par la loi."

See, finally, *Montreal Trust vs Jori Investment Inc*. (J.E. 80-220 (C.S.)), *Eugène Marcoux Inc. v. Côté (1990) R.J.Q. 1221 (C.A.)*

> **First Lien Credit Agreement shall each be entitled to credit bid pursuant to Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code and other applicable law.**

[33] I draw from these excerpts that when the "Stalking Horse" bid process was put in place, those bidders able to benefit from a credit bidding situation could very well revert to the use of this lever or tool in order to arrive at a better bid[7].

[34] Furthermore, many comments were made today with respect to the dollar value of a credit bid versus the dollar value of a cash bid. I think that it is appropriate to conclude that if credit bidding is to take place, it goes without saying that the amount of the credit bid should not exceed, but should be allowed to go as, high as the face value amount of the credit instrument upon which the credit bidder is allowed to rely. The credit bid should not be limited to the fair market value of the corresponding encumbered assets. It would then be just impossible to function otherwise because it would require an evaluation of such encumbered assets, a difficult, complex and costly exercise.

[35] Our Courts have always accepted the dollar value appearing on the face of the instrument as the basis for credit bidding. Rightly or wrongly, this is the situation which prevails.

[36] Many arguments were brought forward, for and against the respective position of the two opposing bidders. At the end of the day, it is my considered opinion that the "Black Diamond" winning bid should prevail and the "Sixth Avenue" bid, the bitter bidder, should fail.

[37] I have dealt briefly with the process. I don't wish to go through every single step of the process but I reiterate that this process was put in place without any opposition whatsoever. It is not enough to appear before a Court and say: "Well, we've got nothing to say now. We may have something to say later" and then, use this argument to reopen the entire process once the result is known and the result turns out to be not as satisfactory as it may have been expected. In other words, silence sometimes may be equivalent to acquiescence. All stakeholders knew what to expect before walking into the auction room.

[38] Once the process is put in place, once the various stakeholders accept the rules, and once the accepted rules call for the possibility of credit bidding, I do not think that,

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[7] The SISP, the bidding procedure and corresponding orders recognize the principle of credit bidding at the auction and these orders were not the subject of any appeal procedure.
See paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 of BDWB's Intervention.
As for the right to credit bid in a sale by auction under the CCAA, see Re: *Maax Corporation* (QSC. no. 500-11-033561-081, July 10, 2008, , Buffoni J.)
See also Re: *Brainhunter* (OSC Commercial List, no.09-8482-00CL, January 22, 2010)

at the end of the day, the fact that credit bidding was used as a tool, may be raised as an argument to set aside a valid bidding and auction process.

[39] Today, the process is completed and to allow "Sixth Avenue" to come before the Court and say: "My bid is essentially better than the other bid and Court ratify my bid as the highest and best bid as opposed to the winning bid" is the equivalent to a complete eradication of all proceedings and judgments rendered to this date with respect to the Sale of Assets authorized in this file since May/June 2010 and I am not prepared to accept this as a valid argument. Sixth Avenue should have expected that BDWB would want to revert to credit bidding and should have sought a modification of the bidding procedure in due time.

[40] The parties have agreed to go through the bidding process. Once the bidding process is started, then there is no coming back. Or if there is coming back, it is because the process is vitiated by an illegality or non-compliance of proper procedures and not because a bidder has decided to credit bid in accordance with the bidding procedures previously adopted by the Court.

[41] The Court cannot take position today which would have the effect of annihilating the auction which took place last week. The Court has to take the result of this auction and then apply the necessary test to approve or not to approve that result. But this is not what the contestants before me ask me to do. They are asking me to make them win a bid which they have lost.

[42] It should be remembered that "Sixth Avenue" agreed to continue to bid even after the credit bidding tool was used in the bidding process during the auction. If that process was improper, then "Sixth Avenue" should have withdrawn or should have addressed the Court for directions but nothing of the sort was done. The process was allowed to continue and it appears evident that it is only because of the end result which is not satisfactory that we now have a contestation of the results.

[43] The arguments which were put before me with a view to setting aside the winning bid (leaving aside those under Section 36 of the CCAA to which I will come to a minute) have not convinced me to set it aside. The winning bid certainly satisfies a great number of interested parties in this file, including the winning bidders, including the Monitor and several other creditors.

[44] I have adverse representations from two specific groups of creditors who are secured creditors of the White Birch Group prior to the issue of the Initial Order which have, from the beginning, taken strong exceptions to the whole process but nevertheless, they constitute a limited group of stakeholders. I cannot say that they speak for more interests than those of their own. I do not think that these creditors speak necessarily for the mass of unsecured creditors which they allege to be speaking for. I see no benefit to the mass of creditors in accepting their submissions, other than

the fact that the Monitor will dispose of US$500,000.00 less than it will if the winning bid is allowed to stand.

[45] I now wish to address the question of Section 36 CCAA.

[46] In order to approve the sale, the Court must take into account the provisions of Section 36 CCAA and in my respectful view, these conditions are respected.

[47] Section 36 CCAA reads as follows:

> **36. (1) A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act <u>may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court</u>. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.**
>
> **(2) A company that applies to the court for an authorization is to give notice of the application to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.**
>
> **(3) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to <u>consider, among other things,</u>**
>
> **(*a*) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was <u>reasonable in the circumstances</u>;**
>
> **(*b*) whether the <u>monitor approved the proc</u>ess leading to the proposed sale or disposition;**
>
> **(*c*) whether the monitor <u>filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;</u>**
>
> **(*d*) the <u>extent to which the creditors were consulted</u>;**
>
> **(*e*) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and**
>
> **(*f*) whether the <u>consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair</u>, taking into account their market value.**
>
> **(4) If the proposed sale or disposition is to a person who is related to the company, the court may, after considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), grant the authorization only if it is satisfied that**
>
> **(*a*) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the company; and**

> **(*b*) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition.**
>
> **(5) For the purpose of subsection (4), a person who is related to the company includes**
>
> **(*a*) a director or officer of the company;**
>
> **(*b*) a person who has or has had, directly or indirectly, control in fact of the company; and**
>
> **(*c*) a person who is related to a person described in paragraph (*a*) or (*b*).**
>
> **(6) The court may authorize a sale or <u>disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction</u> and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.**
>
> **(7) The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments that would have been required under paragraphs 6(4)(*a*) and (5)(*a*) if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement.**
>
> **2005, c. 47, s. 131; 2007, c. 36, s. 78.**
>
> **(added underlining)**

[48] The elements which can be found in Section 36 CCAA are, first of all, not limitative and secondly they need not to be all fulfilled in order to grant or not grant an order under this section.

[49] The Court has to look at the transaction as a whole and essentially decide whether or not the sale is appropriate, fair and reasonable. In other words, the Court could grant the process for reasons others than those mentioned in Section 36 CCAA or refuse to grant it for reasons which are not mentioned in Section 36 CCAA.

[50] Nevertheless, I was given two authorities as to what should guide the Court in similar circumstances, I refer firstly to the comments of Madame Justice Sarah Peppall in *Canwest* [2002], CarswellOnt 3509, and she writes at paragraph 13:

> **"The proposed disposition of assets meets the Section 36 CCAA criteria and those set forth in the *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* decision. Indeed, to a large degree, the criteria overlap. The process was reasonable as the Monitor was content with it** (and this is the case here)**. Sufficient efforts were made to attract the best possible bid** (this was done here through the process, I don't have to review this in detail); **the SISP was widely publicized** (I am given

> to understand that, in this present instance, the SISP was publicized enough to generate the interest of many interested bidders and then a smaller group of Qualified Bidders which ended up in the choice of one "Stalking Horse" bidder); **ample time was given to prepare offers; and there was integrity and no unfairness in the process. The Monitor was intimately involved in supervising the SISP and also made the Superior Cash Offer recommendation. The Monitor had previously advised the Court that in its opinion, the Support Transaction was preferable to a bankruptcy** (this was all done in the present case.) **The logical extension of that conclusion is that the AHC Transaction is as well** (and, of course, understand that the words "preferable to a bankruptcy" must be added to this last sentence). **The effect of the proposed sale on other interested parties is very positive.** (It doesn't mean by saying that, that it is positive upon all the creditors and that no creditor will not suffer from the process but given the representations made before me, I have to conclude that the proposed sale is the better solution for the creditors taken as a whole and not taken specifically one by one) **Amongst other things, it provides for a going concern outcome and significant recoveries for both the secured and unsecured creditors.**

[51] Here, we may have an argument that the sale will not provide significant recoveries for unsecured creditors but the question which needs to be asked is the following: "Is it absolutely necessary to provide interest for all classes of creditors in order to approve or to set aside a "Stalking Horse bid process"?

[52] In my respectful view, it is not necessary. It is, of course, always better to expect that it will happen but unfortunately, in any restructuring venture, some creditors do better than others and sometimes, some creditors do very badly. That is quite unfortunate but it is also true in the bankruptcy alternative. In any event, in similar circumstances, the Court must rely upon the final recommendation of the Monitor which, in the present instance, supports the position of the winning bidder.

[53] In *Nortel Networks*, Mister Justice Morawetz, in the context of a Motion for the Approval of an Assets Sale Agreement, Vesting Order of approval of an intellectual Property Licence Agreement, etc. basically took a similar position (2009, CarswellOnt 4838, at paragraph 35):

> **"The duties of the Court in reviewing a proposed sale of assets are as follows:**
>
> > **1) It should consider whether sufficient effort has been made to obtain the best price and that the debtor has not acted improvidently;**
> >
> > **2) It should consider the interests of all parties;**
> >
> > **3) It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained;**

4) and it should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process."

[54] I agree with this statement and it is my belief that the process applied to the present case meets these criteria.

[55] I will make no comment as to the standing of the "bitter bidder". Sixth Avenue mayo have standing as a stakeholder while it may not have any, as a disgruntled bidder.

[56] I am, however, impressed by the comments of my colleague Clément Gascon, j.s.c. in *Abitibi Bowater*, in his decision of May 3rd, 2010 where, in no unclear terms he did not think that as such, a bitter bidder should be allowed a second strike at the proverbial can.

[57] There may be other arguments that could need to be addressed in order to give satisfaction to all the arguments provided to me by counsel. Again, this has been a long day, this has been a very important and very interesting debate but at the end of the whole process, I am satisfied that the integrity of the "Stalking Horse" bid process in this file, as it was put forth and as it was conducted, meets the criteria of the case law and the CCAA. I do not think that it would be in the interest of any of the parties before me today to conclude otherwise. If I were to conclude otherwise, I would certainly not be able to grant the suggestion of "Sixth Avenue", to qualify its bid as the winning bid; I would have to eradicate the entire process and cause a new auction to be held. I am not prepared to do that.

[58] I believe that the price which will be paid by the winning bidder is satisfactory given the whole circumstances of this file. The terms and conditions of the winning bid are also acceptable so as a result, I am prepared to grant the Motion. I do not know whether the Order which you would like me to sign is available and I know that some wording was to be reviewed by some of the parties and attorneys in this room. I don't know if this has been done. Has it been done? Are KSH and SIII satisfied or content with the wording?

Attorney:
I believe, Mister Justice, that KSH and SIII have………their satisfaction with the wording. I believe also that Dow Jones, who's present, ……their satisfaction. However, AT&T has communicated that they wish to have some minor adjustments.

The Court:
Are you prepared to deal with this now or do you wish to deal with it during the week-end and submit an Order for signature once you will have ironed out the difficulties, unless there is a major difficulty that will require further hearing?

Attorney:
I think that the second option you suggested is probably the better one. So, we'd be happy to reach an agreement and then submit it to you and we'll recirculate everyone the wording.

The Court:
Very well.

The Motion to Approve the Sale of substantially all of the WB Group assets (no. 87) is **granted,** in accordance with the terms of an Order which will be completed and circulated and which will be submitted to me for signature as of Monday, next at the convenience of the parties;

The Motion of Dow Jones Company Inc. (no. 79) will be continued sine die;

The Amended Contestation of the Motion to Approve the Sale (no. 84) on behalf of "Sixth Avenue" is **dismissed** without costs (I believe that the debate was worth the effort and it will serve no purpose to impose any cost upon the contestant);

Also for the position taken by Dunes, there is no formal Motion before me but Mr. Ferland's position was important to the whole debate but I don't think that costs should be imposed upon his client as well;

The Motion to Stay the Assignment of a Contract from AT&T (no. 86) will be continued sine die;

The Intervention and Memorandum of arguments of BD White Birch Investment LLC is **granted**, without costs.

ROBERT MONGEON, J.S.C.

Counsel and parties present: see attendance list annexed to the Procès-Verbal

Date of hearing: 24 September 2010

TAB 5

CITATION: *Harte Gold Corp. (Re)*, 2022 ONSC 653
COURT FILE NO.: CV-21-00673304-00CL
DATE: 2022-02-04

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO (COMMERCIAL LIST)

RE: THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED, Applicant

AND:

A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF HARTE GOLD CORP., Applicant

BEFORE: Penny J.

COUNSEL: *Guy P. Martel, Danny Duy Vu, Lee Nicholson, William Rodler Dumais* for the Applicant

Joseph Pasquariello, Chris Armstrong, Andrew Harmes for the Court appointed Monitor

Leanne M. Williams for the Board of Directors of the Applicant

Marc Wasserman, Kathryn Esaw, Dave Rosenblat, Justin Kanji for 1000025833 Ontario Inc.

Stuart Brotman and Daniel Richer for BNP Paribas

Sean Collins, Walker W. MacLeod and Natasha Rambaran for Appian Capital Advisory LLP, 2729992 Ontario Corp., ANR Investments B.V. and AHG (Jersey) Limited

David Bish for OMF Fund II SO Ltd., Orion Resource Partners (USA) LP and their affiliates

Orlando M. Rosa and Gordon P. Acton for Netmizaaggamig Nishnaabeg First Nation (Pic Mobert First Nation)

Timothy Jones for the Attorney General of Ontario

HEARD: January 28, 2022

ENDORSEMENT

[1] This is a motion by Harte Gold for an approval and reverse vesting order involving the sale of Harte Gold's mining enterprise to a strategic purchaser (that is, an entity in the gold

mining business) and for an order extending the stay and expanding the Monitor's powers to include new entities to be created for the purposes of implementing Harte Gold's proposed restructuring. There was no opposition to the relief sought. All those who appeared at the hearing supported approval of the transaction.

[2] Following the conclusion of oral submissions on Friday, January 28, 2022, I issued the orders sought with written reasons to follow. These are the reasons.

Background

[3] Harte Gold is a public company incorporated under the *Business Corporations Act* (Ontario). Prior to January 17, 2022, its shares publicly traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange, Frankfurt Stock Exchange and over-the-counter. Harte Gold operates a gold mine located in northern Ontario within the Sault Ste. Marie Mining Division and approximately 30 km north of the town of White River. This mine, referred to as the Sugar Loaf Mine, produces gold bullion. Harte Gold has a total of 260 employees on payroll, as well as 19 employees retained through various agencies. Harte Gold's payroll obligations are current.

[4] Of some importance to the form of transaction proposed in this case, involving an approval and reverse vesting order (RVO), is the fact that Harte Gold has 12 material permits and licenses that are required to maintain its mining operations, 24 active work permits and licenses that allow the performance of exploration work on various parts of the Sugar Loaf property and many other forest resource licenses, fire permits and the like, all necessary in one way or another to Harte Gold's continued operations. Harte Gold also has 513 mineral tenures, consisting of three freehold properties, seven leasehold properties, 468 mineral claims and 35 additional tenures. The transfer of these permits and licenses etc. would involve a complex transfer or new application process of indeterminate risk, delay and cost.

[5] It is also important to note that Harte Gold is party to an Impact Benefits Agreement dated April 2018 between Harte Gold and Netmizaaggamig Nishnaabeg First Nation.

[6] Harte Gold has two primary secured creditors. They are: a numbered company (833) owned by Silver Lake Resources Limited (an Australian gold mine company). 833 is a very recent assignee of significant secured debt from BNPP; and, AHG Jersey Limited (AHG is part of the Appian group). Appian entities are also counterparties to a number of offtake agreements under which Harte Gold sells gold in exchange for prices determined by a pricing formula tied to the London bullion market. Orion is, similarly, a counterparty to additional offtake agreements. BNPP, following the assignment of its secured debt, has retained additional obligations in respect of certain hedging arrangements provided to Harte Gold. Harte Gold also has a number of trade and other unsecured creditors who are owed an estimated $7.5 million for pre-filing obligations and further amounts for services rendered post-filing.

[7] At the time of its initial application to the court, Harte Gold's assets were valued at $163.8 million. Its liabilities were valued at $166.1 million. On a balance sheet basis, therefore, Heart Gold was insolvent.

[8] Since about 2019, Harte Gold has been pursuing a number of measures to address a growing liquidity problem, a problem only exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite these efforts, in 2020 Harte Gold was obliged to seek agreement from its prime lender, BNPP, to defer debt payments and to seek a forbearance from enforcement of BNPP's security. In May 2021, Harte Gold initiated a strategic review of options to achieve the desired liquidity and to fund the acquisition of new capital. Harte Gold appointed a strategic committee of its board and, shortly thereafter, a special committee of independent directors. The special committee retained FTI as financial advisor (FTI was subsequently appointed Monitor by this Court) and developed a plan to attract new capital through a potential sale.

[9] This prefiling strategic process involved approaching over 250 potential buyers. 31 of these entities executed confidentiality agreements; 28 of those conducted due diligence through Harte Gold's virtual data room. Harte Gold received four nonbinding expressions of interest but, by the bid deadline in September 2021, no binding offers had been received.

[10] In the aftermath of this unsuccessful process, Silver Lake through 833 acquired BNPP's debt and advanced a proposal to acquire Harte Gold's operations by way of a credit bid and to provide interim financing in connection with any proceedings under the CCAA. An initial order under the CCAA issued from this Court on December 7, 2021.

[11] In the midst of this process, Harte Gold received a competing proposal to make a credit bid from Harte Gold's second secured creditor, Appian. As a result of these developments, Harte Gold resolved to conduct a further (albeit brief, given the extensive process that had just been completed) sale and investment solicitation process, this time with a stalking horse bid. Further competing proposals took place between Silver Lake and Appian over who would be the stalking horse bidder. As a result of this process, the stalking horse bid of Silver Lake was significantly improved. Appian was then content to let Silver Lake's credit bid form the basis of the SISP. I approved this process in an order dated December 20, 2021.

[12] The Monitor provided a new solicitation notice to a total of 48 known and previously unknown potential bidders (other than Silver Lake and Appian). None of the potentially interested parties signed a confidentiality agreement or requested access to the data room.

[13] Only one competing bid was received – a further credit bid from Appian with improved conditions over those proposed by Silver Lake. Ultimately, all parties agreed that the responding commitment from Silver Lake which was at least as favourable to stakeholders as the Appian bid would be, in effect, the prevailing and winning bid.

[14] This took the form of a Second Amended and Restated Subscription Agreement (SARSA) with 833, the actual purchaser. The improved terms were: (a) the assumption by the purchaser of Harte Gold's office lease at 161 Bay Street in Toronto; (b)(i) the proviso that

the $10 million cap on payment of cure costs and pre-filing trade creditors does not apply to the assumption of post-filing trade creditor obligations; and (ii) all amounts owing by Harte Gold to any of the Appian parties are subject to a settlement agreement between 833 Ontario, Silver Lake and Appian and excluded from the prefiling cure costs; and, (c) the undertaking to pay an additional cash deposit of US$1,693,658.72, equivalent to approximately 5% of the Appian indebtedness.

[15] In broad brush terms, the Silver Lake/833 purchase is structured as a reverse vesting order. The transaction will involve:

- the cancellation of all Harte Gold shares and the issue of new shares to the purchaser
- payment by the purchaser of all secured debt
- payment by the purchaser of virtually all prefiling trade amounts (estimated at $7.5 million but with a $10 million cap) and postfiling trade amounts
- certain excluded contracts and liabilities being assigned to newly formed companies which will, ultimately, be put into bankruptcy. The excluded contacts and liabilities include a number of agreements involving ongoing or future services in respect of which there is little if any money currently owed. They also include a number of contracts with Appian entities and Orion, both of which support approval of the transaction The emplyment contracts of four terminated executives will, however, be excluded liabilities, which will nullify the value of any termination claims. Notably, excluded liabilities does not include regulatory or environmental liabilities to any government authority
- retaining on the payroll all but four employees (the four members of the executive team whose employment contracts will be terminated), and
- releases, including of Harte Gold and its directors and officers, the Monitor and its legal counsel and Silver Lake and its directors and officers.

There is no provision for any break fee. Nor is there a request for any form of sealing order.

[16] I should add that the value of what the purchaser is paying for Harte Gold’s business, including the secured debt, the pre and postfiling trade amounts, interim financing and the like, totals well over $160 million.

Issues

[17] There are three principal issues:

(1) Whether the proposed transaction should be approved, including the reverse vesting order transaction structure and the form of the proposed release;

(2) Whether the stay should be extended; and,

(3) Whether the Monitor’s mandate should be extended to included additional companies (newcos) being incorporated for the purposes of executing the proposed transaction.

Analysis

[18] Section 11 of the CCAA confers jurisdiction on the Court in the broadest of terms: “the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances”.

[19] Section 36(1) of the CCAA provides:

A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

[20] Section 36(3) of the CCAA provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered on a motion to approve a sale. These include:

(a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
(b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
(c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
(d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
(e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
(f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

[21] The s. 36(3) criteria largely correspond to the principles articulated in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp*, 1991 CanLII 2727 (ONCA) for the approval of the sale of assets in an insolvency scenario:

(a) whether sufficient effort has been made to obtain the best price and that the debtor has not acted improvidently;

(b) the interests of all parties;

(c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained; and

(d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process:

see *Target Canada Co. (Re)*, 2015 ONSC 1487, at paras. 14-17.

[22] The purchase transaction for which approval is being sought in this case does not provide for a sale of assets but, rather, provides for a "reverse vesting order" under which the purchaser will become the sole shareholder of Harte Gold and certain excluded assets, excluded contracts and excluded liabilities will be vested out to new companies incorporated for that purpose.

[23] In determining whether the transaction should be approved and the RVO granted, it is appropriate to consider:

(a) the statutory basis for a reverse vesting order and whether a reverse vesting order is appropriate in the circumstances; and,

(b) the factors outlined in s. 36(3) of the CCAA, making provision or adjustment, as appropriate, for the unique aspects of a reverse vesting transaction.

The Statutory Basis (Jurisdiction) for a Reverse Vesting Order

[24] The first reverse vesting sale transaction appears to have been approved by this Court in *Plasco Energy (Re)*, (July 17, 2015), CV-15-10869-00CL in the handwritten endorsement of Justice Wilton-Siegel. The use of the reverse vesting order structure was not in dispute (indeed, in most of the cases, reported and otherwise, there has been no dispute). Wilton-Siegel J. found "the Court has authority under section 11 of the CCAA to authorize such transactions notwithstanding that the applicants are not proceeding under s. 6(2) of the CCAA insofar as it is not contemplated that the applicants will propose a plan of arrangement or compromise."

[25] A few dozen of these orders have been made since that time, mostly in a context where there was no opposition and no obvious or identified unfairness arising from the use of the RVO structure. The frequency of applications based on court approval of an RVO structure has increased significantly in the past few years.

[26] More recently, two reverse vesting orders have been approved in contested cases and been considered by appellate courts in Canada. I cite these two cases in particular because, being opposed and appealed, there tends to be a more in-depth analysis of the issues than is usually the case in the context of unopposed orders.

[27] In *Arrangement relatif à Nemaska Lithium Inc, 2020 QCCS 3218* at paras. 52 and 71 (leave to appeal to QCCA refused, *Arrangement relatif à Nemaska Lithium Inc,* 2020 QCCA 1488; leave to appeal to SCC refused, *Arrangement relatif à Nemaska Lithium Inc,* 2021 CarswellQue 4589), Justice Gouin of the Quebec Superior Court approved a reverse vesting transaction in the face of opposition by a creditor. Following a nine day hearing, Gouin J. reviewed the context of the transaction in detail and carefully analyzed the purpose and efficiency of the RVO in maintaining the going concern operations of the debtor companies. He also found that the approval of the RVO should be considered under s. 36 CCAA, subject to determining, for example:

- Whether sufficient efforts to get the best price have been made and whether the parties acted providently

- The efficacy and integrity of the process followed

- The interests of the parties, and

- Whether any unfairness resulted from the process.

Gouin J. considered that these criteria had been met and found the issuance of the RVO to be a valid exercise of his discretion, concluding that it would serve to maximize creditor recoveries while maintaining the debtor companies as a going concern and allowing an efficient transfer of the necessary permits, licences and authorizations to the purchaser.

[28] In denying leave to appeal, the Quebec Court of Appeal noted that the CCAA judge found that "the terms 'sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business' under subsection 36(1) of the CCAA should be broadly interpreted to allow a CCAA judge to grant innovative solutions such as RVOs on a case by case basis, in accordance with the wide discretionary powers afforded the supervising judge pursuant to section 11 CCAA, as recognized by the Supreme Court in *Callidus*": *Nemaska* QCCA at para 19.

[29] Similarly, in *Quest University Canada (Re)*, 2020 BCSC 1883, Justice Fitzpatrick of the British Columbia Supreme Court extensively reviewed the caselaw related to a CCAA court's authority to grant a reverse vesting order. Fitzpatrick J. found that the CCAA provided sufficient authority to grant the reverse vesting order being sought, which was consistent "with the remedial purposes of the CCAA" and consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling on CCAA jurisdiction in *9354-9186 Québec Inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp.,* 2020 SCC 10. She found, therefore, that the issue in each case is not whether the court has sufficient jurisdiction but whether the relief is "appropriate" in the circumstances and stakeholders are treated as fairly and reasonably as the circumstances permit.

[30] In *Quest*, the debtor was in the process of putting forward a plan of compromise under the CCAA. It encountered resistance from an unsecured creditor whose vote could potentially have prevented the necessary creditor approval of the plan. The debtor revised its approach, deleting all conditions precedent requiring creditor and court approval and proceeded with a motion for the approval of an RVO to achieve what it was really after; that is, a sale of certain assets to a new owner with Quest continuing as a going concern academic institution.

[31] Fitzpatrick J. relied on *Callidus* to the effect that:

- Courts have long recognized that s. 11 of the CCAA signals legislative endorsement of the "broad reading of CCAA authority developed by the jurisprudence". On the plain wording of the provision, the jurisdiction granted by s. 11 is constrained only by restrictions set out in the CCAA itself, and the requirement that the order made be "appropriate in the circumstances"

- the CCAA generally prioritizes "avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company"

- Where a party seeks an order relating to a matter that falls within the supervising judge's purview, and for which there is no CCAA provision conferring more specific jurisdiction, s. 11 necessarily is the provision of first resort in anchoring jurisdiction. As Blair J.A. put it in *Stelco*, s. 11 "for the most part supplants the need to resort to inherent jurisdiction" in the CCAA context

- The exercise of the discretion under s. 11 must further the remedial objectives of the CCAA and be guided by the baseline considerations of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence

- Whether this discretion ought to be exercised in a particular case is a circumstance-specific inquiry that must balance the various objectives of the CCAA. The supervising judge is best positioned to undertake this inquiry.

[32] The SCC in *Callidus* made an important point in the context of the limits of broad discretion; all discretion has limits and its exercise under s. 11 must accord with the objectives of the CCAA and other insolvency legislation in Canada. These objectives include: providing for timely, efficient and impartial resolution of a debtor's insolvency; preserving and maximizing the value of a debtor's assets; ensuring fair and equitable treatment of the claims against a debtor; protecting the public interest; and, in the context of a commercial insolvency, balancing the costs and benefits of restructuring or liquidating the company. Further, the discretion under s. 11 must also be exercised in furtherance of three baseline considerations: (a) that the order sought is appropriate in the circumstances, and (b) that the applicant has been acting in good faith and (c) with due diligence.

[33] Ultimately, Fitzpatrick J. held that, in the complex and unique circumstances of that case, it was appropriate to exercise her discretion to allow the RVO structure. Quest sought this relief in good faith and while acting with due diligence to promote the best outcome for all stakeholders. She considered the balance between the competing interests at play and concluded that the proposed transaction was unquestionably the fairest and most reasonable means by which the greatest benefit can be achieved for the overall stakeholder group.

[34] The British Columbia Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, concluding that the appeal was not "meritorious", also noting that reverse vesting orders had been granted in other contested proceedings, namely *Nemaska*. The BCCA also stated that the reverse vesting order granted by Fitzpatrick J. "reflect[ed] precisely the type of intricate, fact-specific, real-time decision making that inheres in judges supervising CCAA proceedings": *Southern Star Developments Ltd. v. Quest University Canada*, 2020 BCCA 364.

[35] It is worthy of note that, in both *Nemaska* and *Quest*, the *bona fides* of the objectors were front and centre in the judicial analysis and, in both cases, the motivations and objectives of the objectors were found suspect and inadequate.

[36] The jurisdiction of the court to issue an RVO is frequently said to arise from s. 11 and s. 36(1) of the CCAA. However, the structure of the transaction employing an RVO typically does not involve the debtor ‘selling or otherwise disposing of assets outside the ordinary course of business’, as provided in s. 36(1). This is because the RVO structure is really a purchase of shares of the debtor and “vesting out” from the debtor to a new company, of unwanted assets, obligations and liabilities.

[37] I am, therefore, not sure I agree with the analysis which founds jurisdiction to issue an RVO in s. 36(1). But that can be left for another day because I am wholeheartedly in agreement that s. 11, as broadly interpreted in the jurisprudence including, most recently, *Callidus*, clearly provides the court with jurisdiction to issue such an order, provided the discretion available under s. 11 is exercised in accordance with the objects and purposes of the CCAA. And it is for this reason that I also wholeheartedly agree that the analytical framework of s. 36(3) for considering an asset sale transaction, even though s. 36 may not support a standalone basis for jurisdiction in an RVO situation, should be applied, with necessary modifications, to an RVO transaction.

[38] Given this context, however, I think it would be wrong to regard employment of the RVO structure in an insolvency situation as the “norm” or something that is routine or ordinary course. Neither the BIA nor the CCAA deal specifically with the use or application of an RVO structure. The judicial authorities approving this approach, while there are now quite a few, do not generally provide much guidance on the positive and negative implications of this restructuring technique or what to look out for. Broader-based commentary and discussion is only now just now starting to emerge. This suggests to me that the RVO should continue to be regarded as an unusual or extraordinary measure; not an approach appropriate in any case merely because it may be more convenient or beneficial for the purchaser. Approval of the use of an RVO structure should, therefore, involve close scrutiny. The Monitor and the court must be diligent in ensuring that the restructuring is fair and reasonable to all parties having regard to the objectives and statutory constraints of the CCAA. This is particularly the case where there is no party with a significant stake in the outcome opposing the use of an RVO structure. The debtor, the purchaser and especially the Monitor, as the court appointed officer overseeing the process and answerable to the court (and in addition to all the usual enquiries and reporting obligations), must be prepared to answer questions such as:

(a) Why is the RVO necessary in this case?

(b) Does the RVO structure produce an economic result at least as favourable as any other viable alternative?

(c) Is any stakeholder worse off under the RVO structure than they would have been under any other viable alternative? and

(d) Does the consideration being paid for the debtor’s business reflect the importance and value of the licences and permits (or other intangible assets) being preserved under the RVO structure?

[39] With this in mind, I will turn to the enumerated s. 36(3) factors. To the extent there are RVO specific issues of concern apart from those enumerated in s. 36(3), I will also address those in the following section of my analysis.

The Section 36 Factors in the RVO Context

Reasonableness of the Process Leading to the Proposed Sale

[40] Between the pre-filing strategic review process and the court approved SISP, the business and assets of Harte Gold have been extensively marketed on a global basis. While the SISP was subject to variation from the format contemplated in my earlier order, the ability of the applicant, in conjunction with the Monitor, to vary the process was already established in that order. I find, in any event, that the adjustments made were appropriate in the circumstances, given there were no new bidders and the only offers came from the two competing secured creditors who had already been extensively involved in the process and whose status, interests and objectives were well known to the applicant and the Monitor.

[41] Prior to its appointment as Monitor, FTI was intimately involved at all stages of the strategic review process, including the implementation of the pre-filing marketing process and the negotiation of the original proposed subscription agreement that was executed prior to the commencement of the CCAA proceedings and subsequently replaced by the stalking horse bid and the SARSA.

[42] Following the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, the Monitor was involved in the negotiations that resulted in the execution of the stalking horse bid and the SARSA. In addition, the Monitor has overseen the implementation of the SISP and is satisfied that it was carried out in accordance with the SISP procedures, including the Monitor’s consent to the amendment of the SISP procedures to cancel the auction as unnecessary and accept the SARSA as the best option available.

[43] The Monitor’s opinion is that the process was reasonable, leading to the best outcome reasonably available in the circumstances.

[44] I am satisfied that the sales process was reasonable. The transaction now before the Court was the culmination of approximately seven months of extensive solicitation efforts on the part of both Harte Gold and FTI as part of the prefiling strategic process and the SISP.

[45] Harte Gold and FTI broadly canvassed the market by contacting 241 parties regarding their potential interest in acquiring Harte Gold’s business and assets. This process ultimately culminated in initial competing bids from Silver Lake and Appian and, subsequently, additional competing bids from both entities as part of the SISP. The competitive tension in this process resulted in material improvements for stakeholders on both occasions.

Comparison with Sale in Bankruptcy

[46] The Monitor has considered whether the completion of the transaction contemplated by the SARSA would be more beneficial to creditors of the applicant and stakeholders generally than a sale or disposition of the business and assets of Harte Gold under a bankruptcy. The Monitor is unambiguously of the view that the SARSA transaction is the vastly more beneficial option.

[47] The SISP has shown that the SARSA represents the highest and best offer available for Harte Gold's business and assets. The Monitor is satisfied that the approval and completion of the transactions contemplated by the SARSA are in the best interests of the creditors of Harte Gold and its stakeholders generally.

[48] In addition to anything else, a bankruptcy would jeopardize ongoing operations and the permits and licences necessary to maintain such operations. A sale in bankruptcy would delay and, again, jeopardize the approval and closing of the proposed transaction as it would be necessary to first assign Harte Gold into bankruptcy or obtain a bankruptcy order, convene a meeting of creditors, appoint inspectors and obtain the approval of the inspectors for the transaction prior to seeking a more traditional AVO or an RVO. Additional costs would also be incurred in undertaking those steps. Silver Lake would have to continue to advance additional funds to finance ongoing operations during this extended period. There is no indication it would be willing to do so. In any event, requiring such a process would fundamentally change the value proposition the purchaser has relied upon and is willing to accept.

[49] Taking all this into account, a sale or disposition of the business and assets of the applicant in a bankruptcy would almost certainly result in a lower recovery for stakeholders and would not be more beneficial than closing the RVO transaction in the CCAA proceedings.

Consultation with Creditors

[50] Harte Gold's major creditors are Silver Lake, the Appian parties and BNPP. BNPP still has potential claims of approximately $28 million in respect of its hedge agreements. Silver Lake has claims of approximately $95 million in respect of the DIP facility and the first lien credit facilities it acquired from BNPP. The Appian parties have claims of approximately US$34 million in respect of amounts owing under the Appian facility and additional potential claims in respect of obligations under royalty and offtake agreements.

[51] BNPP was consulted throughout the strategic review process and has executed a support agreement with the purchaser. In addition, as previously described, the purchaser and the Appian Parties have been extensively involved in the SISP.

[52] While there is no evidence of consultations with unsecured creditors, I do not regard that as a material deficiency given that virtually all creditors, secured and unsecured alike, are going to be paid in full under the terms of the SARSA.

[53] The Monitor is of the view that the degree of creditor consultation has been appropriate in the circumstances. The Monitor does not consider that any material change in the outcome of efforts to sell the business and assets of the Applicant would have resulted from additional creditor consultation.

[54] I find, on the evidence, that the Monitor's assessment of this factor is well supported and correct.

The Effect of the Proposed Sale on Creditors and Other Interested Parties

[55] The proposed transaction affords the following benefits to the creditors and to stakeholders generally:

(a) the retention and payment in full of the claims of almost all creditors of Harte Gold;

(b) continued employment for all except four of the Harte Gold's employees;

(c) ongoing business opportunities for suppliers of goods and services to the Sugar Loaf Mine; and

(d) the continuation of the benefits of the existing Impact Benefits Agreement with Netmizaaggamig Nishnaabeg First Nation.

[56] The Monitor's opinion is that the effect of the proposed transaction is overwhelming positive for the vast majority of Harte Gold's creditors and other stakeholders apart (as discussed below) from the shareholders who have no reasonable economic interest at this point.

[57] Unlike *Quest*, this is not a case in which the RVO is being used to thwart creditor opposition. Indeed, the evidence is that almost all creditors, secured and unsecured, will be paid in full. To the extent there might be concerns that an RVO structure could be used to thwart creditor democracy and voting rights, those concerns are not present here. This is not a traditional "compromise" situation. It is hard to see how anything would change under a creditor class vote scenario because almost all of the creditors are being paid in full.

[58] The evidence is that there is no creditor being placed in a worse position, because of the use of an RVO transaction structure, than they would have been in under a more traditional asset sale and AVO structure (or, for that matter, under any plausible plan of compromise).

[59] Because the transaction contemplates the cancellation of all existing shares and related rights in Harte Gold and the issue of new shares to the purchaser, the existing shareholders of Harte Gold will receive no recovery on their investment. Being a public company, Harte Gold has issued material change notices as the events described above were unfolding. By the time of the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, the shareholders had been advised in no uncertain terms that there was no prospect of shareholders realizing any value for their equity investment.

[60] The evidence of Harte's financial problems and balance sheet insolvency, the unsuccessful prefiling strategic review process, and the hard reality that the only parties willing to bid anything for Harte Gold were the holders of secured debt (and only for, effectively, the value of the secured debt plus carrying and process costs) only serves to emphasize that equity holders will not see, and on any other realistic scenario would not see, any recovery of their equity investment in Harte Gold.

[61] Under s. 186(1) of the OBCA, "reorganization" includes a court order made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or an order made under the *Companies Creditors Arrangement Act* approving a proposal. While the term "proposal" is unfortunate (because there are no formal "proposals" under the CCAA), I view the use of this term in the non-technical sense of the word; that is, as encompassing any proposal such as the proposed transaction brought forward for the approval of the Court under the provisions of the CCAA in this case.

[62] Section 186(2) of the OBCA provides that if a corporation is subject to a reorganization, its articles may be amended by the court order to effect any change that might lawfully be made by an amendment under s. 168. Section 168(1)(g) provides that a corporation may from time to time amend its articles to add, change or remove any provision that is set out in its articles, including to change the designation of all or any of its shares, and add, change or remove any rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions, including rights to accrued dividends, in respect of all or any of its shares. This provides the jurisdiction of the court to approve the cancellation of all outstanding shares and the issuance of new shares to the purchaser.

[63] Section 36(1) of the CCAA contemplates that despite any requirement for shareholder approval, the court may authorize a sale or disposition out of the ordinary course even if shareholder approval is not obtained. While, again, s. 36(1) is concerned with asset sales, the underlying logic of this provision applies to an assessment of cancellation of shares as well. In this case, there is no prospect of shareholder recovery on any realistic scenario.

[64] Equity claims are subject to special treatment under the CCAA. Section 6(8) prohibits court approval of a plan of compromise if any equity is to be paid before payment in full of all claims that are not equity claims. Section 22(1) provides that equity claimants are prohibited from voting on a plan unless the court orders otherwise. In short, shareholders have no economic interest in an insolvent enterprise: *Sino-Forest Corporation (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 4377, paras. 23-29. In circumstances like Harte Gold's, where the shareholders have no economic interest, present or future, it would be unnecessary and, indeed, inappropriate to require a vote of the shareholders: *Stelco Inc. (Re)*, 2006 CanLII 4500 at para. 11. The order requested for the cancellation of existing shares is, for these reasons, justified in the circumstances.

[65] Taking all this into account, I find that the effect of the transaction on creditors and stakeholders is overwhelmingly positive and the best outcome reasonably available in the circumstances.

Fairness of Consideration

[66] Harte Gold's business and assets have been extensively marketed both prior to and during the CCAA proceedings. At the conclusion of the SISP, two bids were available, which were equivalent in all material respects and represented the highest and best offers received. As described earlier, all parties concurred that the Silver Lake-sponsored SARSA should be determined to be the successful bid. As also described above, the closing of the SARSA transaction will provide a vastly superior recovery for creditors than would a liquidation of Harte Gold's assets in bankruptcy. Based on the market, therefore, the consideration must be considered fair and reasonable.[1]

[67] A further concern with an RVO transaction structure such as this one could be whether, in effect, a purchaser making a credit bid might be getting something (i.e., the licences and permits) for nothing (i.e., the licences and permits were not subject to the creditor's security). It is possible that in a bankruptcy, for example, the licences and permits might have no value. The evidence here is that the purchaser is paying more than Harte Gold would be worth in a bankruptcy. The evidence is also that the purchaser is paying considerably more than just the value of the secured debt. This includes cure costs for third party trade creditors and DIP financing to keep the Mine operational – both payments being made to bring about the acquisition of the Mine as a going concern.

[68] It is true that no attempt has been made to put an independent value on the transfer of the licences and permits. However, any strategic buyer (Silver Lake is a strategic buyer and acquired the BNPP debt for this purpose) would need the licences and permits. The results of the prefiling strategic process and the SISP constitutes evidence that no one else among the universe of potential purchasers of an operating gold mine in Northern Ontario was willing to pay more than Silver Lake was willing to pay. In the circumstances, I do not think it could be seriously suggested that Silver Lake is getting "something" for "nothing".

[69] The Monitor is satisfied that the consideration is fair in the circumstances. I agree with the Monitor's assessment for the reasons outlined above.

Other Considerations Re Appropriateness of RVO vs. AVO

[70] As noted, Harte Gold has twelve material permits and licenses that are required to maintain its mining operations, as well as twenty-four active work permits and licenses that allow the performance of exploration work and many other forest resource licences and fire permits.

[71] The principal objective and benefit of employing the RVO approach in this case is the preservation of Harte Gold's many permits and licences necessary to conduct operations at the Sugar Loaf Mine. Under a traditional asset sale and AVO structure, the purchaser would

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[1] The total value of the consideration is, perhaps coincidentally, also roughly equivalent to the value of Harte Gold's assets as shown in its audited financial statements in the last full year prior to the commencement of these proceedings.

have to apply to the various agencies and regulatory authorities for transfers of existing licences and permits or, if transfers are not possible, for new licences and permits. This is a process that would necessarily involve risk, delay, and cost. The RVO sought in this case achieves the timely and efficient preservation of the necessary licences and permits necessary for the operations of the Mine.

[72] It is no secret that time is not on the side of a debtor company faced with Harte Gold's financial challenges. It is also relevant that the purchaser has agreed to provide DIP financing up to $10.8 million and substantial cure costs of pre and post filing trade obligations. This is all financing required to be able to continue operations as a going concern at the Mine post closing and to fund the CCAA process.

[73] The position of the purchaser is, not unreasonably, that it will not <u>both</u> continue to fund ongoing operations and the CCAA process <u>and</u> undertake a process of application to relevant government agencies for transfers of the Harte Gold licenses and permits (or, if necessary, for new ones) with all of the risks and uncertainties of possible adverse outcomes and indeterminant delays and costs associated with such a process. The RVO structure will enable the transaction to be completed efficiently and expeditiously, without exposure to these material risks, delays and costs.

[74] The Monitor supports the use of the RVO transaction structure. The Monitor has also pointed out that the applicant holds some 513 mineral tenures, consisting of three freehold properties, seven leasehold properties, 468 mineral claims and 35 additional tenures. The reverse vesting structure avoids the need to amend the various registrations to reflect a new owner, which would add more cost and delay if the proposed purchase transaction was to proceed through a traditional asset purchase and vesting order.

[75] In addition, Harte Gold has a significant number of contracts that will be retained under the SARSA. Again, the RVO transaction structure will avoid potentially significant delays and costs associated with having to seek consent to assignment from contract counter-parties or, if consents could not be obtained, orders assigning such contracts under s. 11.3 of the CCAA. The Monitor has also pointed out that under the SARSA and the RVO, the purchaser will be required to pay applicable cure costs in respect of the retained contracts which has been structured in substantially the same manner as contemplated by s. 11.3(4) of the CCAA if a contract was assigned by court order.

[76] For all these reasons, I accept that the proposed RVO transaction structure is necessary to achieve the clear benefits of the Silver Lake purchase and that it is appropriate to approve this transaction in the circumstances.

<u>Conclusion on RVO/Section 36 Issues</u>

[77] In all the circumstances, I find that the RVO sought in the circumstances of this case is in the interests of the creditors and stakeholders in general. I consider the RVO to be appropriate in the circumstances. The RVO will: provide for timely, efficient and impartial resolution of Harte Gold's insolvency; preserve and maximize the value of Harte Gold's

assets; ensure a fair and equitable treatment of the claims against Harte Gold; protect the public interest (in the sense of preserving employment for well over 250 employees as well as numerous third party suppliers and service providers and maintaining Harte Gold's commitments to the First Nations peoples of the area); and, balances the costs and benefits of Harte Gold's restructuring or liquidation.

<u>Release</u>

[78] Harte Gold seeks a Release which includes the present and former directors and officers of Harte Gold and the newcos, the Monitor and its legal counsel, and the purchaser and its directors, and officers. The proposed Release covers all present and future claims against the released parties based upon any fact, matter of occurrence in respect of the SARSA transactions or Harte Gold and its assets, business or affairs, except any claim for fraud or willful misconduct or any claim that is not permitted to be released under s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA.

[79] CCAA courts have frequently approved releases, both in the context of a plan and in the absence of a CCAA plan, both on consent and in contested matters. These releases have been in favour of the parties, directors, officers, monitors, counsel, employees, shareholders and advisors.

[80] I find that the requested Release is reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances. I base my decision on an assessment of following factors taken from *Lydian International Limited (Re)*, 2020 ONSC 4006 at para. 54. As is often the case in the exercise of discretionary powers, it is not necessary for each of the factors to apply for the release to be approved.

[81] <u>Whether the claims to be released are rationally connected to the purpose of the restructuring</u>: The claims released are rationally connected to Harte Gold's restructuring. The Release will have the effect of diminishing claims against the released parties, which in turn will diminish indemnification claims by the released parties against the Administration Charge and the Directors' Charge. The result is a larger pool of cash available to satisfy creditor claims. Given that a purpose of a CCAA proceeding is to maximize creditor recovery, a release that helps achieve this goal is rationally connected to the purpose of the Company's restructuring.

[82] <u>Whether the releasees contributed to the restructuring</u>: The released parties made significant contributions to Harte Gold's restructuring, both prior to and throughout these CCAA Proceedings. Among other things, the extensive efforts of the directors and management of Harte Gold were instrumental in the conduct of the prefiling strategic process, the SISP and the continued operations of Harte Gold during the CCAA proceedings. With a proposed sale that will maintain Harte Gold as a going concern and permit most creditors to receive recovery in full, these CCAA proceedings have had what must be considered a "successful" outcome for the benefit of Harte Gold's stakeholders. The released parties have clearly contributed time, energy and resources to achieve this outcome and accordingly, are deserving of a release.

[83] Whether the Release is fair, reasonable and not overly broad: The Release is fair and reasonable. Harte Gold is unaware of any outstanding director claims or liabilities against its directors and officers. Similarly, Harte Gold is unaware of any claims against the advisors related to their provision of services to Harte Gold or to the purchaser relating to Harte Gold or these CCAA proceedings. As such, the Release is not expected to materially prejudice any stakeholders. Further, the Release is sufficiently narrow. Regulatory or environmental liabilities owed to any government authority have not been disclaimed and the language of the Release was specifically negotiated with the Ministry of Northern Development and Mines to preserve those identified obligations. Further, the Release carves out and preserves claims that are not permitted to be released pursuant to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA and claims arising from fraud or wilful misconduct. The scope of the Release is sufficiently balanced and will allow Harte Gold and the released parties to move forward with the transaction and to conclude these CCAA proceedings.

[84] Whether the restructuring could succeed without the Release: The Release is being sought, with the support of Silver Lake and the Appian parties (the most significant stakeholders in these CCAA proceedings) as it will enhance the certainty and finality of the transaction. Additionally, Harte Gold and the purchaser both take the position that the Release is an essential component to the transaction.

[85] Whether the Release benefits Harte Gold as well as the creditors generally: The Release benefits Harte Gold and its creditors and other stakeholders by reducing the potential for the released parties to seek indemnification, thus minimizing further claims against the Administration Charge and the Directors' Charge.

[86] Creditors' knowledge of the nature and effect of the Release: All creditors on the service list were served with materials relating to this motion. Harte Gold also made additional efforts to serve all parties with excluded claims under the transaction. Additionally, the form of the Release was included in the draft approval and reverse vesting order that was included in the original Application Record in these CCAA proceedings. All of this provided stakeholders with ample notice and time to raise concerns with Harte Gold or the Monitor. No creditor (or any other stakeholder) has objected to the Release. A specific claims process for claims against the released parties in these circumstances would only result in additional costs and delay without any apparent corresponding benefit.

Extension of the Stay

[87] The current stay period expires on January 31, 2022. Under s. 11.02 of the CCAA, the court may grant an extension of a stay of proceedings where: (a) circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and (b) the debtor company satisfies the court that it has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

[88] Harte Gold is seeking to extend the stay period to and including March 29, 2022 to allow it to proceed with the closing of the Silver Lake transaction, while at the same time preserving the status quo and preventing creditors and others from taking any steps to try and better their positions in comparison to other creditors.

[89] No creditors are expected to suffer material prejudice as a result of the extension of the stay of proceedings. Harte Gold is acting in good faith and will continue to pay its post-filing obligations in the ordinary course. As detailed in Harte Gold's cash flow forecast, it is expected to have sufficient liquidity to continue its operations during the contemplated extension of the stay.

[90] For these reasons the stay is extended to March 29, 2022.

Expansion of Monitor's Powers

[91] The CCAA provides the Court with broad discretion in respect of the Monitor's functions. Section 23(1)(k) of the CCAA provides that the Monitor can "carry out any other functions in relation to the [debtor] company that the court may direct". In addition, of course, s. 11 of the CCAA authorizes this Court to make any order that is necessary and appropriate in the circumstances.

[92] The order for the Monitor's expanded powers is intended to provide the Monitor with the power, effective upon the issuance of the approval and reverse vesting order, to administer the affairs of the newcos (which is necessary to complete the transaction), along with powers necessary to wind down these CCAA proceedings and to put the newcos into bankruptcy following the close of the transaction. No creditor is prejudiced by the expansion of the Monitor's powers to facilitate the transaction and the wind-down of the CCAA proceedings. On the contrary, the granting of such powers is necessary to achieve the benefits of the transaction to stakeholders which have been described above.

[93] I approve the grant of the requested powers to the Monitor.

Conclusion

[94] For all these reasons, the motion for an order approving the Silver Lake transaction, including the RVO structure, is granted. The additional requests for orders extending the stay and expanding the Monitor's powers are also granted.

Penny J.

Date: 2022-02-04

TAB 6

Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp., Canadian Pension Capital Ltd. and Canadian Insurers Capital Corp.

Indexed as: Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp. (C.A.)

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ONTARIO
Court of Appeal for Ontario
Goodman, McKinlay and Galligan JJ.A.
July 3, 1991

Debtor and creditor -- Receivers -- Court-appointed receiver accepting offer to purchase assets against wishes of secured creditors -- Receiver acting properly and prudently -- Wishes of creditors not determinative -- Court approval of sale confirmed on appeal.

Air Toronto was a division of Soundair. In April 1990, one of Soundair's creditors, the Royal Bank, appointed a receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. The receiver was authorized to sell Air Toronto to Air Canada, or, if that sale could not be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person. Air Canada made an offer which the receiver rejected. The receiver then entered into negotiations with Canadian Airlines International (Canadian); two subsidiaries of Canadian, Ontario Express Ltd. and Frontier Airlines Ltd., made an offer to purchase on March 6, 1991 (the OEL offer). Air Canada and a creditor of Soundair, CCFL, presented an offer to purchase to the receiver on March 7, 1991 through 922, a company formed for that purpose (the 922 offer). The receiver declined the 922 offer because it contained an unacceptable condition and accepted the OEL offer. 922 made a second offer, which was virtually identical to the first one except that the unacceptable condition had been removed. In proceedings before Rosenberg J., an order was made approving the sale of Air Toronto to OEL and dismissing the 922 offer. CCFL appealed.

Held, the appeal should be dismissed.

Per Galligan J.A.: When deciding whether a receiver has acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer, and should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. The decision to sell to OEL was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Prices in other offers received after the receiver has agreed to a sale have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the accepted offer was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. If they do not do so, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If the 922 offer was better than the OEL offer, it was only marginally better and did not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was improvident.

While the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of creditors, a secondary but important consideration is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. The court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

The failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto did not result in the process being unfair, as there was no proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL.

The fact that the 922 offer was supported by Soundair's secured creditors did not mean that the court should have given effect to their wishes. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets (and therefore insulated themselves from the risks of acting privately) should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale by the receiver. If the court decides that a court-appointed receiver has acted providently and properly (as the receiver did in this case), the views of creditors should not be determinative.

Per McKinlay J.A. (concurring in the result): While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it was not a procedure which was likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

Per Goodman J.A. (dissenting): The fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. The creditors in this case were convinced that acceptance of the 922 offer was in their best interest and the evidence supported that belief. Although the receiver acted in good faith, the process which it used was unfair insofar as 922 was concerned and improvident insofar as the secured creditors were concerned.

Cases referred to

Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd. (Re) (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.); British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Inc. (1977), 5 B.C.L.R. 94, 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28 (S.C.); Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.); Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C.

(2d) 131, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320 (note), 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.J.); Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 (C.A.); Selkirk (Re) (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.); Selkirk (Re) (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. Bkcy.)

Statutes referred to

Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137
Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141

APPEAL from the judgment of the General Division, Rosenberg J., May 1, 1991, approving the sale of an airline by a receiver.

J.B. Berkow and Steven H. Goldman, for appellants.

John T. Morin, Q.C., for Air Canada.

L.A.J. Barnes and Lawrence E. Ritchie, for Royal Bank of Canada.

Sean F. Dunphy and G.K. Ketcheson for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver of Soundair Corp., respondent.

W.G. Horton, for Ontario Express Ltd.

Nancy J. Spies, for Frontier Air Ltd.

GALLIGAN J.A.:-- This is an appeal from the order of Rosenberg J. made on May 1, 1991 (Gen. Div.). By that order, he approved the sale of Air Toronto to Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Air Limited and he dismissed a motion to approve an offer to purchase Air Toronto by 922246 Ontario Limited.

It is necessary at the outset to give some background to the dispute. Soundair Corporation (Soundair) is a corporation engaged in the air transport business. It has three divisions. One of them is Air Toronto. Air Toronto operates a scheduled airline from Toronto to a number of mid-sized cities in the United States of America. Its routes serve as feeders to several of Air Canada's routes. Pursuant to a connector agreement, Air Canada provides some services to Air Toronto and benefits from the feeder traffic provided by it. The operational relationship between Air Canada and Air Toronto is a close one.

In the latter part of 1989 and the early part of 1990, Soundair was in financial difficulty. Soundair has two secured creditors who have an interest in the assets of Air Toronto. The Royal Bank of Canada (the Royal Bank) is owed at least $65,000,000. The appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers Capital Corporation (collectively called CCFL) are owed approximately $9,500,000. Those creditors will have a deficiency expected to be in excess of $50,000,000 on the winding-up of Soundair.

On April 26, 1990, upon the motion of the Royal Bank, O'Brien J. appointed Ernst & Young Inc. (the receiver) as receiver of all of the assets, property and undertakings of Soundair. The order required the receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. Because of the close relationship between Air Toronto and Air Canada, it was contemplated that the receiver would obtain the assistance of Air Canada to operate Air Toronto. The order authorized the receiver:

> (b) to enter into contractual arrangements with Air Canada to retain a manager or operator, including Air Canada, to manage and operate Air Toronto under the supervision of Ernst & Young Inc. until the completion of the sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada or other person ...

Also because of the close relationship, it was expected that Air Canada would purchase Air Toronto. To that end, the order of O'Brien J. authorized the receiver:

> (c) to negotiate and do all things necessary or desirable to complete a sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada and, if a sale

to Air Canada cannot be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person, subject to terms and conditions approved by this Court.

Over a period of several weeks following that order, negotiations directed towards the sale of Air Toronto took place between the receiver and Air Canada. Air Canada had an agreement with the receiver that it would have exclusive negotiating rights during that period. I do not think it is necessary to review those negotiations, but I note that Air Canada had complete access to all of the operations of Air Toronto and conducted due diligence examinations. It became thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of Air Toronto's operations.

Those negotiations came to an end when an offer made by Air Canada on June 19, 1990, was considered unsatisfactory by the receiver. The offer was not accepted and lapsed. Having regard to the tenor of Air Canada's negotiating stance and a letter sent by its solicitors on July 20, 1990, I think that the receiver was eminently reasonable when it decided that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada.

The receiver then looked elsewhere. Air Toronto's feeder business is very attractive, but it only has value to a national airline. The receiver concluded reasonably, therefore, that it was commercially necessary for one of Canada's two national airlines to be involved in any sale of Air Toronto. Realistically, there were only two possible purchasers whether direct or indirect. They were Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International.

It was well known in the air transport industry that Air Toronto was for sale. During the months following the collapse of the negotiations with Air Canada, the receiver tried unsuccessfully to find viable purchasers. In late 1990, the receiver turned to Canadian Airlines International, the only realistic alternative. Negotiations began between them. Those negotiations led to a letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. On March 6, 1991, the receiver received an offer from Ontario

Express Limited and Frontier Airlines Limited, who are subsidiaries of Canadian Airlines International. This offer is called the OEL offer.

In the meantime, Air Canada and CCFL were having discussions about making an offer for the purchase of Air Toronto. They formed 922246 Ontario Limited (922) for the purpose of purchasing Air Toronto. On March 1, 1991, CCFL wrote to the receiver saying that it proposed to make an offer. On March 7, 1991, Air Canada and CCFL presented an offer to the receiver in the name of 922. For convenience, its offers are called the 922 offers.

The first 922 offer contained a condition which was unacceptable to the receiver. I will refer to that condition in more detail later. The receiver declined the 922 offer and on March 8, 1991, accepted the OEL offer. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer. It then submitted an offer which was virtually identical to that of March 7, 1991, except that the unacceptable condition had been removed.

The proceedings before Rosenberg J. then followed. He approved the sale to OEL and dismissed a motion for the acceptance of the 922 offer. Before Rosenberg J., and in this court, both CCFL and the Royal Bank supported the acceptance of the second 922 offer.

There are only two issues which must be resolved in this appeal. They are:

(1) Did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to OEL?

(2) What effect does the support of the 922 offer by the secured creditors have on the result?

I will deal with the two issues separately.

I. DID THE RECEIVER ACT PROPERLY

IN AGREEING TO SELL TO OEL?

Before dealing with that issue there are three general observations which I think I should make. The first is that the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

The order of O'Brien J. provided that if the receiver could not complete the sale to Air Canada that it was "to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person". The court did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. It did not say it was to call for bids or conduct an auction. It told the receiver to negotiate and sell. It obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially in the discretion of the receiver. I think, therefore, that the court should not review minutely the process of the sale when, broadly speaking, it appears to the court to be a just process.

As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.J.), at pp. 92-94 O.R., pp. 531-33 D.L.R., of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.

2. It should consider the interests of all parties.

3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.

4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

I intend to discuss the performance of those duties separately.

1. Did the receiver make a sufficient effort to get the best price and did it act providently?

Having regard to the fact that it was highly unlikely that a commercially viable sale could be made to anyone but the two national airlines, or to someone supported by either of them, it is my view that the receiver acted wisely and reasonably when it negotiated only with Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International. Furthermore, when Air Canada said that it would submit no further offers and gave the impression that it would not participate further in the receiver's efforts to sell, the only course reasonably open to the receiver was to negotiate with Canadian Airlines International. Realistically, there was nowhere else to go but to Canadian Airlines International. In doing so, it is my opinion that the receiver made sufficient efforts to sell the airline.

When the receiver got the OEL offer on March 6, 1991, it was over ten months since it had been charged with the responsibility of selling Air Toronto. Until then, the receiver had not received one offer which it thought was acceptable. After substantial efforts to sell the airline over that period, I find it difficult to think that the receiver acted improvidently in accepting the only acceptable offer which it had.

On March 8, 1991, the date when the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers, the OEL offer which was acceptable, and the 922 offer which contained an unacceptable condition. I cannot see how the receiver, assuming for the moment that the price was reasonable, could have done anything but accept the OEL offer.

When deciding whether a receiver had acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in Crown Trust v. Rosenberg, supra, at p. 112 O.R., p. 551 D.L.R.:

> Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment on the elements then available to it. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.
>
> If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

(Emphasis added)

I also agree with and adopt what was said by Macdonald J.A.

in Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303 (C.A.), at p. 11 C.B.R., p. 314 N.S.R.:

> In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement.

(Emphasis added)

On March 8, 1991, the receiver had two offers. One was the OEL offer which it considered satisfactory but which could be withdrawn by OEL at any time before it was accepted. The receiver also had the 922 offer which contained a condition that was totally unacceptable. It had no other offers. It was faced with the dilemma of whether it should decline to accept the OEL offer and run the risk of it being withdrawn, in the hope that an acceptable offer would be forthcoming from 922. An affidavit filed by the president of the receiver describes the dilemma which the receiver faced, and the judgment made in the light of that dilemma:

> 24. An asset purchase agreement was received by Ernst & Young on March 7, 1991 which was dated March 6, 1991. This agreement was received from CCFL in respect of their offer to purchase the assets and undertaking of Air Toronto. Apart from financial considerations, which will be considered in a subsequent affidavit, the Receiver determined that it would not be prudent to delay acceptance of the OEL agreement to negotiate a highly uncertain arrangement with Air Canada and CCFL. Air Canada had the benefit of an "exclusive" in negotiations for Air Toronto and had clearly indicated its intention to take itself out of the running while ensuring that no other party could seek to purchase Air Toronto and maintain the Air Canada connector arrangement vital to its survival. The CCFL offer represented a radical reversal of this position by Air Canada at the eleventh hour. However, it

contained a significant number of conditions to closing which were entirely beyond the control of the Receiver. As well, the CCFL offer came less than 24 hours before signing of the agreement with OEL which had been negotiated over a period of months, at great time and expense.

(Emphasis added)
I am convinced that the decision made was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991.

I now turn to consider whether the price contained in the OEL offer was one which it was provident to accept. At the outset, I think that the fact that the OEL offer was the only acceptable one available to the receiver on March 8, 1991, after ten months of trying to sell the airline, is strong evidence that the price in it was reasonable. In a deteriorating economy, I doubt that it would have been wise to wait any longer.

I mentioned earlier that, pursuant to an order, 922 was permitted to present a second offer. During the hearing of the appeal, counsel compared at great length the price contained in the second 922 offer with the price contained in the OEL offer. Counsel put forth various hypotheses supporting their contentions that one offer was better than the other.

It is my opinion that the price contained in the 922 offer is relevant only if it shows that the price obtained by the Receiver in the OEL offer was not a reasonable one. In Crown Trust v. Rosenberg, supra, Anderson J., at p. 113 O.R., p. 551 D.L.R., discussed the comparison of offers in the following way:

> No doubt, as the cases have indicated, situations might arise where the disparity was so great as to call in question the adequacy of the mechanism which had produced the offers. It is not so here, and in my view that is substantially an end of the matter.

In two judgments, Saunders J. considered the circumstances in which an offer submitted after the receiver had agreed to a sale should be considered by the court. The first is Re Selkirk (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.), at p. 247:

> If, for example, in this case there had been a second offer of a substantially higher amount, then the court would have to take that offer into consideration in assessing whether the receiver had properly carried out his function of endeavouring to obtain the best price for the property.

The second is Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd. (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.), at p. 243:

> If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate.

In Re Selkirk (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. Bkcy.), at p. 142, McRae J. expressed a similar view:

> The court will not lightly withhold approval of a sale by the receiver, particularly in a case such as this where the receiver is given rather wide discretionary authority as per the order of Mr. Justice Trainor and, of course, where the receiver is an officer of this court. Only in a case where there seems to be some unfairness in the process of the sale or where there are substantially higher offers which would tend to show that the sale was improvident will the court withhold approval. It is important that the court recognize the commercial exigencies that would flow if prospective purchasers are allowed to wait until the sale is in court for approval before submitting their final offer. This is something that must be discouraged.

(Emphasis added)

What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered bona fide into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted the sale properly. In such circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.

It is necessary to consider the two offers. Rosenberg J. held that the 922 offer was slightly better or marginally better than the OEL offer. He concluded that the difference in the two offers did not show that the sale process adopted by the receiver was inadequate or improvident.

Counsel for the appellants complained about the manner in which Rosenberg J. conducted the hearing of the motion to confirm the OEL sale. The complaint was, that when they began to discuss a comparison of the two offers, Rosenberg J. said that he considered the 922 offer to be better than the OEL offer. Counsel said that when that comment was made, they did not think it necessary to argue further the question of the difference in value between the two offers. They complain that the finding that the 922 offer was only marginally better or slightly better than the OEL offer was made without them having had the opportunity to argue that the 922 offer was substantially better or significantly better than the OEL offer. I cannot understand how counsel could have thought that by expressing the opinion that the 922 offer was better, Rosenberg J. was saying that it was a significantly or substantially better one. Nor can I comprehend how counsel took the comment to mean that they were foreclosed from arguing that the offer was significantly or substantially better. If there was some misunderstanding on the part of counsel, it should have been raised before Rosenberg J. at the time. I am sure that if it had been, the misunderstanding would have been cleared up quickly. Nevertheless, this court permitted extensive argument dealing with the comparison of the two offers.

The 922 offer provided for $6,000,000 cash to be paid on closing with a royalty based upon a percentage of Air Toronto profits over a period of five years up to a maximum of $3,000,000. The OEL offer provided for a payment of $2,000,000 on closing with a royalty paid on gross revenues over a five-year period. In the short term, the 922 offer is obviously better because there is substantially more cash up front. The chances of future returns are substantially greater in the OEL offer because royalties are paid on gross revenues while the royalties under the 922 offer are paid only on profits. There is an element of risk involved in each offer.

The receiver studied the two offers. It compared them and took into account the risks, the advantages and the disadvantages of each. It considered the appropriate contingencies. It is not necessary to outline the factors which were taken into account by the receiver because the manager of its insolvency practice filed an affidavit outlining the considerations which were weighed in its evaluation of the two offers. They seem to me to be reasonable ones. That affidavit concluded with the following paragraph:

> 24. On the basis of these considerations the Receiver has approved the OEL offer and has concluded that it represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for the Air Toronto division of SoundAir.

The court appointed the receiver to conduct the sale of Air Toronto and entrusted it with the responsibility of deciding what is the best offer. I put great weight upon the opinion of the receiver. It swore to the court which appointed it that the OEL offer represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for Air Toronto. I have not been convinced that the receiver was wrong when he made that assessment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the 922 offer does not demonstrate any failure upon the part of the receiver to act properly and providently.

It follows that if Rosenberg J. was correct when he found that the 922 offer was in fact better, I agree with him that it could only have been slightly or marginally better. The 922 offer does not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was inadequate, unsuccessful or improvident, nor that the price was unreasonable.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the receiver made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.

2. Consideration of the interests of all parties

It is well established that the primary interest is that of the creditors of the debtor: see Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, and Re Selkirk (1986, Saunders J.), supra. However, as Saunders J. pointed out in Re Beauty Counsellors, supra, at p. 244 C.B.R., "it is not the only or overriding consideration".

In my opinion, there are other persons whose interests require consideration. In an appropriate case, the interests of the debtor must be taken into account. I think also, in a case such as this, where a purchaser has bargained at some length and doubtless at considerable expense with the receiver, the interests of the purchaser ought to be taken into account. While it is not explicitly stated in such cases as Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, Re Selkirk (1986, Saunders J.), supra, Re Beauty Counsellors, supra, Re Selkirk (1987, McRae J.), supra, and Cameron, supra, I think they clearly imply that the interests of a person who has negotiated an agreement with a court-appointed receiver are very important.

In this case, the interests of all parties who would have an interest in the process were considered by the receiver and by Rosenberg J.

3. Consideration of the efficacy and integrity of the process by which the offer was obtained

While it is accepted that the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of the creditors, there is a secondary but very important consideration and that is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. This is particularly so in the case of a sale of such a unique asset as an airline as a going concern.

The importance of a court protecting the integrity of the process has been stated in a number of cases. First, I refer to Re Selkirk (1986), supra, where Saunders J. said at p. 246 C.B.R.:

> In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interest of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.
>
> In that connection I adopt the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in Cameron v. Bank of N.S. (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), where he said at p. 11:
>
> > In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a finding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard -- this would be an intolerable situation.
>
> While those remarks may have been made in the context of a

bidding situation rather than a private sale, I consider them to be equally applicable to a negotiation process leading to a private sale. Where the court is concerned with the disposition of property, the purpose of appointing a receiver is to have the receiver do the work that the court would otherwise have to do.

In Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 (C.A.), at p. 61 Alta. L.R., p. 476 D.L.R., the Alberta Court of Appeal said that sale by tender is not necessarily the best way to sell a business as an ongoing concern. It went on to say that when some other method is used which is provident, the court should not undermine the process by refusing to confirm the sale.

Finally, I refer to the reasoning of Anderson J. in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, at p. 124 O.R., pp. 562-63 D.L.R.:

> While every proper effort must always be made to assure maximum recovery consistent with the limitations inherent in the process, no method has yet been devised to entirely eliminate those limitations or to avoid their consequences. Certainly it is not to be found in loosening the entire foundation of the system. Thus to compare the results of the process in this case with what might have been recovered in some other set of circumstances is neither logical nor practical.

(Emphasis added)

It is my opinion that the court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

Before this court, counsel for those opposing the confirmation of the sale to OEL suggested many different ways in which the receiver could have conducted the process other than the way which he did. However, the evidence does not convince me that the receiver used an improper method of attempting to sell the airline. The answer to those submissions is found in the comment of Anderson J. in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, at p. 109 O.R., p. 548 D.L.R.:

> The court ought not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise.

It would be a futile and duplicitous exercise for this court to examine in minute detail all of the circumstances leading up to the acceptance of the OEL offer. Having considered the process adopted by the receiver, it is my opinion that the process adopted was a reasonable and prudent one.

4. Was there unfairness in the process?

As a general rule, I do not think it appropriate for the court to go into the minutia of the process or of the selling strategy adopted by the receiver. However, the court has a responsibility to decide whether the process was fair. The only part of this process which I could find that might give even a superficial impression of unfairness is the failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto.

I will outline the circumstances which relate to the allegation that the receiver was unfair in failing to provide an offering memorandum. In the latter part of 1990, as part of its selling strategy, the receiver was in the process of preparing an offering memorandum to give to persons who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto. The offering memorandum got as far as draft form, but was never released to anyone, although a copy of the draft eventually got into the hands of CCFL before it submitted the first 922 offer on March 7, 1991. A copy of the offering memorandum forms part of the record and it seems to me to be little more than puffery, without any hard information which a sophisticated purchaser would require in order to make a serious bid.

The offering memorandum had not been completed by February 11, 1991. On that date, the receiver entered into the letter of intent to negotiate with OEL. The letter of intent contained a provision that during its currency the receiver would not negotiate with any other party. The letter of intent was renewed from time to time until the OEL offer was received on March 6, 1991.

The receiver did not proceed with the offering memorandum because to do so would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of its letter of intent with OEL.

I do not think that the conduct of the receiver shows any unfairness towards 922. When I speak of 922, I do so in the context that Air Canada and CCFL are identified with it. I start by saying that the receiver acted reasonably when it entered into exclusive negotiations with OEL. I find it strange that a company, with which Air Canada is closely and intimately involved, would say that it was unfair for the receiver to enter into a time-limited agreement to negotiate exclusively with OEL. That is precisely the arrangement which Air Canada insisted upon when it negotiated with the receiver in the spring and summer of 1990. If it was not unfair for Air Canada to have such an agreement, I do not understand why it was unfair for OEL to have a similar one. In fact, both Air Canada and OEL in its turn were acting reasonably when they required exclusive negotiating rights to prevent their negotiations from being used as a bargaining lever with other potential purchasers. The fact that Air Canada insisted upon an exclusive negotiating right while it was negotiating with the receiver demonstrates the commercial efficacy of OEL being given the same right during its negotiations with the receiver. I see no unfairness on the part of the receiver when it honoured its letter of intent with OEL by not releasing the offering memorandum during the negotiations with OEL.

Moreover, I am not prepared top find that 922 was in any way prejudiced by the fact that it did not have an offering memorandum. It made an offer on March 7, 1991, which it contends to this day was a better offer than that of OEL. 922 has not convinced me that if it had an offering memorandum its offer would have been any different or any better than it actually was. The fatal problem with the first 922 offer was that it contained a condition which was completely unacceptable to the receiver. The receiver properly, in my opinion, rejected the offer out of hand because of that condition. That condition did not relate to any information which could have conceivably been in an offering memorandum prepared by the receiver. It was about the resolution of a dispute between CCFL and the Royal Bank, something the receiver knew nothing about.

Further evidence of the lack of prejudice which the absence of an offering memorandum has caused 922 is found in CCFL's stance before this court. During argument, its counsel suggested, as a possible resolution of this appeal, that this court should call for new bids, evaluate them and then order a sale to the party who put in the better bid. In such a case, counsel for CCFL said that 922 would be prepared to bid within seven days of the court's decision. I would have thought that, if there were anything to CCFL's suggestion that the failure to provide an offering memorandum was unfair to 922, it would have told the court that it needed more information before it would be able to make a bid.

I am satisfied that Air Canada and CCFL have, and at all times had, all of the information which they would have needed to make what to them would be a commercially viable offer to the receiver. I think that an offering memorandum was of no commercial consequence to them, but the absence of one has since become a valuable tactical weapon.

It is my opinion that there is no convincing proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL. Therefore, the failure to provide an offering memorandum was neither unfair nor did it prejudice the obtaining of a better price on March 8, 1991, than that contained in the OEL offer. I would not give effect to the contention that the process adopted by the receiver was an unfair one.

There are two statements by Anderson J. contained in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, which I adopt as my own. The first is at p. 109 O.R., p. 548 D.L.R.:

> The court should not proceed against the recommendations of its Receiver except in special circumstances and where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. Any other rule or approach would emasculate the role of the Receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval.

The second is at p. 111 O.R., p. 550 D.L.R.:

> It is equally clear, in my view, though perhaps not so clearly enunciated, that it is only in an exceptional case that the court will intervene and proceed contrary to the Receiver's recommendations if satisfied, as I am, that the Receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly and not arbitrarily.

In this case the receiver acted reasonably, prudently, fairly and not arbitrarily. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the process adopted by the receiver in reaching an agreement was a just one.

In his reasons for judgment, after discussing the circumstances leading to the 922 offer, Rosenberg J. said this [at p. 31 of the reasons]:

> They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

I agree.

The receiver made proper and sufficient efforts to get the best price that it could for the assets of Air Toronto. It adopted a reasonable and effective process to sell the airline which was fair to all persons who might be interested in purchasing it. It is my opinion, therefore, that the receiver properly carried out the mandate which was given to it by the order of O'Brien J. It follows that Rosenberg J. was correct when he confirmed the sale to OEL.

II. THE EFFECT OF THE SUPPORT OF THE 922 OFFER BY THE TWO SECURED CREDITORS

As I noted earlier, the 922 offer was supported before Rosenberg J., and in this court, by CCFL and by the Royal Bank, the two secured creditors. It was argued that, because the interests of the creditors are primary, the court ought to give effect to their wish that the 922 offer be accepted. I would not accede to that suggestion for two reasons.

The first reason is related to the fact that the creditors chose to have a receiver appointed by the court. It was open to them to appoint a private receiver pursuant to the authority of their security documents. Had they done so, then they would have had control of the process and could have sold Air Toronto to whom they wished. However, acting privately and controlling the process involves some risks. The appointment of a receiver by the court insulates the creditors from those risks. But insulation from those risks carries with it the loss of control over the process of disposition of the assets. As I have attempted to explain in these reasons, when a receiver's sale is before the court for confirmation the only issues are the propriety of the conduct of the receiver and whether it acted providently. The function of the court at that stage is not to step in and do the receiver's work or change the sale strategy adopted by the receiver. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale made by the receiver. That would take away all respect for the process of sale by a court-appointed receiver.

There can be no doubt that the interests of the creditor are an important consideration in determining whether the receiver has properly conducted a sale. The opinion of the creditors as to which offer ought to be accepted is something to be taken into account. But, if the court decides that the receiver has acted properly and providently, those views are not necessarily determinative. Because, in this case, the receiver acted properly and providently, I do not think that the views of the creditors should override the considered judgment of the receiver.

The second reason is that, in the particular circumstances of this case, I do not think the support of CCFL and the Royal Bank of the 922 offer is entitled to any weight. The support given by CCFL can be dealt with summarily. It is a co-owner of 922. It is hardly surprising and not very impressive to hear that it supports the offer which it is making for the debtors' assets.

The support by the Royal Bank requires more consideration and involves some reference to the circumstances. On March 6, 1991, when the first 922 offer was made, there was in existence an interlender agreement between the Royal Bank and CCFL. That agreement dealt with the share of the proceeds of the sale of Air Toronto which each creditor would receive. At the time, a dispute between the Royal Bank and CCFL about the interpretation of that agreement was pending in the courts. The unacceptable condition in the first 922 offer related to the settlement of the interlender dispute. The condition required that the dispute be resolved in a way which would substantially favour CCFL. It required that CCFL receive $3,375,000 of the $6,000,000 cash payment and the balance, including the royalties, if any, be paid to the Royal Bank. The Royal Bank did not agree with that split of the sale proceeds.

On April 5, 1991, the Royal Bank and CCFL agreed to settle the interlender dispute. The settlement was that if the 922 offer was accepted by the court, CCFL would receive only $1,000,000 and the Royal Bank would receive $5,000,000 plus any royalties which might be paid. It was only in consideration of that settlement that the Royal Bank agreed to support the 922 offer.

The Royal Bank's support of the 922 offer is so affected by the very substantial benefit which it wanted to obtain from the settlement of the interlender dispute that, in my opinion, its support is devoid of any objectivity. I think it has no weight.

While there may be circumstances where the unanimous support by the creditors of a particular offer could conceivably override the proper and provident conduct of a sale by a receiver, I do not think that this is such a case. This is a case where the receiver has acted properly and in a provident way. It would make a mockery out of the judicial process, under which a mandate was given to this receiver to sell this airline, if the support by these creditors of the 922 offer were permitted to carry the day. I give no weight to the support which they give to the 922 offer.

In its factum, the receiver pointed out that, because of greater liabilities imposed upon private receivers by various statutes such as the Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, and the Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, it is likely that more and more the courts will be asked to appoint receivers in insolvencies. In those circumstances, I think that creditors who ask for court-appointed receivers and business people who choose to deal with those receivers should know that if those receivers act properly and providently their decisions and judgments will be given great weight by the courts who appoint them. I have decided this appeal in the way I have in order to assure business people who deal with court-appointed receivers that they can have confidence that an agreement which they make with a court-appointed receiver will be far more than a platform upon which others may bargain at the court approval stage. I think that persons who enter into agreements with court-appointed receivers, following a disposition procedure that is appropriate given the nature of the assets involved, should expect that their bargain will be confirmed by the court.

The process is very important. It should be carefully protected so that the ability of court-appointed receivers to negotiate the best price possible is strengthened and supported. Because this receiver acted properly and providently in entering into the OEL agreement, I am of the opinion that

Rosenberg J. was right when he approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer.

I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. I would award the receiver, OEL and Frontier Airlines Limited their costs out of the Soundair estate, those of the receiver on a solicitor-and-client scale. I would make no order as to the costs of any of the other parties or interveners.

MCKINLAY J.A. (concurring in the result):-- I agree with Galligan J.A. in result, but wish to emphasize that I do so on the basis that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. Consequently, in all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver to determine whether it satisfies the tests set out by Anderson J. in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.J.). While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case, as described by Galligan J.A., was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it is not a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

I should like to add that where there is a small number of creditors who are the only parties with a real interest in the proceeds of the sale (i.e., where it is clear that the highest price attainable would result in recovery so low that no other creditors, shareholders, guarantors, etc., could possibly benefit therefrom), the wishes of the interested creditors should be very seriously considered by the receiver. It is true, as Galligan J.A. points out, that in seeking the court appointment of a receiver, the moving parties also seek the protection of the court in carrying out the receiver's functions. However, it is also true that in utilizing the court process the moving parties have opened the whole process to detailed scrutiny by all involved, and have probably added significantly to their costs and consequent shortfall as a result of so doing. The adoption of the court process should in no way diminish the rights of any party, and most certainly not the rights of the only parties with a real interest. Where a receiver asks for court approval of a sale which is opposed by the only parties in interest, the court should scrutinize with great care the procedure followed by the receiver. I agree with Galligan J.A. that in this case that was done. I am satisfied that the rights of all parties were properly considered by the receiver, by the learned motions court judge, and by Galligan J.A.

GOODMAN J.A. (dissenting):-- I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment herein of Galligan and McKinlay JJ.A. Respectfully, I am unable to agree with their conclusion.

The case at bar is an exceptional one in the sense that upon the application made for approval of the sale of the assets of Air Toronto two competing offers were placed before Rosenberg J. Those two offers were that of Frontier Airlines Ltd. and Ontario Express Limited (OEL) and that of 922246 Ontario Limited (922), a company incorporated for the purpose of acquiring Air Toronto. Its shares were owned equally by Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers Capital Corporation (collectively CCFL) and Air Canada. It was conceded by all parties to these proceedings that the only persons who had any interest in the proceeds of the sale were two secured creditors, viz., CCFL and the Royal Bank of Canada (the Bank). Those two creditors were unanimous in their position that they desired the court to approve the sale to 922. We were not referred to nor am I aware of any case where a court has refused to abide by the unanimous wishes of the only interested creditors for the approval of a specific offer made in receivership proceedings.

In British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Inc. (1977), 5 B.C.L.R. 94, 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28 (S.C.), Berger J. said at p. 95 B.C.L.R., p. 30 C.B.R.:

> Here all of those with a financial stake in the plant have joined in seeking the court's approval of the sale to Fincas. This court does not having a roving commission to decide what

is best for investors and businessmen when they have agreed among themselves what course of action they should follow. It is their money.

I agree with that statement. It is particularly apt to this case. The two secured creditors will suffer a shortfall of approximately $50,000,000. They have a tremendous interest in the sale of assets which form part of their security. I agree with the finding of Rosenberg J., Gen. Div., May 1, 1991, that the offer of 922 is superior to that of OEL. He concluded that the 922 offer is marginally superior. If by that he meant that mathematically it was likely to provide slightly more in the way of proceeds it is difficult to take issue with that finding. If on the other hand he meant that having regard to all considerations it was only marginally superior, I cannot agree. He said in his reasons [pp. 17-18]:

> I have come to the conclusion that knowledgeable creditors such as the Royal Bank would prefer the 922 offer even if the other factors influencing their decision were not present. No matter what adjustments had to be made, the 922 offer results in more cash immediately. Creditors facing the type of loss the Royal Bank is taking in this case would not be anxious to rely on contingencies especially in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry.

I agree with that statement completely. It is apparent that the difference between the two offers insofar as cash on closing is concerned amounts to approximately $3,000,000 to $4,000,000. The Bank submitted that it did not wish to gamble any further with respect to its investment and that the acceptance and court approval of the OEL offer, in effect, supplanted its position as a secured creditor with respect to the amount owing over and above the down payment and placed it in the position of a joint entrepreneur but one with no control. This results from the fact that the OEL offer did not provide for any security for any funds which might be forthcoming over and above the initial downpayment on closing.

In Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303 (C.A.), Hart J.A., speaking for the majority of the court, said at p. 10 C.B.R., p. 312 N.S.R.:

> Here we are dealing with a receiver appointed at the instance of one major creditor, who chose to insert in the contract of sale a provision making it subject to the approval of the court. This, in my opinion, shows an intention on behalf of the parties to invoke the normal equitable doctrines which place the court in the position of looking to the interests of all persons concerned before giving its blessing to a particular transaction submitted for approval. In these circumstances the court would not consider itself bound by the contract entered into in good faith by the receiver but would have to look to the broader picture to see that the contract was for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. When there was evidence that a higher price was readily available for the property the chambers judge was, in my opinion, justified in exercising his discretion as he did. Otherwise he could have deprived the creditors of a substantial sum of money.

This statement is apposite to the circumstances of the case at bar. I hasten to add that in my opinion it is not only price which is to be considered in the exercise of the judge's discretion. It may very well be, as I believe to be so in this case, that the amount of cash is the most important element in determining which of the two offers is for the benefit and in the best interest of the creditors.

It is my view, and the statement of Hart J.A. is consistent therewith, that the fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. I agree completely with the views expressed by McKinlay J.A. in that regard in her reasons.

It is my further view that any negotiations which took place between the only two interested creditors in deciding to support the approval of the 922 offer were not relevant to the determination by the presiding judge of the issues involved in the motion for approval of either one of the two offers nor are they relevant in determining the outcome of this appeal. It is sufficient that the two creditors have decided unanimously what is in their best interest and the appeal must be considered in the light of that decision. It so happens, however, that there is ample evidence to support their conclusion that the approval of the 922 offer is in their best interests.

I am satisfied that the interests of the creditors are the prime consideration for both the receiver and the court. In Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd. (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.) Saunders J. said at p. 243:

> This does not mean that a court should ignore a new and higher bid made after acceptance where there has been no unfairness in the process. The interests of the creditors, while not the only consideration, are the prime consideration.

I agree with that statement of the law. In Re Selkirk (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.) Saunders J. heard an application for court approval for the sale by the sheriff of real property in bankruptcy proceedings. The sheriff had been previously ordered to list the property for sale subject to approval of the court. Saunders J. said at p. 246 C.B.R.:

> In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interests of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with the commercial efficacy and integrity.

I am in agreement with that statement as a matter of general principle. Saunders J. further stated that he adopted the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. in Cameron, supra, at pp. 92-94 O.R., pp. 531-33 D.L.R., quoted by Galligan J.A. in his reasons. In Cameron, the remarks of Macdonald J.A. related to situations involving the calling of bids and fixing a time limit for the making of such bids. In those circumstances the process is so clear as a matter of commercial practice that an interference by the court in such process might have a deleterious effect on the efficacy of receivership proceedings in other cases. But Macdonald J.A. recognized that even in bid or tender cases where the offeror for whose bid approval is sought has complied with all requirements a court might not approve the agreement of purchase and sale entered into by the receiver. He said at pp. 11-12 C.B.R., p. 314 N.S.R.:

> There are, of course, many reasons why a court might not approve an agreement of purchase and sale, viz., where the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; or, where the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids or that inadequate notice of sale by bid was given (where the receiver sells property by the bid method); or, where it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner. Court approval must involve the delicate balancing of competing interests and not simply a consideration of the interests of the creditors.

The deficiency in the present case is so large that there has been no suggestion of a competing interest between the owner and the creditors.

I agree that the same reasoning may apply to a negotiation process leading to a private sale but the procedure and process applicable to private sales of a wide variety of businesses and undertakings with the multiplicity of individual considerations applicable and perhaps peculiar to the particular business is not so clearly established that a departure by the court from the process adopted by the receiver in a particular case will result in commercial chaos to the detriment of future receivership proceedings. Each case must be decided on its own merits and it is necessary to consider the process used by the receiver in the present proceedings and to determine whether it was unfair, improvident or inadequate.

It is important to note at the outset that Rosenberg J. made the following statement in his reasons [p. 15]:

> On March 8, 1991 the trustee accepted the OEL offer subject to court approval. The receiver at that time had no other

offer before it that was in final form or could possibly be accepted. The receiver had at the time the knowledge that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and had not fulfilled the promise of its letter of March 1. The receiver was justified in assuming that Air Canada and CCFL's offer was a long way from being in an acceptable form and that Air Canada and CCFL's objective was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada.

In my opinion there was no evidence before him or before this court to indicate that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and that the receiver had knowledge of such lack of good faith. Indeed, on this appeal, counsel for the receiver stated that he was not alleging Air Canada and CCFL had not bargained in good faith. Air Canada had frankly stated at the time that it had made its offer to purchase which was eventually refused by the receiver that it would not become involved in an "auction" to purchase the undertaking of Air Canada and that, although it would fulfil its contractual obligations to provide connecting services to Air Toronto, it would do no more than it was legally required to do insofar as facilitating the purchase of Air Toronto by any other person. In so doing Air Canada may have been playing "hard ball" as its behaviour was characterized by some of the counsel for opposing parties. It was nevertheless merely openly asserting its legal position as it was entitled to do.

Furthermore there was no evidence before Rosenberg J. or this court that the receiver had assumed that Air Canada and CCFL's objective in making an offer was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada. Indeed, there was no evidence to support such an assumption in any event although it is clear that 922 and through it CCFL and Air Canada were endeavouring to present an offer to purchase which would be accepted and/or approved by the court in preference to the offer made by OEL.

To the extent that approval of the OEL agreement by Rosenberg

J. was based on the alleged lack of good faith in bargaining and improper motivation with respect to connector traffic on the part of Air Canada and CCFL, it cannot be supported.

I would also point out that, rather than saying there was no other offer before it that was final in form, it would have been more accurate to have said that there was no unconditional offer before it.

In considering the material and evidence placed before the court I am satisfied that the receiver was at all times acting in good faith. I have reached the conclusion, however, that the process which he used was unfair insofar as 922 is concerned and improvident insofar as the two secured creditors are concerned.

Air Canada had been negotiating with Soundair Corporation for the purchase from it of Air Toronto for a considerable period of time prior to the appointment of a receiver by the court. It had given a letter of intent indicating a prospective sale price of $18,000,000. After the appointment of the receiver, by agreement dated April 30, 1990, Air Canada continued its negotiations for the purchase of Air Toronto with the receiver. Although this agreement contained a clause which provided that the receiver "shall not negotiate for the sale ... of Air Toronto with any person except Air Canada", it further provided that the receiver would not be in breach of that provision merely by receiving unsolicited offers for all or any of the assets of Air Toronto. In addition, the agreement, which had a term commencing on April 30, 1990, could be terminated on the fifth business day following the delivery of a written notice of termination by one party to the other. I point out this provision merely to indicate that the exclusivity privilege extended by the Receiver to Air Canada was of short duration at the receiver's option.

As a result of due diligence investigations carried out by Air Canada during the month of April, May and June of 1990, Air Canada reduced its offer to 8.1 million dollars conditional upon there being $4,000,000 in tangible assets. The offer was made on June 14, 1990 and was open for acceptance until June

29, 1990.

By amending agreement dated June 19, 1990 the receiver was released from its covenant to refrain from negotiating for the sale of the Air Toronto business and assets to any person other than Air Canada. By virtue of this amending agreement the receiver had put itself in the position of having a firm offer in hand with the right to negotiate and accept offers from other persons. Air Canada in these circumstances was in the subservient position. The receiver, in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, allowed the Air Canada offer to lapse. On July 20, 1990 Air Canada served a notice of termination of the April 30, 1990 agreement.

Apparently as a result of advice received from the receiver to the effect that the receiver intended to conduct an auction for the sale of the assets and business of the Air Toronto Division of Soundair Corporation, the solicitors for Air Canada advised the receiver by letter dated July 20, 1990 in part as follows:

> Air Canada has instructed us to advise you that it does not intend to submit a further offer in the auction process.

This statement together with other statements set forth in the letter was sufficient to indicate that Air Canada was not interested in purchasing Air Toronto in the process apparently contemplated by the receiver at that time. It did not form a proper foundation for the receiver to conclude that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada, either alone or in conjunction with some other person, in different circumstances. In June 1990 the receiver was of the opinion that the fair value of Air Toronto was between $10,000,000 and $12,000,000.

In August 1990 the receiver contacted a number of interested parties. A number of offers were received which were not deemed to be satisfactory. One such offer, received on August 20, 1990, came as a joint offer from OEL and Air Ontario (an Air Canada connector). It was for the sum of $3,000,000 for the good will relating to certain Air Toronto routes but did not include the purchase of any tangible assets or leasehold interests.

In December 1990 the receiver was approached by the management of Canadian Partner (operated by OEL) for the purpose of evaluating the benefits of an amalgamated Air Toronto/Air Partner operation. The negotiations continued from December of 1990 to February of 1991 culminating in the OEL agreement dated March 8, 1991.

On or before December, 1990, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to make a bid for the Air Toronto assets. The receiver, in August of 1990, for the purpose of facilitating the sale of Air Toronto assets, commenced the preparation of an operating memorandum. He prepared no less than six draft operating memoranda with dates from October 1990 through March 1, 1991. None of these were distributed to any prospective bidder despite requests having been received therefor, with the exception of an early draft provided to CCFL without the receiver's knowledge.

During the period December 1990 to the end of January 1991, the receiver advised CCFL that the offering memorandum was in the process of being prepared and would be ready soon for distribution. He further advised CCFL that it should await the receipt of the memorandum before submitting a formal offer to purchase the Air Toronto assets.

By late January CCFL had become aware that the receiver was negotiating with OEL for the sale of Air Toronto. In fact, on February 11, 1991, the receiver signed a letter of intent with OEL wherein it had specifically agreed not to negotiate with any other potential bidders or solicit any offers from others.

By letter dated February 25, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL made a written request to the Receiver for the offering memorandum. The receiver did not reply to the letter because he felt he was precluded from so doing by the provisions of the letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. Other prospective purchasers were also unsuccessful in obtaining the promised memorandum to assist them in preparing their bids. It should be noted that exclusivity provision of the letter of intent expired on February 20, 1991. This provision was extended on three occasions, viz., February 19, 22 and March 5, 1991. It is clear that from a legal standpoint the receiver, by refusing to extend the time, could have dealt with other prospective purchasers and specifically with 922.

It was not until March 1, 1991 that CCFL had obtained sufficient information to enable it to make a bid through 922. It succeeded in so doing through its own efforts through sources other than the receiver. By that time the receiver had already entered into the letter of intent with OEL. Notwithstanding the fact that the receiver knew since December of 1990 that CCFL wished to make a bid for the assets of Air Toronto (and there is no evidence to suggest that at any time such a bid would be in conjunction with Air Canada or that Air Canada was in any way connected with CCFL) it took no steps to provide CCFL with information necessary to enable it to make an intelligent bid and, indeed, suggested delaying the making of the bid until an offering memorandum had been prepared and provided. In the meantime by entering into the letter of intent with OEL it put itself in a position where it could not negotiate with CCFL or provide the information requested.

On February 28, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL telephoned the receiver and were advised for the first time that the receiver had made a business decision to negotiate solely with OEL and would not negotiate with anyone else in the interim.

By letter dated March 1, 1991 CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to submit a bid. It set forth the essential terms of the bid and stated that it would be subject to customary commercial provisions. On March 7, 1991 CCFL and Air Canada, jointly through 922, submitted an offer to purchase Air Toronto upon the terms set forth in the letter dated March 1, 1991. It included a provision that the offer was conditional upon the interpretation of an interlender agreement which set out the relative distribution of proceeds as between CCFL and the Royal Bank. It is common ground that it was a condition over which the receiver had no control and accordingly would not have been acceptable on that ground alone. The receiver did not, however, contact CCFL in order to negotiate or request the removal of the condition although it appears that its agreement with OEL not to negotiate with any person other than OEL expired on March 6, 1991.

The fact of the matter is that by March 7, 1991, the receiver had received the offer from OEL which was subsequently approved by Rosenberg J. That offer was accepted by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that OEL had been negotiating the purchase for a period of approximately three months the offer contained a provision for the sole benefit of the purchaser that it was subject to the purchaser obtaining:

> ... a financing commitment within 45 days of the date hereof in an amount not less than the Purchase Price from the Royal Bank of Canada or other financial institution upon terms and conditions acceptable to them. In the event that such a financing commitment is not obtained within such 45 day period, the purchaser or OEL shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon giving written notice of termination to the vendor on the first Business Day following the expiry of the said period.

The purchaser was also given the right to waive the condition.

In effect the agreement was tantamount to a 45-day option to purchase excluding the right of any other person to purchase Air Toronto during that period of time and thereafter if the condition was fulfilled or waived. The agreement was, of course, stated to be subject to court approval.

In my opinion the process and procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL. Although it was aware from December 1990 that CCFL was interested in making an offer, it effectively delayed the making of such offer by continually referring to the preparation of the offering memorandum. It did not endeavour during the period December 1990 to March 7, 1991 to negotiate with CCFL in any way the possible terms of purchase and sale agreement. In the result no offer was sought from CCFL by the receiver prior to February 11, 1991 and thereafter it put itself in the position of being unable to negotiate with anyone other than OEL. The receiver, then, on March 8, 1991 chose to accept an offer which was conditional in nature without prior consultation with CCFL (922) to see whether it was prepared to remove the condition in its offer.

I do not doubt that the receiver felt that it was more likely that the condition in the OEL offer would be fulfilled than the condition in the 922 offer. It may be that the receiver, having negotiated for a period of three months with OEL, was fearful that it might lose the offer if OEL discovered that it was negotiating with another person. Nevertheless it seems to me that it was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to it. The potential loss was that of an agreement which amounted to little more than an option in favour of the offeror.

In my opinion the procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL in that, in effect, it gave OEL the opportunity of engaging in exclusive negotiations for a period of three months notwithstanding the fact that it knew CCFL was interested in making an offer. The receiver did not indicate a deadline by which offers were to be submitted and it did not at any time indicate the structure or nature of an offer which might be acceptable to it.

In his reasons Rosenberg J. stated that as of March 1, CCFL and Air Canada had all the information that they needed and any allegations of unfairness in the negotiating process by the receiver had disappeared. He said [p. 31]:

> They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

If he meant by "acceptable in form" that it was acceptable to the receiver, then obviously OEL had the unfair advantage of its lengthy negotiations with the receiver to ascertain what kind of an offer would be acceptable to the receiver. If, on the other hand, he meant that the 922 offer was unacceptable in its form because it was conditional, it can hardly be said that the OEL offer was more acceptable in this regard as it contained a condition with respect to financing terms and conditions "acceptable to them".

It should be noted that on March 13, 1991 the representatives of 922 first met with the receiver to review its offer of March 7, 1991 and at the request of the receiver withdrew the inter-lender condition from its offer. On March 14, 1991 OEL removed the financing condition from its offer. By order of Rosenberg J. dated March 26, 1991, CCFL was given until April 5, 1991 to submit a bid and on April 5, 1991, 922 submitted its offer with the interlender condition removed.

In my opinion the offer accepted by the receiver is improvident and unfair insofar as the two creditors are concerned. It is not improvident in the sense that the price offered by 922 greatly exceeded that offered by OEL. In the final analysis it may not be greater at all. The salient fact is that the cash down payment in the 922 offer constitutes approximately two-thirds of the contemplated sale price whereas the cash down payment in the OEL transaction constitutes approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the contemplated sale price. In terms of absolute dollars, the down payment in the 922 offer would likely exceed that provided for in the OEL agreement by approximately $3,000,000 to $4,000,000.

In Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., supra, Saunders J. said at p. 243 C.B.R.:

> If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate. In such a case the proper course might be to refuse approval and to ask the trustee to recommence the process.

I accept that statement as being an accurate statement of the law. I would add, however, as previously indicated, that in determining what is the best price for the estate the receiver or court should not limit its consideration to which offer provides for the greater sale price. The amount of down payment and the provision or lack thereof to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price over and above the down payment may be the most important factor to be considered and I am of the view that is so in the present case. It is clear that that was the view of the only creditors who can benefit from the sale of Air Toronto.

I note that in the case at bar the 922 offer in conditional form was presented to the receiver before it accepted the OEL offer. The receiver in good faith, although I believe mistakenly, decided that the OEL offer was the better offer. At that time the receiver did not have the benefit of the views of the two secured creditors in that regard. At the time of the application for approval before Rosenberg J. the stated preference of the two interested creditors was made quite clear. He found as a fact that knowledgeable creditors would not be anxious to rely on contingencies in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry. It is reasonable to expect that a receiver would be no less knowledgeable in that regard and it is his primary duty to protect the interests of the creditors. In my view it was an improvident act on the part of the receiver to have accepted the conditional offer made by OEL and Rosenberg J. erred in failing to dismiss the application of the receiver for approval of the OEL offer. It would be most inequitable to foist upon the two creditors who have already been seriously hurt more unnecessary contingencies.

Although in other circumstances it might be appropriate to ask the receiver to recommence the process, in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to do so in this case. The only two interested creditors support the acceptance of the 922 offer and the court should so order.

Although I would be prepared to dispose of the case on the grounds stated above, some comment should be addressed to the question of interference by the court with the process and procedure adopted by the receiver.

I am in agreement with the view expressed by McKinlay J.A. in her reasons that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. As a result the procedure adopted by the receiver was somewhat unusual. At the outset, in accordance with the terms of the receiving order, it dealt solely with Air Canada. It then appears that the receiver contemplated a sale of the assets by way of auction and still later contemplated the preparation and distribution of an offering memorandum inviting bids. At some point, without advice to CCFL, it abandoned that idea and reverted to exclusive negotiations with one interested party. This entire process is not one which is customary or widely accepted as a general practice in the commercial world. It was somewhat unique having regard to the circumstances of this case. In my opinion the refusal of the court to approve the offer accepted by the receiver would not reflect on the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers and is not the type of refusal which will have a tendency to undermine the future confidence of business persons in dealing with receivers.

Rosenberg J. stated that the Royal Bank was aware of the process used and tacitly approved it. He said it knew the terms of the letter of intent in February 1991 and made no comment. The Royal Bank did, however, indicate to the receiver that it was not satisfied with the contemplated price nor the amount of the down payment. It did not, however, tell the receiver to adopt a different process in endeavouring to sell the Air Toronto assets. It is not clear from the material filed that at the time it became aware of the letter of intent, it knew that CCFL was interested in purchasing Air Toronto.

I am further of the opinion that a prospective purchaser who has been given an opportunity to engage in exclusive negotiations with a receiver for relatively short periods of time which are extended from time to time by the receiver and who then makes a conditional offer, the condition of which is for his sole benefit and must be fulfilled to his satisfaction unless waived by him, and which he knows is to be subject to court approval, cannot legitimately claim to have been unfairly dealt with if the court refuses to approve the offer and approves a substantially better one.

In conclusion I feel that I must comment on the statement made by Galligan J.A. in his reasons to the effect that the suggestion made by counsel for 922 constitutes evidence of lack of prejudice resulting from the absence of an offering memorandum. It should be pointed out that the court invited counsel to indicate the manner in which the problem should be resolved in the event that the court concluded that the order approving the OEL offer should be set aside. There was no evidence before the court with respect to what additional information may have been acquired by CCFL since March 8, 1991 and no inquiry was made in that regard. Accordingly, I am of the view that no adverse inference should be drawn from the proposal made as a result of the court's invitation.

For the above reasons I would allow the appeal with one set of costs to CCFL-922, set aside the order of Rosenberg J., dismiss the receiver's motion with one set of costs to CCFL-922 and order that the assets of Air Toronto be sold to numbered corporation 922246 on the terms set forth in its offer with appropriate adjustments to provide for the delay in its execution. Costs awarded shall be payable out of the estate of Soundair Corporation. The costs incurred by the receiver in making the application and responding to the appeal shall be paid to him out of the assets of the estate of Soundair Corporation on a solicitor-and-client basis. I would make no order as to costs of any of the other parties or interveners.

Appeal dismissed.

TAB 7

CITATION: Lydian International Limited (Re), 2020 ONSC 4006
COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-00633392-00CL
DATE: 2020-07-10

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF LYDIAN INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, LYDIAN CANADA VENTURES CORPORATION AND LYDIAN U.K. CORPORATION LIMITED

BEFORE: Chief Justice G.B. Morawetz

COUNSEL: *Elizabeth Pillon, Maria Konyukhova, Sanja Sopic,* and *Nicholas Avis*, for the Applicants

D. J. Miller and *Rachel Bergino*, for Alvarez & Marsal Inc.

Robert Mason and *Virginie Gauthier*, for Osisko Bermuda Limited

Pamela Huff and *Chris Burr*, for Resource Capital Fund VI L.P.

David Bish and *Michael Pickersgill*, for Orion Capital Management

Alexander Steele, for Caterpillar Financial Services (UK) Limited

Bruce Darlington, for ING Bank N.V./Abs Svensk Exportkredit (publ)

John LeRoux, Hasan Ciftehan, Mehmet Ali Ekingen and Atilla Bozkay, each in their capacity as a Shareholders of Lydian International Limited

HEARD by ZOOM Hearing and DECIDED: **June 29, 2020**

REASONS RELEASED: **July 10, 2020**

ENDORSEMENT

[1] Lydian International Limited, Lydian Canada Ventures Corporation and Lydian U.K. Corporation Limited (the "Applicants") bring this motion for an order (the "Sanction and Implementation Order"), among other things:

a) declaring that the Meeting of Affected Creditors held on June 19, 2020 was duly convened and held, all in accordance with the Meeting Order;

b) sanctioning and approving the Applicants' Plan of Arrangement (the "Plan") as approved by a requisite majority of Affected Creditors at the Meeting, in accordance with the Plan Meeting Order (each as defined below), a copy of which is attached as Schedule "A" to the draft Sanction and Implementation Order; and

c) granting various other related relief (as more particularly outlined below).

[2] The Applicants submit that the Plan represents the culmination of the Applicants' restructuring efforts and allows for the resolution of these CCAA Proceedings. The Monitor and the majority of the Affected Creditors are supportive of the Plan and if sanctioned and implemented, the Plan will provide a path forward for Lydian Canada and Lydian UK as part of a privatized Restructured Lydian Group (as defined in the Plan) and ultimately lead to the termination of these CCAA Proceedings.

[3] Shortly after the conclusion of the hearing on June 29, 2020, which was conducted by Zoom, I granted the motion with reasons to follow.

[4] The facts with respect to this motion are more fully set out in the Affidavit of Edward A. Sellers sworn June 24, 2020 (the "Sellers Sanction Affidavit"), the Affidavit of Edward A. Sellers sworn June 15, 2020 (the "Sellers Meeting Affidavit") and the Affidavit of Mark Caiger sworn June 11, 2020 (the "BMO Affidavit"). Mr. Sellers and Mr. Caiger were not cross-examined. Capitalized terms used herein but not otherwise defined have the meanings ascribed to them in the Sellers Sanction Affidavit, the Sellers Meeting Affidavit, and the Plan. All references to currency in this factum are references to United States dollars, unless otherwise indicated.

Background

[5] The Applicants are three entities at the top of the Lydian Group. The Lydian Group owns a development-stage gold mine in south-central Armenia through its wholly owned non-applicant operating subsidiary Lydian Armenia. The Applicants contend that they have been unable to access their main operating asset, the Amulsar mine, since June 2018 due to blockades and the associated actions and inactions of the Government of Armenia ("GOA"), and as a result, this has prevented the Applicants from completing construction of the mine and generating revenue in the ordinary course.

[6] The Applicants further contend that the effects of the blockades, amongst other factors, caused the Applicants to seek protection under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA"). An Initial Order was granted on December 23, 2019. Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. was appointed as Monitor.

[7] In the two years since the blockades began, the Applicants contend that they have used their best efforts to resolve the factors that led to their insolvency, including engaging in negotiations with the GOA, defending their commercial rights and commencing legal proceedings in Armenia to attempt to remove the blockades but these efforts have yet to result in the Applicants re-gaining access to the Amulsar site.

[8] In early 2018, the Applicants retained BMO to canvass the market for potential refinancing or sale options. BMO has conducted multiple rounds of a sales process to market the Lydian Group's mining assets. BMO also ran a process to solicit interest in financing the Applicants' potential Treaty Arbitration. These efforts have not yet resulted in a transaction capable of satisfying the claims of the Applicants' secured lenders.

[9] Since the blockades began, the Senior Lenders have been funding the Applicants' efforts to find a solution to the situation caused by the blockades. The Senior Lenders provided additional financial support to the Lydian Group totalling in excess of $43 million.

[10] As of March 31, 2020, the Lydian Group owed its secured lenders more than $406.8 million.

[11] According to the Applicants, the secured lenders are no longer willing to support the Applicants' efforts to monetize their assets. The Equipment Financiers CAT and ING have taken enforcement steps and Ameriabank has issued preliminary notice of enforcement.

[12] Further, the Applicants point out that the liquidity made available to the Applicants since April 30, 2020 has been conditioned on the Applicants: (i) proposing a restructuring that would be equivalent to the Senior Lenders enforcing their security over the shares of Lydian Canada; and (ii) meeting a deadline to exit the CCAA Proceedings imposed by a majority of the Applicants' Senior Lenders, or further enforcement steps would be taken.

[13] The Applicants submit that the Plan represents the most efficient mechanism to effect an orderly transition of the Lydian Group's affairs. The Applicants contend that the Plan minimizes adverse collateral impacts on Lydian Armenia, provides for winding down the proceedings before this court and the Jersey Court and avoids uncoordinated enforcement steps being taken on the Lydian Group's property to the detriment of the Lydian Group's stakeholders generally.

<u>The Plan</u>

[14] The Plan recognizes and continues the priority position of the Senior Lenders in the Restructured Lydian Group. The Senior Lenders make up the only class eligible to vote on the Plan and receive a distribution thereunder.

[15] According to the Applicants, secured creditors and unsecured creditors with claims at or below Restructured Lydian will continue to maintain their claims in the Restructured Lydian Group, including Lydian Armenia, with the same priority as they previously had, ranking behind the Senior Lenders. Stakeholders with claims at the Lydian International level will continue to have their claims on the Plan Implementation Date, which are intended to be addressed through

the proposed J&E Process in Jersey. Equity claims and unsecured claims against Lydian International will not be assumed by Restructured Lydian as part of the Plan.

[16] The purpose of the Plan is to (a) implement a corporate and financial restructuring of the Applicants, (b) provide for the assignment or settlement of all intercompany debts owing to the Applicants prior to the Effective Time to, among other things, minimize adverse tax consequences to Lydian Armenia and its stakeholders, (c) provide for the equivalent of an assignment of substantially all of the assets of Lydian International to an entity owned and controlled by the Senior Lenders ("SL Newco"), through an amalgamation of Lydian Canada with SL Newco resulting in a new entity ("Restructured Lydian"), and (d) provide a release of all of the existing indebtedness and obligations owing by Lydian International to the Senior Lenders. The Plan will result in the privatization of the Lydian Group to continue as the Restructured Lydian Group.

[17] The steps involved in the Plan's execution are described in detailed in paragraphs 71 to 74 of the Sellers Meeting Affidavit.

[18] The Plan provides for certain releases. The releases are more fully described in the Sellers Meeting Affidavit at paragraph 83.

[19] Mr. Sellers in the Sellers Sanction Affidavit at para. 16 states that the releases were critical components of the negotiations and decision-making process for the D&Os and Senior Lenders in obtaining support for the Plan and resolving these CCAA Proceedings for the benefit of the Restructured Lydian Group, including Lydian Armenia, and all of its stakeholders.

[20] Mr. Sellers further states that the Released Parties made significant contributions to the Applicants' restructuring, both prior to and throughout these CCAA Proceedings, which resulted directly in the preservation of the Lydian Group's business, provided numerous opportunities for the Applicants to seek to monetize their assets for the benefit of stakeholders generally and led to the successful negotiation of the Plan for the benefit of the Restructured Lydian Group.

[21] The Plan provides for a Plan Implementation Date on or prior to June 30, 2020. The majority of the Applicants' Senior Lenders have agreed to fund the costs associated with implementing the Plan and termination of the CCAA Proceedings and the J&E Process in Jersey, through the DIP Exit Facility Amendment, which will make a DIP Exit Credit Facility available to the Applicants totalling an estimated additional $1.866 million.

[22] The test that a debtor company must satisfy in seeking the Court's approval for a plan of compromise or arrangement under the CCAA is well established:

a) there must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;

b) all materials filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the CCAA and prior Orders of the Court in the CCAA proceedings; and

c) the plan must be fair and reasonable.

Issues

[23] The issues for determination on this motion are whether:

a) the Plan is fair and reasonable and should be sanctioned;

b) the releases contemplated by the Plan are appropriate;

c) the increase to the DIP Charge to capture the amounts to be advanced under the DIP Exit Credit Facilities is appropriate;

d) the Stay Period should be extended;

e) the unredacted Sellers Sanction Affidavit should be sealed; and

f) the Monitor's activities, as detailed in the Fifth Report, Sixth Report and Seventh Report, should be approved and the fees of Monitor and its counsel through to June 23, 2020 should be approved.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Approval of the Plan

[24] To determine whether there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements, the court considers factors such as whether: (a) the applicant meets the definition of a "debtor company" under section 2 of the CCAA; (b) the applicant has total claims against it in excess of C$5 million; (c) the notice calling the creditors' meeting was sent in accordance with the order of the court; (d) the creditors were properly classified; (e) the meeting of creditors was properly constituted; (f) the voting was properly carried out; and (g) the plan was approved by the requisite majority.

[25] The Applicants submit that they have complied with the procedural requirements of the CCAA, the Initial Order, the Amended and Restated Initial Order, the Meeting Order and all other Orders granted by this Court during these CCAA Proceedings. In particular:

a) at the time the Initial Order was granted, the Applicants were found to be "debtor companies" to which the CCAA applied and that the Applicants' liabilities exceeded the C$5 million threshold amount under the CCAA;

b) the classification of the Applicants' Senior Lenders into one voting class (namely, the Affected Creditors class) was approved pursuant to the Meeting Order. This classification was not opposed at the hearing to approve the Meeting, nor was the Meeting Order appealed; the Applicants properly effected notice in accordance with the Meeting Order prior to the

Meeting. In addition, the Applicants issued a press release on June 15, 2020 announcing their intention to seek an Order of the Court to file the Plan and call, hold and conduct a meeting of the Senior Lenders;

c) the Meeting was properly constituted and the voting on the Plan was carried out in accordance with the Meeting Order; and

d) the Plan was approved by the Required Majority.

[26] Sections 6(3), 6(5) and 6(6) of the CCAA provide that the Court may not sanction a plan unless the plan contains certain specified provisions concerning Crown claims, employee claims and pension claims. The Applicants' submit that these provisions of the CCAA are satisfied by the Plan. Crown claims and employee claims are treated by the Plan as Unaffected Claims, meaning that such claims, if any, are not compromised or otherwise affected. The Applicants do not maintain any pension plans, and thus section 6(6) of the CCAA does not apply. In compliance with s. 6(8) of the CCAA, the Plan does not provide for any recovery to equity holders.

[27] I accept the foregoing submissions. I am satisfied that the statutory prerequisites to approval of the Plan have been satisfied, and that there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements.

[28] The Applicants submit that no unauthorized steps have been taken in these CCAA Proceedings and throughout the entirety of these CCAA Proceedings, they have kept this Court and Monitor appraised of all material aspects of the Applicants' conduct, activities, and key issues they have worked to resolve. I accept this submission.

[29] The Applicants' submit that when considering whether a plan of compromise and arrangement is fair and reasonable, the court should consider the relative degree of prejudice that would flow from granting or refusing to grant the relief sought. Courts should also consider whether the proposed plan represents a reasonable and fair balancing of interests, in light of the other commercial alternatives available (see: *Re Canadian Airlines Corp*, 2000 ABQB 442 at paras. 3, 94, 96, and 137 – 138; and *Re Canwest Global Communications Corp*, 2010 ONSC 4209).

[30] The CCAA permits the filing of a Plan by an Applicant to its secured creditors. The Applicants' submit the fact that unsecured creditors may receive no recovery under a proposed plan of arrangement does not, of itself, negate the fairness and reasonableness of a plan of arrangement (*Anvil Range Mining Corp. (Re)*, 2002 CanLII 42003 (ONCA); and *1078385 Ontario Ltd., (Re)*, 2004 CanLII 55041 (ONCA) at paras 30-31 (CanLII), affirming 2004 CanLII 66329 (ONSC)).

[31] The Plan was presented to the Senior Lenders, who are the Applicants' only secured creditors and they voted on the Plan as a single class. The Senior Lenders voted in favour of the Plan by the Required Majority. The value of the claims of Orion and Osisko, who voted in

favour of the Plan comprise 77.8% of the total value of the Affected Creditors who were present and voting.

[32] RCF, a secured lender and 32% shareholder, did not vote in favour of the Plan. RCF has advised that it "does not intend at this time to propose or fund an alternative to the Plan, and in the absence of such an alternative we expect that the Court will have no choice but to issue the Sanction and Implementation Order."

[33] I have been advised that an issue as between the Senior Lenders and ING has been resolved and for greater certainty this Plan does not compromise any claim that ING may have in respect of proceeds from a successfully-asserted arbitration claim. In addition, the Senior Lenders have agreed that, after payment of all claims of the Senior Lenders to proceeds from a successfully-asserted arbitration claim whether on account of: (i) claims of the Senior Lenders prior to the Plan Implementation Date; or (ii) further advances made by the Senior Lenders (or their affiliates) after the Plan Implementation Date, (whether such further advances are made as equity, secured debt or unsecured debt), the proceeds will be paid to Lydian Armenia in an amount sufficient and to be used to pay ING's claims against Lydian Armenia prior to any further monies being returned to equity holders.

[34] The Applicants submit that the structure and the nature of the releases in the Plan recognizes and continues the priority position of the Senior Lenders. Secured creditors and unsecured creditors with claims at or below Restructured Lydian will continue to maintain their claims in the Restructured Lydian Group, including Lydian Armenia, with the same priority as they previously had, ranking behind the Senior Lenders.

[35] The Applicants state that they have considered and believe the Plan is the best available outcome for the Applicants, and the interests of the stakeholders generally in the Lydian Group.

[36] As noted in the BMO Affidavit, despite multiple rounds of the SISP and the Treaty Arbitration financing solicitation process, the Applicants submit that no transaction which would satisfy the Lydian Group's secured obligations is currently available to the Applicants.

[37] The Applicants submit that the monetization of Treaty Arbitration is also not open to the Applicants at this time, and if initiated would require an extended period to litigate and significant additional financial resources.

[38] The Applicants submit that for the purposes of valuing an estate at a plan sanction hearing, the "value has to be determined on a current basis. […] It is inappropriate to value the assets on a speculative or (remote) possibility basis." A relevant consideration in this analysis is the scope and extent of previous sale or capital raising efforts undertaken by the company and any financial advisors. In support of this submission, the Applicants reference: *Anvil Range Mining Corp. (Re)*, 2002 CanLII 42003 (ONCA), para 36 (CanLII); *Philip Services Corp., Re*, 1999 CanLII 15012 (ONSC) at para 9 (CanLII) *1078385 Ontario Ltd., (Re*), 2004 CanLII 55041 (ONCA) at paras 30-31 (CanLII), affirming *1078385 Ontario Ltd. (Re)*, 2004 CanLII 66329 (ONSC) (CanLII).

[39] The Applicants submit that the outcome of the Plan, that being the distribution of the Applicants' estates to the Senior Lenders, is essentially identical to what would be achieved with any other options available in the circumstances. Without the Plan, the Senior Lenders could (a) privatize the Applicants' assets through the enforcement of share pledges and other security, or (b) could credit bid their debt to acquire the shares or assets; or (c) enforce their secured positions following the Applicants filing for bankruptcy, administration, or liquidation proceedings across multiple jurisdictions. In each scenario (as with the Plan), the Applicants' assets are transitioned to the Senior Lenders.

[40] The foregoing submissions were not challenged.

[41] The Monitor supports the Plan. As noted in the Monitor's Seventh Report, "it is the Monitor's view that the Plan represents a better path forward than any other alternative that is available to the Applicants and is fair and reasonable."

[42] I am aware that concerns with respect to the fairness of the Plan have been raised by numerous shareholders of Lydian International and oral submissions were made by John LeRoux, Hasan Ciftehan, Mehmet Ali Ekingen and Atilla Bozkay.

[43] In addition, a number of emails were sent directly to the court, which were forwarded to counsel to the Monitor. In addition, certain emails were sent to the Monitor. None of the emails were in a proper evidentiary form.

[44] The concerns of the shareholders included criminal complaints of activities in Armenia, the content of certain press releases and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Some shareholders requested a delay of three months in these proceedings.

[45] As previously noted, equity claims and unsecured claims against Lydian International will not be assumed by Restructured Lydian as part of the Plan. Simply put, the shareholders of Lydian International will not receive any compensation for their shareholdings. This is a reflection of the insolvency of the Applicants and the priority position afforded to shareholders by the CCAA.

[46] I recognize that the shareholders' monetary loss will be crystalized if the Plan is sanctioned. However, a monetary loss resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of their equity interest is an "equity claim" as defined in s. 2(1) of the CCAA. This definition is significant as s. 6(8) of the CCAA provides:

> 6(8) Payment – equity claims – No compromise or arrangement that provides for the payment of an equity claim is to be sanctioned by the court unless it provides that all claims that are not equity claims are to be paid in full before the equity claim is to be paid.

[47] The Plan does not provide for payment in full of claims that are not equity claims. Consequently, equity claimants are not in the position to receive any compensation.

[48] The economic reality facing the shareholders existed prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Applicants were insolvent when they filed these proceedings on December 23, 2019. The financial situation facing the Applicants has not improved since the filing. In fact, it has declined. The mine is not operating with the obvious result that it is not generating revenues and interest continues to accrue on the secured debt. The fact that shareholders will receive no compensation is unfortunate but is a reflection of reality which does not preclude a finding that the Plan is fair and reasonable for the purposes of this motion.

[49] The Senior Lenders have voted in sufficient numbers in favour of the Plan. I am satisfied that there are no viable alternatives, and, in my view, it is not feasible to further delay these proceedings.

[50] Section 6.6 of the Plan provides for full and final releases in favour of the Released Parties, who consist of (a) the Applicants, their employees, agents and advisors (including counsel) and each of the members of the Existing Lydian Group's current and former directors and officers; (b) the Monitor and its counsel; and (c) the Senior Lenders and each of their respective affiliates, affiliated funds, their directors, officers, employees, agents and advisors (including counsel) (collectively, the "Ancillary Releases"). A chart setting out the impact of the releases is attached as Schedule "A" to these reasons.

[51] The Applicants submit that the releases apply to the extent permitted by law and expressly do not apply to, among other things:

a) Lydian Canada's, Lydian UK's or the Senior Lenders' obligations under the Plan or incorporated into the Plan;

b) obligations of any Existing Lydian Group member other than Lydian International under the Credit Agreement and Stream Agreement, and any agreements entered into relating to the foregoing, from and after the Plan Implementation Date;

c) any claims arising from the willful misconduct or gross negligence of any applicable Released Party; and

d) any Director from any Director Claim that is not permitted to be released pursuant to section 5.1(2) of the CCAA.

[52] Unsecured creditors' claims, other than the Ancillary Releases in favour of the Directors, are not compromised or released and remain in the Restructured Lydian Group.

[53] The Applicants submit that it is accepted that there is jurisdiction to sanction plans containing releases if the release was negotiated in favour of a third party as part of the "compromise" or "arrangement" where the release reasonably relates to the proposed restructuring and is not overly broad. There must be a reasonable connection between the third-party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third-party release in the plan (see: *Re Canadian Airlines Corp*, 2000 ABQB 442

at para 92 (CanLII) CCAA at s. 5(1); *Re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp*., 2008 ONCA 587 at paras 61 and 70 (CanLII); *Re Canwest Global Communications Corp*, 2010 ONSC 4209 at para 28-30 (CanLII); and *Re Kitchener Frame Ltd*, 2012 ONSC 234 at paras 85-88 (CanLII).

[54] The Applicants submit that in considering whether to approve releases in favour of third parties, courts will consider the particular circumstances of the case and the objectives of the CCAA. While no single factor will be determinative, the courts have considered the following factors:

a) Whether the parties to be released from claims were necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;

b) Whether the claims to be released were rationally connected to the purpose of the plan and necessary for it;

c) Whether the plan could succeed without the releases;

d) Whether the parties being released were contributing to the plan; and

e) Whether the release benefitted the debtors as well as the creditors generally.

[55] The Applicants submit that the releases were critical components of the decision-making process for the Applicants' directors and officers and Senior Lenders' participation in these CCAA Proceedings in proposing the Plan and the Applicants submit that they would not have brought forward the Plan absent the inclusion of the releases.

[56] The Applicants also submit that the support of the Senior Lenders is essential to the Plan's viability. Without such support, which is conditional on the releases, the Plan would not succeed.

[57] The Applicants submit that the Released Parties made significant contributions to the Applicants' restructuring, both prior to and throughout these CCAA Proceedings. The extensive efforts of the Applicants' directors and officers and the Senior Lenders and Monitor resulted in the negotiation of the Plan, which forms the foundation for the completion of these CCAA Proceedings. The Senior Lenders financial contributions through forbearances, additional advances and DIP and Exit Financing were instrumental.

[58] The Applicants also submit that the releases are an integral part of the CCAA Plan which provides an orderly and effective alternative to uncoordinated and disruptive secured lender enforcement proceedings. The Plan permits unsecured creditors future potential recovery in the Restructured Lydian Group, which may not exist in bankruptcy (*Re Metcalfe &Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp*., 2008 ONCA 587 at paras 71 (CanLII); and *Re Kitchener Frame Ltd*, 2012 ONSC 234 at paras 80-82 (CanLII).

[59] The Applicants submit that this Court has exercised its authority to grant similar releases, including in circumstances where the released claims included claims of parties who did not vote on the plan and were not eligible to receive distributions (*Target Canada Co. et al*. (2 June 2016), Toronto CV-15-10832-00CL (Ont. Sup. Ct. [Comm. List]) Sanction and Vesting Order at Schedule "B" art. 7 (Monitor's website); *Rubicon Minerals Corporation et al*. (8 December 2016), Toronto CV-16-11566-00CL (Ont. Sup. Ct. [Comm. List]) Sanction Order at Schedule "A" art. 7 (Monitor's website); and *Nortel Networks Corporation et al*. (30 November 2016), Toronto 09-CL-7950 (Ont. Sup. Ct. [Comm. List]) Plan of Compromise and Arrangement at art. 7 (Monitor's website)).

[60] Full disclosure of the releases was made in (a) the draft Plan that was circulated to the Service List and filed with this Court as part of the Applicants' Motion Record (returnable June 18, 2020); and (b) the Plan attached to the Meeting Order. The Applicants also issued the Press Releases. This notification process ensured that the Applicants' stakeholders had notice of the nature and effect of the Plan and releases.

[61] The foregoing submissions with respect to the releases were not challenged.

[62] In my view, each of the Released Parties has made a contribution to the development of the Plan. In arriving at this determination, I have taken into account the activities of the Released Parties as described in the Reports of the court-appointed Monitor. I am satisfied that it is appropriate for the Plan to include the releases in favour of the Released Parties.

[63] The development of this Plan has been challenging and as the Monitor has stated, "the Plan represents a better path forward than any other alternative that is available to the Applicants and is fair and reasonable".

[64] I accept this assessment and find that the Plan is fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

DIP Charge

[65] The terms of the DIP Exit Facility Amendment are described in the Sellers Sanction Affidavit. The DIP Exit Facility Amendment provides for exit financing totalling $1.866 million to assist in implementing the Plan and taking the necessary ancillary steps to terminate the CCAA Proceedings and support the J&E Process.

[66] This Court has the jurisdiction to authorize funding in the context of a CCAA restructuring pursuant to s. 11.2(1) and 11.2(2) of the CCAA. In considering whether to approve DIP financing, the Court is to consider the non-exhaustive list of factors set out in s. 11.2(4) of the CCAA. These same provisions of the CCAA provide this Court with the authority to approve amendments to a DIP agreement and secure all obligations arising from the amended DIP loans with an increased DIP charge.

[67] The Applicants submit that, based on the following, the DIP Amendment should be approved and the increase to the DIP Facility should be secured by the DIP Charge:

a) the DIP Exit Credit Facility is necessary to enable the Applicants to implement the Plan;

b) the Monitor is supportive of the DIP Exit Facility Amendment;

c) the DIP Exit Facility Amendment is not anticipated to give rise to any material financial prejudice; and

d) the DIP Lenders are the majority of Senior Lenders.

[68] I am satisfied that the requested relief in respect to the DIP Amendment is reasonably necessary and appropriate in the circumstances.

Sealing Request

[69] The Applicants seek to seal the unredacted Sellers Sanction Affidavit on the basis that the redacted portions of the Sellers Sanction Affidavit contain commercially sensitive information, the disclosure of which could be harmful to stakeholders.

[70] The redactions currently being sought are consistent with previous Orders in these CCAA Proceedings. In my view, the documents in question contain sensitive commercial information. Having considered the principles set out in *Sierra Club of Canada* v. *Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 Sec. 41 at para. 53 I am satisfied that the request for a sealing order is appropriate and is granted.

Stay Period

[71] On the Plan Implementation Date, the CCAA Proceedings with respect to Lydian UK and Lydian Canada will be terminated, such that Lydian International will be the only remaining Applicant in the CCAA Proceedings. The Applicants are requesting an extension of the Stay Period for Lydian International until and including the earlier of (i) the issuance of the Monitor's CCAA Termination Certificate and (ii) December 21, 2020 to enable the remaining Applicant and the Monitor to take the steps necessary to implement the Plan and terminate the CCAA Proceedings and initiate the J&E Process. The Applicants are also requesting an extension of the Stay Period for the Non-Applicant Stay Parties (other than Lydian US) until and including the earlier of the issuance of the Monitor's Plan Implementation Certificate.

[72] I am satisfied that the Applicants in requesting the extension of the Stay Period have demonstrated that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and that they have acted and are acting in good faith and with due diligence such that the request is appropriate.

Approval of Monitor's Activities

[73] The Applicants are seeking an order approving the Monitor's activities to date, as detailed in the Fifth Report, Sixth Report and the Seventh Report (collectively, the "Reports").

This Court has already approved the activities of the Monitor that were detailed in its previous reports. There was no opposition to the request.

[74] I am satisfied that the Reports and the activities described therein should be approved. The Reports were prepared in a manner consistent with the Monitor's duties and the provisions of the CCAA and in compliance with the Initial Order. The Reports are approved in accordance with the language provided in the draft order.

Approval of Monitor's Fees

[75] The Applicants further seek approval of the fees and disbursements of (i) the Monitor for the period April 14, 2020 to June 23, 2020, inclusive, and (ii) counsel to the Monitor for the period April 16, 2020 to June 23, 2020. The Applicants have reviewed the fees of the Monitor and its counsel and support the payment of the same.

[76] I am satisfied that the fee requests are appropriate in the circumstances and they are approved.

DISPOSITION

[77] The Applicants' motion is granted. The Plan is sanctioned and approved. The ancillary relief referenced in the motion is also granted and an Order reflecting the foregoing has been signed.

Chief Justice Geoffrey B. Morawetz

Date: July 10, 2020

SCHEDULE "A"

Lydian International Limited et al.

Impact of the Releases Described in s. 6.6 of the Plan

Lydian Jersey		
Type of Claim	**Treatment**	**Plan Reference**
Senior Lender Claims Held by RCF, Orion and Osisko	Released	Section 6.3(n)
Unsecured Guarantee of Equipment Lessors ING, CAT, Ameriabank	Not Released. Addressed in the J&E Process in Jersey	Section 6.6 (carve-out (E))
Other Unsecured Claims Includes Maverix Metals claim against Lydian Jersey	Not Released. Addressed in the J&E Process in Jersey.	Section 6.6 (carve-out (E))
Equity Claims Held by RCF, Orion, and public Shareholders	Not Released. Addressed in the J&E Process in Jersey.	Section 3.5
D&O Claims Claims against the Directors and their legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)
Claims against Monitor Claims against the Monitor, and Monitor's legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)
Claims against Senior Lenders Claims against the Senior Lenders and their legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)
Intercompany Claims Claims by Lydian Jersey against Lydian Canada and other subsidiaries	Assigned to Lydian Canada	Section 6.3(h)
Priority Claims Admin Charge, DIP Lender's Charge, Transaction Charge, D&O Charge	Transaction Charge and D&O Charge to be terminated on Plan Implementation Date Admin Charge and DIP Lender's Charge to be terminated on CCAA Termination Date	Section 5.2(i)

Lydian Canada		
Type of Claim	**Treatment**	**Plan Reference**
Senior Lender Claims Held by RCF, Orion and Osisko	Not Released	Section 6.6
Unsecured Claims of Equipment Lessors[1] ING, CAT, Ameriabank	Not Released	Section 6.6 (carve-out (E))
Other Unsecured Claims	Not Released	Section 6.6 (carve-out (E))
Equity Claims Shareholdings of Lydian Jersey in Lydian Canada	Not Released (but subject to amalgamation with SL Newco)	Section 3.5
D&O Claims Claims against the Directors and their legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)

[1] This includes contractual rights as outlined in the Waiver and Consent Agreement between Lydian Jersey, Lydian Canada, Lydian UK and Lydian Armenia dated November 26, 2018 (the "**Waiver**").

Claims against Monitor Claims against the Monitor, and Monitor's legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)
Claims against Senior Lenders Claims against the Senior Lenders and their legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)
Priority Claims Admin Charge, DIP Lender's Charge, Transaction Charge, D&O Charge	Transaction Charge and D&O Charge to be terminated on Plan Implementation Date Admin Charge and DIP Lender's Charge to be terminated on CCAA Termination Date	Section 5.2(i)

Lydian UK		
Type of Claim	**Treatment**	**Plan Reference**
Senior Lender Claims Held by RCF, Orion and Osisko	Not Released	Section 6.6
Unsecured Claims of Equipment Lessors ING, CAT, Ameriabank[2]	Not Released	Section 6.6 (carve-out (E))
Other Unsecured Claims	Not Released	Section 6.6 (carve-out (E))
Equity Claims Shareholdings of Lydian Canada in Lydian UK	Not Released	Section 3.5
D&O Claims Claims against the Directors and their legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)
Claims against Monitor Claims against the Monitor, and Monitor's legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)
Claims against Senior Lenders Claims against the Senior Lenders and their legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)
Priority Claims Admin Charge, DIP Lender's Charge, Transaction Charge, D&O Charge	Transaction Charge and D&O Charge to be terminated on Plan Implementation Date Admin Charge and DIP Lender's Charge to be terminated on CCAA Termination Date	Section 5.2(i)

[2] This includes the contractual rights outlined in the Waiver.

11910728 Canada Inc. ("DirectorCo")		
Type of Claim	**Treatment**	**Plan Reference**
Senior Lender Claims Held by RCF, Orion and Osisko	Not Released	Section 6.6
Unsecured Claims	Not Released	Section 6.6 (carve-out (E))
Equity Claims Shareholdings of Lydian Canada in DirectorCo	Not Released	Section 3.5
D&O Claims Claims against the Directors and their legal cousnel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii) of the Plan
Claims against Monitor Claims against the Monitor, and Monitor's legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)
Claims against Senior Lenders Claims against the Senior Lenders and their legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)

Lydian International Holdings Limited, Lydian Resources Armenia Limited, and Lydian Resources Kosovo Limited		
Type of Claim	**Treatment**	**Plan Reference**
Senior Lender Claims Held by RCF, Orion and Osisko	Not Released	Section 6.6
Other Secured Claims Includes claim of Maverix Metals in shares of Lydian Resources Armenia Limited, which is subordinated to claims of Senior Lenders	Not Released	Section 6.6
Unsecured Claims Includes Maverix Metals claim against Lydian International Holdings Limited	Not Released	Section 6.6 (carve-out (E))
Equity Claims Shareholdings of Lydian UK in Lydian International Holdings Limited, and shareholdings of Lydian International Holdings Limited in Lydian Resources Armenia ("**BVI**") and Lydian Resources Kosovo Limited Includes Maverix Metals' share pledge in BVI	Not Released	Section 6.6 (carve-out (E))
D&O Claims Claims against the Directors and their legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii) of the Plan
Claims against Monitor Claims against the Monitor, and Monitor's legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)
Claims against Senior Lenders Claims against the Senior Lenders and their legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)

Lydian Armenia		
Type of Claim	**Treatment**	**Plan Reference**
Senior Lender Claims Held by RCF, Orion and Osisko	Not Released	Section 6.6
Equipment Lessor Secured Claims ING, CAT and Ameriabank (to the extent secured by their collateral)	Not Released	Section 6.6 (carve-out (E))
Equipment Lessor Unsecured Claims ING, CAT and Ameriabank (unsecured deficiency claims)	Not Released	Section 6.6 (carve-out (E))
Other Unsecured Claims e.g. Trade creditors	Not Released	Section 6.6 (carve-out (E))
Equity Claims Shareholdings held by BVI / DirectorCo (as sole shareholder representative of BVI	Not Released	Section 3.5
D&O Claims Claims against the Directors	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6 (i) and (ii)
Claims against Monitor Claims against the Monitor, and Monitor's legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)
Claims against Senior Lenders Claims against the Senior Lenders and their legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)

Lydian US Lydian Zoloto, Lydian Resources Georgia Limited ("Lydian Georgia") and Georgian Resource Company LLC ("Lydian GRC", and collectively with Lydian US, Lydian Zoloto and Lydian Georgia, the "Released Guarantors" under the Plan)		
Type of Claim	**Treatment**	**Plan Reference**
Senior Lender Claims Held by RCF, Orion and Osisko	Released	Section 6.3(n)
Unsecured Claims	Not Released	Section 6.6
Equity Claims (a) Shareholdings of Lydian Jersey in Lydian US, Lydian Georgia and Lydian Zoloto; and (b) Shareholdings of Lydian Georgia in Lydian GRC	(a) Not Released. Per s. 6.4 of the Plan, Lydian US and Lydian Zoloto to be wound-up and dissolved pursuant to the laws of Colorado and Armenia, respectively. (b) Lydian Georgia shares held by Lydian Jersey to be transferred to Lydian Georgia Purchaser on Plan Implementation Date. (b) Shares of Lydian GRC held by Lydian Georgia not released. See note re: Lydian Georgia above.	Section 3.5 and section 6.4
D&O Claims, Claims against the Directors and their legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)

Claims against Monitor Claims against the Monitor, and Monitor’s legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)
Claims against Senior Lenders Claims against the Senior Lenders and their legal counsel	Released (subject to s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA)	Section 6.6(i) and (ii)

TAB 8

CITATION: Re Green Relief Inc.
2020 ONSC 6837
COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-00639217-00CL
DATE: 20201109

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

(COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF **GREEN RELIEF INC.** (the "**Applicant**")

BEFORE: Koehnen J.

COUNSEL: C *Robert I. Thornton*, *Rebecca L. Kennedy*, *Mitchell Grossell*, for the Applicant

Peter Osborne, Christopher Yung for the directors Neilank Jha, Tony Battaglia, Brian Ranson, Christopher McNamara and Stephen Massel.

Mark Abradjian for Tony Battaglia in his capacity as shareholder and creditor

David Ward for 2650064 Ontario Inc.

Alex Henderson for Susan Basmaji

Gavin Finlayson for Auxley Cannabis Group Inc. and Kolab Project Inc.

Anton Granic on his own behalf

Rory McGovern, for Steve LeBlanc

Alan Dick and Adrienne Boudreau for Thomas Saunders

Steven Weisz and Amanda McInnis for Lyn Mary Bravo

Brian Duxbury for Warren Bravo

Alex Henderson for Susan Basmaji

Robert Kennaley, *Joshua W. Winter* for Henry Schilthuis and Mark Lloyd

Danny Nunes, for the Monitor

HEARD: November 2 and 3, 2020

ENDORSEMENT

[1] The Applicant, Green Relief Inc., seeks an order approving a transaction for the sale of its assets in the course of a proceeding under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA"). The sale transaction is generally not contested. Certain stakeholders do however, take issue with the release that the approval and vesting order purports to grant in favour of certain releasees as a condition precedent to the sale. For ease of reference, I refer to Green Relief alternatively by its name, as the Applicant or as the Company in these reasons.

[2] For the reasons set out below, I:

a. Approve the sales transaction as Green Relief seeks, including the release. There is substantial difference of opinion on the proper interpretation of the release. It is not appropriate to interpret the release in a vacuum. It is preferable to do so on the basis of concrete circumstances which might present themselves if and when any claim is brought that implicates the release. I will however remain seized of the interpretation of the release. If any claim arises that calls for interpretation of the release, including an interpretation of any available insurance coverage, that issue must be brought before me for determination.

b. Temporarily lift the stay of proceedings until 12:01 a.m. November 27, 2020 to permit the filing of claims that might attract insurance coverage the that the release refers to.

c. Decline to extend the benefit of the release to Susan Basmaji.

I. The Sale Transaction

[3] Green Relief seeks approval of the sale of certain assets to 2650064 Ontario Inc. (265 Co.) (the "Transaction"). As a result of the proposed transaction, 265 Co. will acquire new common shares of Green Relief in a sufficient quantity to reduce the holdings of existing shareholders to fractional shares which would be cancelled on the close of the transaction. On closing, Residual Co. will be established and added as an applicant to the CCAA proceeding. In effect, all obligations and liabilities of Green Relief will be transferred to Residual Co.

[4] 265 Co. will pay $5,000,000 for the common shares. Approximately $1,500,000 of that is an operating loan with the balance being available for creditors. In addition, 265 Co. will

pay Residual Co. up to $7,000,000 as an earn out during the first two fiscal years following closing. The earn out is based on a payment of 25% of annual EBITDA above $5,000,000.

[5] Section 36(3) of the CCAA provides that, when deciding whether to authorize a sale of assets, the court should consider, among other things:

(a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;

(b) whether the Monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale;

(c) whether the Monitor filed with the court a report stating that in its opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;

(d) the extent to which creditors were consulted;

(e) the effects of the proposed sale or distribution on the creditors and other interested parties; and

(f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

[6] These factors are consistent with the principles set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* 1991 CanLII 2727 (ON CA) at para. 16 for the approval of a sales transaction.

[7] I am satisfied that the principles of *Soundair* and the factors set out in section 36 (3) of the CCAA have been met here.

[8] The process leading to the Transaction was reasonable in the circumstances. While there was no formal sale and investor solicitation process, the transaction was the culmination of a seven-month long Notice of Intention and CCAA proceeding. The proceeding involved vigorously competing stakeholders and a competitive bidding process between interested purchasers. The competing stakeholder groups had ample opportunity to bring the business to the attention of potential purchasers. I am satisfied that there was ample information available and ample time for stakeholders to participate in the purchase process or bring the purchase to the attention of market players who may be interested in acquiring Green Relief. The Monitor approved the process and the Transaction. The Monitor notes that its liquidation analysis demonstrates that the Transaction is preferable to a bankruptcy. While creditors were not formally consulted on the process, they had ample information about it as a result of the ongoing CCAA proceeding. Creditors appeared at the various hearings. At times they made submissions in favour of an alternative bid, which submissions I gave effect to. The creditors who have made submissions before me on this motion approve of the Transaction and the release. No creditors ever objected to the process that was being followed. The Transaction makes funds available for creditors and is the best transaction available.

[9] No one opposes the Transaction. Those who spoke in opposition on the motion did not oppose the Transaction but opposed only the release.

II. The Release

[10] The release is opposed by the founders of Green Relief, Steven Leblanc, Warren Bravo and Lynn Bravo. They are supported on this motion by three other shareholders, Thomas Saunders, Henry Schilthuis and Mark Lloyd. For ease of reference, I will refer to those who oppose the release as the Objectors.

[11] There is a long, bitter history of litigation and threats of litigation between the founders, the existing board and Green Relief's approximately 700 other shareholders.

[12] The Objectors argue that I should reject the release because:

(i) It was improper to include it as a condition precedent to the Transaction.

(ii) I have no jurisdiction to approve the release.

(iii) The release fails to meet the test set out in case law concerning releases.

(iv) The release is too broad in scope.

(i) Release as a Condition Precedent

[13] The Objectors note that the term sheet that preceded this motion and that I approved, did not contain any releases, let alone as a condition precedent to a transaction. Mr. Leblanc says he did not oppose the term sheet because it did not refer to releases. As negotiations towards a final agreement developed, the Company and the Monitor advised that Green Relief would be bringing a motion to approve releases. When the issue of a motion to approve releases arose, 265 Co. advised that it was agnostic about releases and that the releases were not theirs to give or ask for. The Objectors note that, instead of a motion to approve a release, Green Relief presented a transaction that contains a release as a condition precedent. The Objectors submit that the court should not be strong-armed in this fashion.

[14] Both Green Relief and the Monitor did advise the court they would be bringing a motion to seek permission to include a release in the Transaction. It is certainly preferable for parties to live by representations they make to the court rather than represent one thing and do another. There is no evidence before me about how the release came to be a condition precedent in the transaction. 265 Co. made no representations in support of the release although it wants the Transaction to be approved. I infer from 265 Co.'s submissions that it does not care about the release and that the release was inserted at the insistence of others.

[15] That certain parties have characterized the release as a condition precedent, is irrelevant to my analysis. Given that Green Relief and the Monitor represented to the court that they would be seeking the court's approval for any release, I will hold them to that representation. I do not feel in any way constrained to accept or reject the release simply because it has been included as a condition precedent. I consider myself free to approve the Transaction with or without the release.

(ii) Jurisdiction to Grant Release

[16] The Objectors submit that I have no jurisdiction to grant the release because the wording of the CCAA does not permit it on the facts of this case.

[17] The Objectors begin their analysis with section 5.1 (1) of the CCAA which provides:

> 5.1 (1) **A compromise or arrangement** made in respect of a debtor company **may include** in its terms provision for the **compromise of claims against directors** of the company **that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act** and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations (emphasis added).

[18] The Objectors note that the section contains two qualifications. First it provides that a compromise or arrangement may include a release. Second, it limits the release to prefiling claims

[19] The Objectors note that the cases to which Green Relief points for the authority to grant a release address the release at the same time as the plan is being approved. Here, there is no plan to approve yet.

[20] The Objectors submit that the distinction is significant because a plan is only approved after a claims process, negotiation for a plan, a meeting approving the plan and a two thirds majority vote in favour of the plan. Those steps are important in their view because they refine the claims against the company and ascertain the value of those claims.

[21] Green Relief has not yet conducted a claims process or proposed a plan. Instead, the objective is to complete the Transaction, put $3,500,000 into Residual Co. and conduct a claims process once Residual Co. has been funded.

[22] Green Relief has not yet decided whether it will address litigation claims inside or outside the CCAA claims process.

[23] While the presence of a plan is relevant to the approval of releases for the reasons the Objectors cite, I do not agree that the absence of a plan deprives the court of jurisdiction to approve a release.

[24] The primary advantage of approving a release on a plan approval is that it gives creditors better insight into the parameters of the plan they are being asked to approve. The interests of creditors are a prime consideration in any step of a CCAA proceeding. While the creditors have not approved a plan here, they have had the opportunity to make submissions throughout the process. They availed themselves of that opportunity. In large part I acceded to their requests as the primary beneficiaries of any plan. When certain creditors asked me to allow the Company to pursue a transaction other than one that 265 Co. was proposing at the time, I did so. When that possibility did not materialize, they spoke in favour of newer 265 Co. proposals and now speak in favour of Transaction and the proposed release. They favour the release because it maximizes the size of the estate available for distribution amongst creditors.

[25] Returning the language of s. 5.1 (1), it is drafted permissively. It does not limit the overall jurisdiction of the court under section 11 of the CCAA to make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

[26] At least one other court has approved a release in the absence of a plan and in the face of opposition to the release: *Re Nemaska Lithium Inc.* 2020 QCCS 3218 where Gouin J. noted that the carveout provided by s. 5.1 (2) of the CCAA adequately protected the shareholders who opposed the release.

(iii) The Test for a Release

[27] In *Lydian International Limited (Re)* 2020 ONSC 4006 at paragraph 54, Morawetz J. (as he then was) summarized the factors relevant to the approval of releases in CCAA proceedings as including the following:

(a) Whether the claims to be released are rationally connected to the purpose of the plan;

(b) Whether the plan can succeed without the releases;

(c) Whether the parties being released contributed to the plan;

(d) Whether the releases benefit the debtors as well as the creditors generally;

(e) Whether the creditors voting on the plan have knowledge of the nature and the effect of the releases; and

(f) Whether the releases are fair, reasonable and not overly-broad.

[28] As in most discretionary exercises, it is not necessary for each of the factors to apply in order for the release to be granted: *Target Canada Co., Re*, endorsement of Morawetz J. (as he then was) at p. 14. Some factors may assume greater weight in one case than another.

[29] In this case, I would add to these factors an additional factor, the quality of the claims the Objectors wish to maintain. While this may already be implicit in some of the considerations set out in *Lydian,* it warrants separate identification on the facts of the case before me.

[30] The Objectors argue vigorously that this is not the stage to assess the strength of any potential action against proposed defendants or the size of damage claims available against them. I agree. At the same time, however, the court should not entirely ignore the nature of the proposed claim. If the court is being asked to release claims, it is helpful to know what is being released. The court's impression of the nature of the claim is a relevant factor to consider when determining whether releases should be granted. I do not think it would be advisable to lay down a precise definition of the quality of claim required to determine whether releases should or should not be granted nor would I described this as a threshold test to grant or deny the release. It is more of a directional or qualitative factor to consider in deciding whether to grant a release rather than a precise legal test. The stronger a claim appears, the less likely a court may be to grant a release. The thinner and more speculative a claim, the more likely a court may be to grant a release.

The Quality of the Claims being Released

[31] As noted earlier, the principal Objectors are the founders of Green Relief Steven Leblanc, Warren Bravo and Lynn Bravo. Relations between the founders on the one hand and the existing board and other shareholders are poisoned.

[32] On the motion before me, shareholders spoke out against the founders and made submissions to the effect that the release should not preclude any claims by shareholders against the founders. Those shareholders see themselves as having been deprived of their entire investment, in some cases their life savings, because of alleged misrepresentations or improper transactions by the founders. None of those allegations are before me. I raise them only to set the highly litigious context in which the release arises. The release does not propose to release claims against the founders but only releases claims against current directors, Green Relief's legal counsel, the Monitor and its legal counsel.

[33] This proceeding has been highly litigious from the outset, particularly in light of the relatively modest size of the estate at issue. It has been marred by litigation over who is a shareholder, who is or should be a director and who is a creditor.

[34] This follows on a highly contentious corporate history involving struggles between shareholder groups, allegations of misrepresentation and allegations of fraud.

[35] The Objectors' primary opposition to the release is based on their desire to bring an action against the current directors, the Company's legal advisors during the CCAA proceedings, the Monitor and its counsel for their conduct during the CCAA proceedings. The Objectors submit that the current Board, the Monitor and their legal counsel misled the court by suggesting that they had a transaction in the offing that would have injected $20,000,000 into Green Relief. The Objectors say that the releasees did insufficient due diligence to determine whether the proposed purchaser in fact had $20,000,000 available.

[36] The Objectors submit that the Company has incurred needless professional fees because of the fruitless pursuit of the $20,000,000 transaction and that Green Relief suffered a loss of chance in that it was deprived of the ability to pursue alternative transactions.

[37] If anything, the proposed action demonstrates the need for a release. In the overall circumstances of the case, the threat of litigation against the current board, the Company's counsel, the Monitor and its counsel is unfounded and disproportionate. To demonstrate this requires some context and background.

[38] At the outset of the proceeding, 265 Co. proposed to extend a $5,000,000 operating loan to Green Relief. The loan provided no money for creditors. The board feared that accepting the loan would inevitably put Green Relief further into debt and ultimately end up with 265 Co. having ownership of Green Relief without having provided anything for other stakeholders. Mr. Leblanc supported the 265 Co. proposal and urged that I adopt it.

[39] The board urged me to allow them to pursue a proposal from another investor, Mr. Vercouteren. The Vercouteren proposal would have injected $20,000,000 into Green Relief. As it turns out, the Vercouteren proposal did not materialize. Initially the court was advised that the Vercouteren proposal was being delayed because of administrative holdups attributable to the Covid 19 pandemic. A few months later it was discovered that the delays were attributable to the fact that the Vercouteren proposal was contingent upon the completion of another transaction in Europe. The nature of that transaction, its status, closing date, likelihood of closing and reason for not closing to date were never revealed.

[40] It is fair to say that when I discovered this, I expressed frustration to the Applicant for having failed to disclose the true status of the Vercouteren proposal from the outset. The Applicant assured me that they had done due diligence on Mr. Vercouteren and had been assured by his counsel, a reputable law firm, that he was a person of financial substance with the means to complete a transaction of the sort he had proposed.

[41] With the benefit of hindsight one can debate whether the board acted perfectly, their conduct, however, ultimately led to the situation we find ourselves in now which is one that has 265 Co. offering more money to creditors and potentially other stakeholders than its initial proposal did. The proposal I am being asked to approve would see 265 Co. inject $5,000,000 of which $1,500,000 would be for operating purposes and $3,500,000 would be for distribution to creditors. In addition, the 265 Co. proposal contains an earn out of up to an additional $7,000,000 for distribution to creditors. While I agree that it does not offer $20,000,000, the reality is that $20,000,000 was not on the table.

[42] Mr. McGovern, on behalf of Mr. Leblanc submits that the fact that the current offer of 265 Co. is superior to the prior offer does not end the analysis because the board and its advisors got that superior offer by engaging in questionable conduct. According to Mr. McGovern, this introduces moral hazard into the equation which is undesirable.

[43] On that analysis, if anyone has been damaged by the alleged moral hazard, it is 265 Co. which has been led to improve its previous offers based on allegedly misleading information. However, 265 Co. does not complain. It wishes to close the Transaction.

[44] Mr. Dick on behalf of Mr. Saunders and Mr. Kennaley on behalf of Messrs. Schilthuis and Lloyd submit that the Objectors should be able to pursue their loss of chance claim. They argue that there were no other bids for Green Relief because the size of the Vercouteren proposal inhibited others from bidding. While perhaps initially appealing as a basis to speculate about what other bids may have been available, I do not accept the submission for three reasons.

[45] First, the Vercouteren proposal did not stop 265 Co. from making its $5,000,000 operating loan proposal. It also did not stop 265 Co. from making a significantly more superior offer later subject to an exit right based on what its due diligence revealed. Anyone who was seriously interested in the business could have made an offer with a due diligence exit right. There is nothing unusual in that type of proposal

[46] Second, the founders supported 265 Co.'s initial inferior proposal. Had they truly believed Green Relief was worth $20,000,000, it is unlikely they would have done so. In addition, the founders were ideally placed to find other financial solutions preferable to the one on offer. They did not do so. Even when they learned that the current proposal was conditional on the release, the Objectors did not suggest that the company return to the drawing board to search for another transaction. The Objectors want me to approve the Transaction but with the release removed.

[47] Third, no creditor objects to the Transaction. Any hope of a transaction that would offer more funds for creditors, let alone shareholders, than the Transaction does is illusory. At an earlier stage in this proceeding, Mr. Weisz stated that "Green Relief is hopelessly insolvent": see my endorsement of April 20, 2020 at para. 6. At the time, Green Relief was in default of leases, had tax arrears of over $100,000 and was over five months in arrears on a mortgage in favour of Rescom. Hopelessly insolvent companies do not have enough money to pay off creditors, let alone provide value to shareholders. This particular hopelessly insolvent company is a cannabis business. The entire cannabis industry is undergoing a fundamental shakeup. There is no shortage of CCAA proceedings involving players in the cannabis industry. The harsh business reality is that creditors, let alone shareholders, will come out short in these restructurings. If anyone stands to gain from a superior offer, it is creditors. Yet no creditor, apart from Ms. Bravo who asserts that she is a creditor, wants to pursue a claim against anyone for their conduct of the CCAA proceeding.

[48] In those circumstances, I am satisfied that whatever right of action is being removed by the release is so insubstantial that the court need not be concerned about depriving anyone of a cause of action that has even a remote chance of success. At best, it is a cause of action that is entirely without legal merit but which might have some economic value if a defendant were prepared to settle on the basis of the claim's nuisance value. Permitting unmeritorious claims to proceed so that the founders can try to extract a nuisance value settlement arising from steps that were approved by the court at each stage would amount to legally authorized extortion which I am not inclined to permit.

[49] In the circumstances described above, the quality of the claims released would incline me to approve the release.

Application of the Lydian Factors

[50] **Releasees necessary and essential:** The released parties here were necessary and essential to the restructuring. A CCAA proceeding quite obviously cannot proceed without a Monitor, Monitor's counsel or company counsel. Similarly, a restructuring cannot proceed without the other releasees like directors, officers and employees.

[51] **Rational connection between claims released and the purpose of the plan:** The claims released are rationally connected to the purpose of the plan. The object of the release is to diminish indemnity claims by the releasees against Residual Co. and the pool of cash that is being created in its hands to satisfy creditor claims. Given that one purpose of a CCAA proceeding is to maximize creditor recovery, a release which helps do that is rationally connected to the purpose of the plan.

[52] **Whether the plan can succeed without the releases** is unknown. The directors have made the releases a condition precedent to the plan. The court should not accept the release simply because it is said to be a condition precedent. In the circumstances of this case, the condition precedent strikes me as more of a strong-arm tactic that courts should resist. I feel myself at liberty to call the directors' bluff and approve the Transaction without the release.

[53] Success of the plan without releases should, however, also be assessed with regard to factors other than potential strong-arming by incumbent directors. Here, the pool of assets immediately available for distribution of creditors is approximately $3,500,000. As noted, the releasees may have a claim on those funds to satisfy any indemnity claims arising out of the litigation. Mr. McGovern's announced desire to sue the Monitor, its counsel, the directors and Green Relief's counsel for their conduct during the restructuring may give rise to indemnity claims of a size that would make a significant dent in the cash available for creditors. That diminution would make the plan significantly less successful and, depending on circumstances, could eliminate assets available for creditors.

[54] **Did the releasees contribute to the plan:** While there is not yet a plan, the releasees have clearly contributed to get the Company to this stage. The Monitor, its counsel, the directors and Company counsel dedicated time and effort to the CCAA proceedings. Professional advisors contributed further by deferring billing and collection. Messrs. Jha and Battaglia contributed $1,500,000 of their personal funds to provide DIP financing at relatively modest interest rates. Mr. Battaglia contributed $220,000. Dr. Jha initially contributed $500,000 and then increased his contribution to $1,250,000 in June 2020.

[55] **Does the release benefit the debtor as well as creditors:** The release benefits the debtor in that it helps facilitate a transaction that will make funds available to creditors. In the absence of the release, the funds available to creditors could be significantly diminished because of indemnity claims by the releasees. Those indemnity claims would include claims for advancement of defence costs. The advancement of defence costs would be claimed in relation to an action that questions the conduct of the releasees during a court supervised and court approved the process. As noted above, the nature of those claims is highly tenuous.

[56] **Creditors knowledge of the nature and effect of the release:** All creditors on the service list were served with materials relating to this motion. Creditors were free to attend the hearing, several did. Those creditors who made submissions on the motion supported the release.

[57] A consideration of the foregoing *Lydian* factors would also incline me to approve the release. If I balance the right to the Objectors to pursue the releasees for their conduct during the CCAA proceeding against the right of creditors to maximize recovery against the Green Relief estate, there is simply no contest. The creditors with proven claims have legitimate, verified demands against the corporate estate. The Objectors have tenuous claims based on objections to a court supervised process that would in effect amount to a collateral attack on court orders. In those circumstances I am satisfied that the release benefits the debtor and creditors generally.

Scope of the Releases

[58] Although the scope of the releases is captured by the factor that Lydian describes as whether the releases are fair, reasonable and not overly broad, I consider the scope of the release here in a standalone section because of the prominence given to it during argument.

[59] The release is found in paragraph 24 of the proposed order. Its material language provides:

> …the current directors, officers, employees, independent contractors that have provided legal or financial services to the Applicant, legal counsel and advisors of the Applicant, and (ii) the Monitor and its legal counsel (collectively, the "Released Parties") shall be … released … from …all … claims …of any nature or

> kind whatsoever … based in whole or in part on any act or omission, … taking place prior to the filing of the Monitor's Certificate and that relate in any manner whatsoever to the Applicant or any of its assets (current or historical), obligations, business or affairs or this CCAA Proceeding, … provided that nothing in this paragraph shall … release… any claim: (i) that is not permitted to be released pursuant to section 5.1(2) of the CCAA, (ii) against the former directors and officers of the Applicant for breach of trust arising from acts or omissions occurring before the date of the Initial Order, (iii) that may be made against any applicable insurance policy of the Applicant prior to the date of the Initial Order, or (iv) that may be made against the current directors and officers that would be covered by the Directors' Charge granted pursuant to the Initial Order.

[60] While the release appears broad at first blush, a closer reading narrows it scope considerably. The parties being released are by and large parties who provided services to the company during the CCAA process. Given that the incremental steps in the CCAA process were approved by the court and were subject to submission by a wide variety of parties, the release is not, prima facie, unreasonable. In addition, while current directors are also released, the longest-serving of those are Messrs. Jha and Battaglia who became directors on March 7, 2019, approximately one year before the Notice of Intention was filed. The time period for which they are being released outside of the court proceedings is therefore relatively limited. On the motion, no one advanced any basis for a claim against them for pre-Notice of Intention conduct.

[61] The release then goes on to carve out certain types of claims that are not being released even as against the limited population of releasees. The carveouts include claims not permitted to be released under section 5.1 (2) of the CCAA and claims that may be made against any applicable insurance policy.

[62] Section 5.1 (2) of the CCAA prohibits releases for, among other things, "wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors. " Just what that means was the subject of much argument on the motion.

[63] On behalf of Green Relief, Mr. Thornton submitted that the carveout for "wrongful or oppressive conduct" is broad and would include negligence claims. In other words, in the Company's view, negligence claims are not being released. Mr. Thornton submitted that the language of section 5.1 (2) of the CCAA effectively releases the directors from statutory liabilities for which they may be liable because the corporation failed to do something even though that failure is not attributable to any wrongdoing by directors. By way of example, directors' statutory liability for unpaid wages would fall into this category and would be captured by the release.

[64] In *BlueStar Battery Systems International Corp., Re*, 2000 CanLII 22 678 (ON SC) Farley J. said the following about the scope of section 5.1 (2) at para 14:

> "However it seems to me that the directors of any corporation in difficulty and contemplating a CCAA plan would be unwise to engage in a game of hide and go seek since the language of s. 5.1 (2)(b) appears wide enough to encompass those situations where the directors stand idly by and do nothing to correct any misstatements or other wrongful or oppressive conduct of others in the corporation (either other directors acting qua directors, or officers or underlings). There was no evidence presented that the directors here had knowledge or ought to have had knowledge of such here. One may have the greatest of suspicion that they did or ought to have had such knowledge. This could have been crystallized if RevCan had put the directors on notice of the promises to pay GST. It would seem to me at first glance that the oppression claims cases which arise pursuant to corporate legislation such as the Canada Business Corporations Act and the Business Corporations Act (Ontario) would be of assistance in defining "oppressive conduct". Similarly it would appear that "wrongful conduct" would be conduct which would be tortious (or akin thereto) as well as any conduct which was illegal."

[65] This passage would appear to support Mr. Thornton's submission.

[66] Mr. Osborne, on behalf of the current directors took a narrower view of the meaning of "wrongful or oppressive" conduct and described it as referring to "active but not "passive torts". In Mr. Osborne's submission, the release covers claims in respect of which the corporation can indemnify directors, including negligence, but does not include intentional conduct like fraud.

[67] Given the difference of views, some counsel asked me to define specifically what was or was not excluded by section 5.1 (2) while others urged me not to define the scope of the section at this stage.

[68] My inclination is to not to define the scope of the section or the release in a vacuum. Both the release and section 5.1 (2) are better interpreted in light of a specific claim in the context of the circumstances existing if and when any such claim arises.

[69] In that regard I would urge a heavy dose of restraint on all parties. There has been no shortage of animosity and litigation between the parties. Temperatures have run high throughout. Before continuing any existing litigation or commencing new litigation, I would urge all parties to consider whether they are proceeding out of anger and frustration, however justified it may be, or are they proceeding on a rational economic basis because there is a cogent basis for a claim that will lead to recovery considerably in excess of the costs of litigating. This is a situation where suing "out of principle" warrants considerable restraint.

[70] The release also carves out claims "that may be made against any applicable insurance policy of the Applicant prior to the date of the initial order." I was advised during the motion that the directors were unable to obtain insurance after the Notice of Intention was filed in March 2020 but that the company purchased tail coverage that extended coverage for past conduct of directors. The tail coverage expires on November 26, 2020. That still provides plaintiffs with a period of time to commence an action for which there might be insurance coverage and to which the release might therefore not apply. The tail coverage may for example, cover current and former directors for conduct that arose before the Notice of Intention was filed.

[71] To permit such claims to be filed, I am temporarily lifting the stay of proceedings against officers and directors of Green Relief solely for the purpose of initiating claims that would potentially obtain the benefit of the carveouts under the release.

[72] Given my preference for interpreting the release in light of actual circumstances rather than in a vacuum and given my temporary lift of the stay of proceedings against officers and directors, there is considerable benefit to the parties and considerable judicial efficiency in having the release interpreted by the same judicial officer who approved it and who had oversight of the CCAA proceedings. I will therefore remain seized of this issue and order that any issue about whether the release applies (including the issue of insurance coverage) will be determined by me.

[73] To be clear, if any actions are commenced because of the temporary lift stay, the parties will still have to agree that such actions are carved out of the release by virtue of insurance coverage or I will have to determine that issue. The actions will not proceed and need not be defended until such agreement is reached or until I have determined whether the release applies.

Relief requested by Susan Basmaji

[74] Susan Basmaji is a shareholder who asks that I extend the coverage of the release to her. Ms. Basmaji says she motivated a large number of other shareholders to cooperate with the Monitor and the Company to support the Transaction. She says that as a result of those efforts, Mr. Leblanc has commenced a defamation action against her.

[75] I am not inclined to extend the release to Ms. Basmaji. The release was the product of negotiations between various stakeholders. It is not for the court to rewrite the release and bring other parties into the negotiation. I have extremely limited knowledge of the dispute between Mr. Leblanc and Ms. Basmaji and have no basis for concluding whether Ms. Basmaji was essential to the success of the Transaction as Lydian suggests nor do I have enough information about the defamation action to determine whether Ms. Basmaji should benefit from a release. That that said, it strikes me that the litigation between Mr. Leblanc and Ms. Basmaji a dispute to which the exhortation in paragraph 69 above is particularly relevant.

Disposition

[76] For the reasons set out above, I

a. approve the Transaction;

b. approve the release;

c. will remain seized of all issues concerning the interpretation of the release and the insurance coverage referred to in it;

d. lift the stay of proceedings solely to permit actions to be brought up to and including November 26, 2020 in order to capture the benefit of insurance coverage referred to in the release;

e. reimpose the stay of proceedings effective at 12:01 AM on November 27, 2020; and

f. decline to extend the benefit of the release to Susan Basmaji.

Koehnen J.

Date: November 9, 2020

TAB 9

SUPERIOR COURT
(Commercial Division)

CANADA
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
DISTRICT OF MONTREAL

No.: 500-11-060598-212

DATE: July 8, 2022 (**RECTIFIED July 13, 2022**)

BY THE HONOURABLE MARIE-ANNE PAQUETTE, Chief Justice

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, C. C-36 OF:

BLACKROCK METALS INC.
BLACKROCK MINING INC.
BRM METALS GP INC.
BLACKROCK METALS LP.
Debtors
-and-

DELOITTE RESTRUCTURING INC.
Monitor
-and-

INVESTISSEMENT QUÉBEC
OMF FUND II H LTD.
Secured Creditors
-and-

13482332 CANADA INC.
Shareholder Bidder
-and-

WINNER WORLD HOLDINGS LIMITED
4470524 CANADA INC.
GOLDEN SURPLUS TRADING
PROSPERITY STEEL
Intervenors

<u>RECTIFIED</u> JUDGMENT
ON THE AMENDED SHAREHOLDER BIDDER'S APPLICATION TO EXTEND THE PHASE 2 BID DEADLINE (SEQ. 23)
AND
ON THE DEBTORS' APPLICATION TO APPROVE A VESTING ORDER (SEQ. 17) [1]

<u>OVERVIEW</u>

[1] The debtors BlackRock Metals Inc., BlackRock Mining Inc., BlackRock Metals LP and BRM Metals GP Inc. (collectively: **BlackRock**) were established in 2008. They are developing a metals and materials manufacturing business with a mine in Chibougamau, and a metallurgical plant to be located at the Port of Saguenay (**Project Volt**).

[2] The mine and plant to be built under Project Volt will eventually supply vanadium, high purity pig iron and titanium products, three specialty metals which are, according to

[1] Reasons in support of orders issued on May 31, 2022 and rectified on June 1, 2022

BlackRock, central to the green materials transition in North America. BlackRock's business plan contemplates a forty-one year project life generating strong returns, with a small-scale mining operation.

[3] As of now, BlackRock has been in the process of raising the necessary capital to start the construction and implementation of Project Volt, which is now being estimated to cost approximately US$1.02 billion. Considering the early stage of its development, no revenues have ever been generated by the project.

[4] BlackRock's only secured creditors are OMF Fund II H Ltd. (**Orion**) and Investissement Québec (**IQ**). On January 18, 2019, BlackRock signed a loan credit agreement with Orion and IQ to supply the necessary working capital required to continue Project Volt. This loan was due and payable on December 1, 2022 and, as of now, Orion and IQ's secured claim amounts to approximately $100M, which constitutes the best part of BlackRock's pre-filing obligations. Orion and IQ also own, respectively, 18% and 12% of BlackRock's shares.

[5] On December 22, BlackRock filed an Application for an Initial Order and other ancillary relief in the present *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (**CCAA**)[2] restructuring proceedings.

[6] On January 7, 2022, the Court issued a two-part order in view of the sale of the assets of BlackRock. Firstly, the Court established the parameters of a sale and investment solicitation process (**SISP**) for the sale of such assets.

[7] Secondly, the Court approved the Agreement of Purchase and Sale signed by Orion and IQ as purchaser (**Stalking Horse Agreement**) and ordered that this agreement be considered as constituting the "Stalking Horse Bid" under the SISP. The agreed purchase price under the Stalking Horse Agreement is to be equal to the fair market value of BlackRock's secured debt towards Orion and IQ (approximately $100M).

[8] Pursuant to the January 7, 2022 orders, Phase 2 Bids under the SISP were to be submitted before May 11, 2022, as will be discussed below.

[9] Two Applications are before the Court in relation to the above:

9.1. Amended Application by the Shareholder Bidder, 13482332 Canada Inc. (**Canada Inc.**) to extend the Phase 2 Bid Deadline (**Bid Extension Application**); and

9.2. BlackRock' Application to approve a vesting order (**RVO application**)

[10] In the Bid Extension Application, Canada Inc. seeks to extend the deadlines provided for in the January 7, 2022 orders, with the view of continuing to canvass the

[2] R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

market for financial partners that would allow it to submit a Phase 2 Bid after the Phase 2 Bid deadline.

[11] In the RVO Application, BlackRock seeks an order approving the sale of its assets essentially along the terms of the IQ and Orion's Stalking Horse Agreement (**Proposed Transaction**).

[12] On May 31, 2022, due to time constraints, the Court rejected the Bid Extension Application and granted the RVO Application, with reasons to follow. The reasons are found below.

1. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND (COURT ORDERS)

[13] On December 22, 2021, BlackRock filed an Application for an Initial Order and other ancillary relief.

[14] On December 23, 2021, the Court issued a First Day Initial Order pursuant to the CCAA and, *inter alia*, appointed Deloitte Restructuring Inc. as the monitor (**Monitor**).

[15] On January 7, 2022, the Court issued an *Amended and Restated Initial Order* and an *Order Approving a Sale and Investment Solicitation Process (SISP) and Approving a Stalking Horse Agreement of Purchase and Sale*.

[16] The January 7, 2022 orders (**Initial Orders**) provided that BlackRock was authorized to borrow from Orion and IQ, as interim lenders, such amounts from time to time as BlackRock may consider necessary or desirable, up to a maximum principal amount of $2M outstanding at any time, to fund the ongoing expenditures of BlackRock and to pay such other amounts as may be permitted (**Interim Facility**). The Court also authorized a corresponding Interim Charge, for a maximum amount of $2.4M, in favor or IQ and Orion.

[17] The Initial Orders also approved a SISP to be conducted in accordance with the approved procedures (**Bidding Procedures**);

17.1. authorized the Monitor and BlackRock to implement the SISP;

17.2. approved the Stalking Horse Agreement, solely for the purposes of:

(i) constituting the "stalking horse bid" under the SISP; and

(ii) approving the Expense Reimbursement (as defined in the Stalking Horse Agreement), and subject to further Order of this Court.

[18] Pursuant to the Initial Orders and at the request of the Intervenors (shareholders), the Court extended the SISP by an additional 30 days beyond what was originally contemplated.

[19] The Stay of proceedings was thereafter extended to June 30, 2022, in accordance with further requests made and in accordance with the debate arising from the two Motions identified above.

2. PHASES OF THE SISP

[20] The objective of the SISP was to solicit interest either (i) in one or more sales or partial sales of all, substantially all, or certain portions of the BlackRock's business; and/or (ii) for an investment in a restructuring, recapitalization, refinancing or other form of reorganization of BlackRock or its business.

[21] The Bidding Procedures provide that a party interested in participating in the SISP must sign and deliver to the Monitor a non-disclosure agreement (**NDA**) and upon doing so, is considered a "**Phase 1 Qualified Bidder**", following which the Monitor will provide to such party a confidential information memorandum (**CIM**) and access to the confidential virtual data room (**VDR**) set up by BlackRock and the Monitor.

[22] The Bidding Procedures further provide that if a Phase 1 Qualified Bidder wishes to submit a bid, it must deliver to the Monitor a non-binding letter of intent (**LOI**) which must conform to certain specified requirements (**Phase 1 Qualified Bid**) no later than 5:00 p.m. on March 9, 2022 (**Phase 1 Bid Deadline**).

[23] Following the Phase 1 Bid Deadline, BlackRock shall determine, in consultation with the Monitor, if an LOI qualifies as a "**Phase 1 Successful Bid**", in which case the bidder is thereafter deemed a "**Phase 2 Qualified Bidder**".

[24] Phase 2 Qualified Bidders shall thereafter submit their Phase 2 Qualified Bid no later than 5:00 p.m. on May 11, 2022, or such other date or time as may be agreed by the Monitor in consultation with BlackRock and with the authorization of Orion and IQ as Stalking Horse Bidders, acting reasonably (**Phase 2 Bid Deadline**).

[25] Also pursuant to the Bidding Procedures, the Stalking Horse Bidders are Phase 2 Qualified Bidders for all purposes under the SISP.

[26] Therefore, Canada Inc. had until May 11, 2022, 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time) to submit its Phase 2 Qualified Bid (**Phase 2 Bid Deadline**).

3. TASKS PERFORMED BY THE MONITOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SISP

[27] Further to the Initial Orders, the Monitor undertook the following steps to conduct the solicitation process in accordance with the SISP:

a. the Monitor contacted 415 potentially interested parties;

b. 374 potentially interested parties received the Teaser according to email confirmations received by the Monitor;

c. 232 potentially interested parties were contacted directly by the Monitor, in addition to the general distribution that occurred on January 10, 2022;

d. 65 potentially interested parties participated in more serious discussions about the opportunity or confirmed that they were not interested;

e. 7 interested parties executed an NDA and were granted access to the VDR; and,

f. 1 interested party (Shareholder Bidder) submitted a non-binding Letter of Interest (LOI) prior to the Phase 1 Bid Deadline.[3]

4. CANADA INC.'S LOI

[28] Canada Inc. was incorporated on March 8, 2022, as a special purpose vehicle to participate in the SISP and submit a bid.

[29] Canada Inc.'s shares are owned by 3 individuals, Mr. Edward Yu, Mr. Solomon (Sam) Pillersdorf and Mr. Leslie A. Wittlin, who, directly or through corporate entities under their control, own approximately 50% of the outstanding shares of BlackRock. Mr. Yu, Mr. Pillersdorf and Mr. Wittlin also act as directors and officers of the company. Canada Inc.'s representatives submit that they have well established links into the mining industry and, based on same, have assembled a team of experienced advisory professionals in the field.

[30] The Monitor did not receive any other LOI on or before the Phase 1 Bid Deadline. Therefore, Canada Inc.'s non-binding LOI[4] of March 9, 2022 is the only Phase 1 Successful Bid.

[31] In its LOI, Canada Inc. proposes a purchase price for BlackRock's shares that shall be either the sum of $100M or such greater amount as would be required to exceed the minimum purchase price as defined in the Initial Order.

5. ORDERS SOUGHT AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT

5.1 The Bid Extension Application

[32] Canada Inc. argues that its tremendous efforts to submit a bid to the Monitor are on the verge of bearing fruit, albeit slightly past the Bid Deadline. Canada Inc. therefore begs the Court to extend the Phase 2 Bid Deadline (which expired on May 11, 2021) for an extra thirty days after the present judgment.

[33] The Monitor, BlackRock and Orion and IQ object to such extension.

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3 Fifth Report, par. 27.
4 Exhibits A-2, R-3.

[34] For the reasons below, the Court refused the extension sought.

5.2 The RVO Application

[35] The only pending bid therefore is the one made by Orion and IQ, the Stalking Horse Bidders. With the support of BlackRock and of the Monitor, they beg the Court to approve the drafted agreement.[5]

[36] The **Intervenors**, who own approximately 50% of the shares of BlackRock, object to the structure of the Proposed Transaction, as it would amount to an illegal appropriation of their shares, without their consent. They also object to the granting of a release to Orion and IQ, as contemplated under the Stalking Horse Agreement.

[37] For the reasons below, the Court dismissed the Intervenors' objection and approved the transaction in accordance with the RVO.

<u>ANALYSIS</u>

6. <u>BID EXTENSION APPLICATION</u>

6.1 Facts relevant to the issue

[38] As indicated above, Canada Inc.'s LOI[6] is the only Phase 1 Successful Bid. Therefore, only IQ and Orion (Stalking Horse Bidders) and Canada Inc. (Shareholder Bidder) were permitted to proceed to Phase 2 of the SISP.

[39] More particularly, on March 8-9, 2022, before the Phase 1 Bid Deadline, Canada Inc. was incorporated and delivered to the Monitor a non-binding LOI, which was confirmed as a Phase 1 Successful Bid. Canada Inc. therefore qualified for Phase 2 of the SISP.

[40] To assist in making such a decision, BlackRock and the Monitor requested and received clarifications, particularly with respect to the ability of Canada Inc.'s representatives to fund its bid from their own assets or from third-party financing (**Clarification Letter**)[7], which will be discussed below.[8]

[41] At a later meeting, held on May 9, 2022, Canada Inc. informed the Monitor and BlackRock that despite having initiated, with the help of its own financial advisors, a solicitation process to identify financial partners that would support its bid, it would not be in position to file a qualified bid by the Phase 2 Deadline.

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5 Exhibit R-2.
6 Exhibits A-2, R-3.
7 Exhibit R-5.
8 See par. [68] and following of the present judgment.

[42] Canada Inc. therefore verbally requested that the Phase 2 Bid Deadline be extended for an additional 30 days in order to continue to canvass the market for financing.[9]

[43] The Monitor consulted with BlackRock and requested the position of Orion and IQ, as Stalking Horse Bidders, in accordance with paragraph 21 of the approved Bidding Procedures. They expressed serious concerns but were agreeable to considering an extension of the Phase 2 Bid Deadline, subject to several conditions. These conditions included the financing (subordinate to the DIP and to the approximately $100M of secured debt held by the Orion and IQ) of the costs resulting from the extra 30-day extension (estimated at $500K) and the confirmation that no further extension would be sought in the future.[10]

[44] Canada Inc. replied that it was prepared to advance a first tranche of $200K of a DIP loan within one week of the acceptance date of their request for a SISP extension, and the balance of $300K as needed. Canada Inc. contemplated that this proposed loan totaling $500K was to be made on the same terms and conditions as the existing DIP loan of the Secured Lenders, and was to rank *pari passu* with them in all respects.

[45] The Monitor estimated that it was unlikely that the extension sought would allow Canada Inc. to provide a proper bidding offer at the end of the extension. After further consultation with BlackRock and the Stalking Horse Bidders and with their support, the Monitor denied the extension and informed Canada Inc. accordingly on May 12, 2022.

[46] On May 11, 2022, Canada Inc. filed the present Bid Extension Application.

6.2 Opposing arguments of the parties

[47] Canada Inc. submits that its LOI conforms with the requirements of the Bidding Procedures in that, without limitation, it meets the “Minimum Purchase Price” requirement of providing at closing net cash proceeds that are not less than the aggregate of (a) the amount of cash payable under the Stalking Horse Agreement together with the amount of obligations being credit bid thereunder, (b) the amount of expense reimbursement payable to the Stalking Horse Bidders, plus (c) a minimum overbid amount of $1M.

[48] Canada Inc. also pleads that there is equity for the stakeholders of BlackRock, including the shareholders, based on their knowledge of the company and on recent pre-money valuations performed by third parties which ranged between USD$175M and 350M. In order to assist in designing and financing its final bid, Canada Inc. has retained at its own costs the services of two consultants, FTI Capital Advisors Canada and ERG Securities US.

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9 Exhibit R-6.
10 Exhibit R-7.

[49] Canada Inc.'s consultants have contacted 156 investors to solicit interest in the opportunity. To date, seven remain highly interested in the opportunity and have executed NDAs and are continuing to perform due diligence on the asset. An additional three have expressed interest and are evaluating the opportunity internally before proceeding to execute an NDA. Investors that have executed NDAs have been added to the VDR and are actively analyzing and reviewing BlackRock's materials. The Consultants have prepared a report on the status of the financing process.[11] For example, Canada Inc. submits a signed non-binding letter of interest signed on May 6, 2022, from a serious investment fund for a USD$65M financing, conditional *inter alia* on a 30-day-due diligence.[12] Canada Inc. further argues that the recent events in Ukraine have improved the outlook of Project Volt and increased the value of its strategic metals.

[50] However, according to Canada Inc., based on the feedback provided to its consultants from investors and given the complexity of this transaction, the condensed timeframe of the SISP is a significant hurdle for investors to perform the necessary due diligence in order to provide a commitment to finance the its Phase 2 Qualified Bid. As such, the Consultants believe that additional time will have a material impact on the likelihood of raising the capital required.

[51] Canada Inc. argues that although it has made significant progress, it needs more time to pursue these various opportunities and finalize the business and financial terms which will form part of the its Phase 2 Qualified Bid.

[52] To that effect, Canada Inc. reminds the Court of its broad discretion under section 11 of the CCAA and points to case law[13] that suggests that the Court would be justified to refuse an asset sale in the presence of impropriety in the sales process.

[53] The Monitor, BlackRock, Orion and IQ and BlackRock's First Nation Partners[14] oppose to such extension of the Phase 2 Bid Deadline.

[54] BlackRock, the Monitor and Orion and IQ argue that such extension would run contrary to the clear rules of the Bidding Procedures and would break the integrity of the SISP, to the prejudice of all potential bidders who made their decisions based on the rules known to all. Moreover, the extension sought would maintain uncertainty for BlackRock for an additional period, with no realistic chance of obtaining a better offer. Also, the extension would increase the costs and the amounts to be advanced by the Orion and IQ as interim lenders while Canada Inc. is not ready to pay for those expenses for the requested additional period.

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[11] Exhibit A-3.
[12] Exhibit A-4, filed under seal.
[13] *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*, 1991 CanLII 2727 (Ont. CA); *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 (N.S.C.A.); *Bank of Montreal v. Maitland* (1983), 46 C.B.R. (N.S.) 75 (N.S.S.C.).
[14] Exhibit R-11.

6.3 Legal principles

[55] The CCAA primarily seeks to refinance and restructure insolvent companies rather than liquidate them.[15] When selling the assets of the company, one of the objectives is thus naturally to achieve the best possible price for the assets. This usually coincides with finding the best outcome for the company's creditors.

[56] To achieve this goal, the court benefits from a wide discretionary power pursuant to section 11 of the CCAA:

> **11 [General power of court]** Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, <u>make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances</u>.
>
> [Emphasis added]

[57] The three baseline requirements to meet for an order to be considered "appropriate in the circumstances" are appropriateness, good faith and due diligence.

[58] In addition, the order sought must advance the policy and remedial objectives of the CCAA to qualify as "appropriate" within the meaning of section 11.[16] The overarching remedial objectives pursued by the CCAA include:[17]

> 1. providing for timely, efficient and impartial resolution of a debtor's insolvency;
> 2. preserving and maximizing the value of a debtor's assets;
> 3. ensuring fair and equitable treatment of the claims against a debtor;
> 4. protecting the public interest; and
> 5. in the context of a commercial insolvency, balancing the costs and benefits of restructuring or liquidating the company.

[59] Hence, although the objective of any sale process is obviously to obtain the best possible price from prospective purchasers, monetary considerations cannot be the only relevant factor when the Court determines if it is appropriate to deviate from a process that has been duly followed by all parties involved.

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15 *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2010 SCC 60, par. 14-15.
16 *Canada v. Canada North Group Inc*., 2021 SCC 30, par. 21; *9354-9186 Québec inc v. Callidus Capital Corp*, 2020 SCC 10, par. 48-51.
17 *9354-9186 Québec inc v. Callidus Capital Corp*, 2020 SCC 10, par. 40.

[60] On the contrary, it is well established that sale processes are important in CCAA proceedings and that modifying same *post facto* every time there is a chance of a better financial outcome could have a negative impact on all the parties involved. Therefore, Courts have often insisted on the importance of preserving the integrity of the sales process. As this court held in *Re Boutiques San Francisco Inc.*:

> [20] Dans le cadre des plans d'arrangement qu'elle autorise, le but de la LACC est, entre autres, de favoriser un processus ordonné et encadré où les paramètres choisis doivent par conséquent avoir un sens. Dans le contexte de cette loi, tout comme par exemple dans celui de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*, la recherche du meilleur prix possible pour les créanciers ne peut se faire en vase clos, en ignorant la protection nécessaire de l'intégrité et de la crédibilité du processus choisi pour atteindre cet objectif.[18]

[61] The Bidding Procedures, which govern the SISP approved by this Court, are fundamentally important for assessing the Proposed Transaction as well as the arguments of the parties.[19]

6.4 Discussion

[62] The Monitor also explains that efforts have already been made for some years before the beginning of the CCAA proceedings in order to further finance Project Volt. BlackRock, with the assistance of its financial advisors at the time, have conducted a global search since 2015, but, and despite considerable time and effort, have not been able to secure the required funding.

[63] At the inception of the CCAA proceedings, the Court also modified the proposed Bidding Procedures to include a 30 day extension to the "Phase 1 Bid Deadline" based on a request from the Intervenors and their submission that such further time would suffice to ensure a fulsome and fair process. This extension has not led to the desired results.

[64] The Monitor then conducted a thorough solicitation process as part of the Phase 1 of the SISP, as mentioned previously, which culminated in a single LOI submitted by Canada Inc.:

> Based on the various discussions with prospective bidders during Phase 1 of the SISP, it was apparent to the Monitor that the BRM project, which had previously been promoted extensively in the market by BRM and its financial advisors for financing purposes, was already very well known by most of the strategic and industry leaders. This situation likely explains why many potentially interested

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[18] *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re*, 2004 CanLII 480, par. 20 (QC CS). See also *Bloom Lake, g.p.l. (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2015 QCCS 3064, par. 70 (leave to appeal dismissed, 2015 QCCA 754).

[19] See *Arrangement relatif à Nemaska Lithium inc.*, 2020 QCCS 3218, par. 14 (leave to appeal dismissed, 2020 QCCA 1488; leave to appeal to SCC dismissed, 2021 CanLII 34999).

> parties declined the opportunity without signing an NDA and without performing due diligence of the VDR.[20]

[65] The lack of interest of other bidders in taking part in the Debtor's restructuring has thus been apparent since the very first stages of the SISP process. According to the Monitor, potential players who were contacted either found the opportunity too risky, or not strategic or profitable enough, or did not believe in the feasibility of the technology involved. It remains unlikely that this situation will change in the near future.

[66] Moreover, Canada Inc. was unable to secure financing of its own bid during the extended 60 days of Phase 1 of the SISP and waited all the way until that phase's deadline to execute an NDA and to enter into the process.

[67] In determining that Canada Inc.'s non-binding LOI constituted a Phase 1 Successful Bid, the Monitor relied on Canada Inc.'s reassurance that it had both the ability and the means required to pay the offered purchase price and to raise or contribute further capital resources to BlackRock's business to continue it as a going concern. The LOI went on to state that the net worth of the Bidder's representatives was, collectively, well above the said amount and that "[b]ased on their extensive experience and engagement in the industry", they were "well placed to obtain both direct and/or third party financing in an aggregate amount sufficient both to complete the Transaction and thereafter required to proceed with the Business and lead it to profitability as a going concern."[21]

[68] Canada Inc., in its Clarification Letter of March 14, 2022, refused to provide more details about its representatives' respective worth.[22] Still, it is not in doubt that they have enough assets to finance its bid if needed.

[69] However, Canada Inc. wrote that it was "unable to advise with certainty to what extent [its] three principals […] may contribute to the capital required to fund the transaction contemplated by the non-binding LOI." This issue would "clarify as [its] funding plan finalizes through [its] on-going efforts already well underway." Canada Inc. confirmed that it would "have its financing, to the extent necessary and sufficient for the purpose of the binding LOI, on or before the Phase 2 bid deadline", but added that "some or all" of the funds "may come from external sources", which was subject to further due diligence that could only be performed during Phase 2 of the SISP.

[70] These answers are evasive and, in retrospect, proved to include many loopholes. Still, the Clarification letter was considered and the Monitor nonetheless qualified Canada Inc. for Phase 2.

[71] The Monitor understood that Canada Inc.'s primary focus during Phase 2 of the SISP was to secure financing, through equity or debt, in order to submit a binding offer

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[20] Fifth Report, par. 28.
[21] Exhibit A-2.
[22] Exhibit R-5, par. 3.

prior to the Phase 2 Bid Deadline. Indeed, the due diligence performed during that Phase was limited. Only one meeting occurred, at the request of Canada Inc.'s consultants, with BlackRock and the Monitor, to review the assumptions supporting the financial model of BlackRock. Also, all the groups that were granted access spent a relatively short amount time on the VDR reviewing the information available for this kind of project.[23]

[72] At the time of the meeting on May 9, 2022, despite some cursory interest manifested by certain potential capital partners, and except for a non-binding LOI received from a third party for an amount (USD$65M) significantly less than the one required to exceed the Stalking Horse Bid ($100M), Canada Inc. received no other letter of intent or confirmation of interest in writing from a potential capital partner during the SISP.

[73] Critically, Canada Inc. also revealed on May 9, 2022 that none of its representatives actually intended to participate in the financing of an eventual Phase 2 Qualified Bid, should there be such a bid.

[74] The Monitor testified that had he known in due time that the shareholders had no intention to finance the bid using their own personal assets, Canada Inc. would likely not have qualified for Phase 2 of the SISP. This aspect of the LOI was described as a key consideration in the Monitor's decision at the time.

[75] In addition, the failure by Canada Inc. to confirm that it would fund all of the Debtor's costs, including professional costs, during the extended 30-day period, indicates that it is not willing to put "skin in the game" as evidence of its *bona fide* intentions. It appears that Canada Inc. is unwilling to fund the costs of a further delay notwithstanding that any successful bid would necessarily have to cover those costs in order to exceed the value of the Stalking Horse Bid.

[76] The above findings remain, in spite of the letter from VanadiumBank Inc., which Canada Inc. filed the day before the hearing.[24] This letter is presented as a new "financing proposal" in favor of Canada Inc. for up to $125M in support of its bid.

[77] Actually, it appears that VanadiumBank was incorporated only a few weeks before the hearing.[25] Notwithstanding its name, it is not a bank. Its offer to Canada Inc. is not to lend funds out of its own pocket, but rather to arrange a loan facility after seeking and obtaining the required financing from third parties in the market.

[78] In other words, with VanadiumBank's proposal, Canada Inc. is nowhere closer to achieving its financial goals before the proposed extended Phase 2 Bid Deadline. The Court therefore gives no weight to VanadiumBank's letter.

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23 Fifth Report, par. 38-41.
24 Exhibit A-11.
25 Exhibit R-14.

[79] It now seems clear that, as it was unable to meet the requirements of the Initial order, Canada Inc. instead decided to launch what could be described as a parallel SISP, which was nowhere authorized and which runs contrary to the letter and spirit of the SISP as ordered by the Court.

[80] Although the Court recognizes Canada Inc. and its representatives' efforts in securing third party financing for their bid, and their belief in the potential of BlackRock's projects to attract new interest as the market evolves, it is time for the SISP to come to an end and for the CCAA proceedings to move forward.

[81] It is advantageous to the stakeholders generally that BlackRock complete the restructuring process as soon as possible in order to, in particular, end the negative narrative surrounding the company, to limit any further uncertainty and risk and facilitate the completion of the financing necessary for Project Volt, if possible.

[82] The SISP provided for a level playing field to all potential bidders. The rules were known to all parties and certain potential bidders might have decided not to participate in the SISP because of its duration (which is often the case in insolvency proceedings). Any modification of the rules after they are set and after all the players have made their choices accordingly should not be taken lightly. In the case at hand, there is no justification whatsoever to such a disruption of the fairness of the process. The overarching remedial objectives of the CCAA are better served by rejecting the Bid Extension Application.

7. RVO APPLICATION

[83] The Court's refusal to further extend the Phase 2 Deadline leaves the Stalking Horse Bid from IQ and Orion as the only Phase 2 Qualified Bid. Pursuant to the RVO Application, the Court shall now turn to the question of whether it should approve the Proposed Transaction as per the terms of his bid and, in particular, BlackRock's restructuration through a reverse vesting order (**RVO**).

7.1 Legal Principles

[84] In assessing the relevant criteria and determining whether the proposed transaction shall be approved, the Court is mindful not to modify the contractual terms that have been duly negotiated between the parties.[26] In this case, it takes the form of a RVO.

[85] RVOs are a fairly new way to achieve the remedial objective of the CCAA: instead of selling the assets of a debtor, a series of transactions will result in i) the purchaser becoming the sole shareholder of a debtor and ii) the unwanted liabilities be vested out

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[26] *Mecachrome Canada Inc. (In the matter of the plan of compromise or arrangement of)* c. *Ernst & Young Inc.*, 2009 QCCS 6355, par. 28.

to a separate entity, thereby ensuring that the purchaser will not inherit the unwanted liabilities.[27]

[86] Albeit new, RVOs have been confirmed by the courts as an appropriate way for a debtor to sell its business when the circumstances justify such structure.[28] In particular, CCAA courts have approved RVO structures in several complex mining transactions and have recognized that their benefits, which include maximizing recovery for creditors, importantly limiting delays and transaction costs, and facilitating the preservation of the insolvent business' going concern, justify the use of this innovative restructuring tool.

[87] In addition to section 11, discussed above, section 36 of the CCAA has been interpreted as providing courts with the jurisdiction and the relevant criteria to issue an RVO:

> **36 (1) [Restriction on disposition of business assets]** A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.
>
> **(2) [Notice to creditors]** A company that applies to the court for an authorization is to give notice of the application to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.
>
> **(3) [Factors to be considered]** In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,
>
> **(a)** whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
>
> **(b)** whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
>
> **(c)** whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
>
> **(d)** the extent to which the creditors were consulted;

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27 Exhibit R-2.

28 See *Arrangement relatif à Nemaska Lithium inc.*, 2020 QCCS 3218, par. 71-79 (leave to appeal dismissed, 2020 QCCA 1488; leave to appeal to SCC dismissed, 2021 CanLII 34999); *Quest University Canada (Re)*, 2020 BCSC 1883, par. 151-172 (leave to appeal dismissed, 2020 BCCA 364); *Clearbeach and Forbes*, 2021 ONSC 5564, par. 24-26; *Harte Gold Corp. (Re)*, 2022 ONSC 653, par. 36-39, 77.

> **(e)** the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
>
> **(f)** whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.
>
> […]
>
> **(6) [Assets may be disposed of free and clear]** The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.
>
> […] [Emphasis added]

[88] This Court approved an RVO in the face of opposition by a creditor in *Arrangement relatif à Nemaska Lithium inc.*[29]. It was held that section 36 should be interpreted broadly and in accordance with the policy and remedial objectives of the CCAA and the wide discretionary power vested to the supervising judge pursuant to section 11. The Court relied in part on the Supreme Court ruling in *9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp.*[30] It added:

> [52] La *LACC* donne donc au juge surveillant la flexibilité nécessaire pour rendre les ordonnances «indiquées» afin de faciliter la restructuration d'une compagnie insolvable.
>
> [53] La nature des problèmes économiques contemporains commande que des solutions innovatrices soient envisagées et, si elles permettent que les objectifs fondamentaux de la *LACC* soient atteints, au bénéfice de tous, alors elles doivent être entérinées.
>
> […]
>
> [71] Le Tribunal est d'avis que les termes «disposer, notamment par vente, d'actifs hors du cours ordinaire de ses affaires» / «sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business» de l'article 36(1) *LACC* permettent un grand éventail d'actes et modes de disposition, incluant, en partie ou en totalité, par voie de «dévolution inversée», une solution innovatrice, à être analysée au cas par cas.
>
> [72] L'article 36(1) *LACC* ne comporte aucune restriction à cet égard.

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29 2020 QCCS 3218 (leave to appeal dismissed, 2020 QCCA 1488; leave to appeal to SCC dismissed, 2021 CanLII 34999).

30 2020 CSC 10.

> [73] Sortir des sentiers battus n'est pas contre-indiqué, au contraire, surtout lorsque cela permet de meilleurs résultats.
>
> [74] D'ailleurs, dans l'Affaire *Callidus*, la Cour suprême mentionne ce qui suit quant au pouvoir discrétionnaire général du Tribunal prévu à l'article 11 *LACC* :
>
>> «[…] le pouvoir conféré par l'art. 11 n'est limité que par les restrictions imposées par la *LACC* elle-même, ainsi que par l'exigence que l'ordonnance soit « indiquée » dans les circonstances.»
>
> [75] Dans la présente affaire, la solution d'une «dévolution inversée», efficace et rapide, n'affecte pas le résultat final pour les créanciers des Débitrices, au contraire, elle l'améliore.
>
> [76] En effet, le maintien des permis, licences et autorisations existants et des contrats essentiels à l'exploitation des entreprises, et l'utilisation possible des divers attributs fiscaux disponibles, ont facilité l'obtention de concessions de la part des Offrants, et confirmées par le Contrôleur, ce qui devrait permettre qu'une distribution plus importante soit éventuellement effectuée au bénéfice des créanciers des Débitrices.

[89] The Court of Appeal refused leave in that case, while noting that some issues raised by the appeal did "appear to qualify as being significant to the practice of insolvency":

> [36] […] This is particularly the case regarding the issue of the scope of authority of the CCAA supervising judge in the context of an order that is not strictly limited to the "sale or disposition of assets" provided for under section 36 (6) CCAA, which, according to the Applicants, results in an outcome that would normally form part of an arrangement subject to prior approval by the creditors. There is also an issue of principle raised regarding the granting of broad third party releases (that are not limited to the transaction itself), outside the confines of an arrangement and without determining their appropriateness and submitting same to the required vote of creditors.[31]

[90] In *Re Quest University Canada*, the Supreme Court of British Columbia cautioned that in the case of an RVO, "the ability of a CCAA court to be innovative and creative is not boundless; as always, the court must exercise its discretion with a view to the statutory objectives and purposes of the CCAA […]."[32] On the other hand, the Court added that "[t]here is no provision in the CCAA that prohibits an RVO structure. As is usually the case in CCAA matters, the court must ensure that any relief is 'appropriate' in the

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31 *Arrangement relatif à Nemaska Lithium inc.*, 2020 QCCA 1488 (leave to appeal to SCC dismissed, 2021 CanLII 34999).

32 *Quest University Canada (Re)*, 2020 BCSC 1883, par. 154 (leave to appeal dismissed, 2020 BCCA 364).

circumstances and that all stakeholders are treated as fairly and reasonably 'as the circumstances permit' […]."[33]

[91] Similarly, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice relied on sections 11 and 36 of the CCAA to issue an RVO in *Clearbeach and Forbes*.[34]

[92] An RVO structure was approved most recently by the same court in *Harte Gold Corp*.[35] Although the Court was unconvinced that such an order could rely entirely on section 36 of the *CCAA*, it concluded that its discretion under section 11 was clearly broad enough to encompass it. Furthermore, the criteria set out at paragraph 36(3) provide an analytical framework that could be applied *mutatis mutandis* to an RVO transaction:

> [36] The jurisdiction of the court to issue an RVO is frequently said to arise from s. 11 and s. 36(1) of the CCAA. However, the structure of the transaction employing an RVO typically does not involve the debtor 'selling or otherwise disposing of assets outside the ordinary course of business', as provided in s. 36(1). This is because the RVO structure is really a purchase of shares of the debtor and "vesting out" from the debtor to a new company, of unwanted assets, obligations and liabilities.
>
> [37] I am, therefore, not sure I agree with the analysis which founds jurisdiction to issue an RVO in s. 36(1). But that can be left for another day because I am wholeheartedly in agreement that s. 11, as broadly interpreted in the jurisprudence including, most recently, *Callidus*, clearly provides the court with jurisdiction to issue such an order, provided the discretion available under s. 11 is exercised in accordance with the objects and purposes of the CCAA. And it is for this reason that I also wholeheartedly agree that the analytical framework of s. 36(3) for considering an asset sale transaction, even though s. 36 may not support a standalone basis for jurisdiction in an RVO situation, should be applied, with necessary modifications, to an RVO transaction.[36]

[93] It is true that a Canadian appeal court has yet to rule definitively on the legality of an RVO under the CCAA. This being said, and although the contexts might differ, the Court sees no compelling reason why it should set aside its reasoning in *Nemaska Lithium*.

[94] Even if this type of transaction was not contemplated by section 36 of the CCAA, section 11 could clearly step in as a basis for the Court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Canada recently held that the other provisions of the CCAA, dealing with specific orders which the courts can issue, do not restrict the general language and power of section 11.[37]

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33 *Id.*, par. 157, citing *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2010 SCC 60, par. 14-15.
34 2021 ONSC 5564, par. 24.
35 2022 ONSC 653.
36 *Harte Gold Corp. (Re)*, 2022 ONSC 653, par. 36-37.
37 *Canada v. Canada North Group Inc*., 2021 SCC 30, par. 23. See also *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2010 SCC 60, par. 70.

[95] The Court agrees with the judge in *Harte Gold Corp* that paragraph 36(3), in any event, lays out a useful analytical framework for the issue at bar. These criteria, which are laid out above, should be applied in conjunction with the factors enumerated in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*:[38]

95.1. "whether sufficient efforts to get the best price have been made and whether the parties acted providently";

95.2. "the efficacy and integrity of the process followed";

95.3. "the interests of the parties"; and

95.4. "whether any unfairness resulted from the process."[39]

[96] The Court also agrees that an RVO structure should remain the exception and not the rule, and should be approved only in the limited circumstances where it constitutes the appropriate remedy.

[97] Some authorities indeed call for caution. For instance, Professor Janis Sarra recently stressed the importance for courts to provide detailed reasons when approving RVOs.[40] Among other things, Professor Sarra reminds us that this type of order deviates significantly from the usual CCAA framework, which is meant to provide all creditors with an opportunity to be heard in the process:

> […] [T]here must be exceptional circumstances for the court to be persuaded to bypass provisions of insolvency legislation aimed at giving both secured and unsecured creditors a meaningful voice/vote in the proceedings, as they are the residual claimants to the value of the debtor's assets during insolvency. […]
>
> […]
>
> The CCAA, particularly in its various amendments over the years, has sought to achieve an appropriate balance between various interests affected by a debtor company's insolvency. Part I sets out the framework of the statute, well-known to practitioners and Canadian courts. It allows for a compromise or arrangement to be proposed between a debtor company and its secured and unsecured creditors, a meeting of the creditors to vote on the plan, and, if a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or the class of creditors, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting, agree to any plan of compromise or arrangement, the plan may be sanctioned by the court and, if so sanctioned, is

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38 1991 CanLII 2727 (Ont. CA); *AbitibiBowater inc. (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2010 QCCS 1742, par. 34-35.

39 See *Arrangement relatif à Nemaska Lithium inc.*, 2020 QCCS 3218, par. 50 (leave to appeal dismissed, 2020 QCCA 1488; leave to appeal to SCC dismissed, 2021 CanLII 34999); *Clearbeach and Forbes*, 2021 ONSC 5564, par. 25.

40 Janis SARRA, "Reverse Vesting Orders – Developing Principles and Guardrails to Inform Judicial Decisions", 2022 CanLIIDocs 431.

binding. There are specific provisions addressing Crown claims, employees and pensioners, and treatment of equity claims, all designed to balance multiple interests in complex proceedings.

[…]

This statutory framework represents a careful balancing of interests and prejudice, and gives voice and vote to the creditors that are the residual claimants to the value of the debtor company. Many of the provisions are aimed at mitigating the imbalance in power that secured creditors have in insolvency proceedings, at least during the period of negotiations for a plan, with a view to maximizing the value of the assets, preserving going-concern value, and protection of employees and the public interest.

It makes sense, therefore, that in any application to bypass this carefully crafted statutory process, the court consider whether there are compelling and exceptional circumstances to justify this extraordinary remedy, even where the RVO is not specifically contested, as the court needs to be satisfied of the integrity of the system and the potential prejudice to creditors and other stakeholders that may not be appearing before it. Reasons are important for stakeholders to understand the benefits and prejudice that may accrue to any particular transaction.[41]

[98] As the Supreme Court of British Columbia held in *Quest University*:

[171] <u>I do not consider that an RVO structure would be generally employed or approved in a CCAA restructuring to simply rid a debtor of a recalcitrant creditor who may seek to exert leverage through its vote on a plan while furthering its own interests</u>. Clearly, every situation must be considered based on its own facts; different circumstances may dictate different results. A debtor should not seek an RVO structure simply to expedite their desired result without regard to the remedial objectives of the CCAA.[42]

[Emphasis added]

[99] In particular, the following comments made in *Harte Gold Corp* are enlightening:

[38] Given this context, however, I think <u>it would be wrong to regard employment of the RVO structure in an insolvency situation as the “norm” or something that is routine or ordinary course</u>. Neither the BIA nor the CCAA deal specifically with the use or application of an RVO structure. The judicial authorities approving this approach, while there are now quite a few, do not generally provide much guidance on the positive and negative implications of this restructuring technique or what to look out for. Broader-based commentary and discussion is only now just now starting to emerge. <u>This suggests to me that the RVO should continue to be regarded as an</u>

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[41] *Id.*, p. 4, 26. See ss. 4-6 of the CCAA.

[42] *Quest University Canada (Re)*, 2020 BCSC 1883, par. 171 (leave to appeal dismissed, 2020 BCCA 364).

> unusual or extraordinary measure; not an approach appropriate in any case merely because it may be more convenient or beneficial for the purchaser. Approval of the use of an RVO structure should, therefore, involve close scrutiny. The Monitor and the court must be diligent in ensuring that the restructuring is fair and reasonable to all parties having regard to the objectives and statutory constraints of the CCAA. This is particularly the case where there is no party with a significant stake in the outcome opposing the use of an RVO structure. The debtor, the purchaser and especially the Monitor, as the court appointed officer overseeing the process and answerable to the court (and in addition to all the usual enquiries and reporting obligations), must be prepared to answer questions such as:
>
> (a) Why is the RVO necessary in this case?
>
> (b) Does the RVO structure produce an economic result at least as favourable as any other viable alternative?
>
> (c) Is any stakeholder worse off under the RVO structure than they would have been under any other viable alternative? and
>
> (d) Does the consideration being paid for the debtor's business reflect the importance and value of the licences and permits (or other intangible assets) being preserved under the RVO structure?
>
> [Emphasis added]

7.2 Discussion on criteria to approve an RVO

[100] The Court will now apply the criteria set out in paragraph 36(3) of the CCAA to the RVO Application, keeping in mind the other relevant factors identified by the case law, and will analyze the appropriateness of the RVO structure in particular.

[101] The process leading to the proposed sale was reasonable in the circumstances (s. 36(3)(a) of the CCAA). As detailed in the Fifth Report, BlackRock and the Monitor have conducted the SISP in accordance with the Bidding Procedures approved by this Court on January 7, 2022. The market has been adequately canvassed through a fulsome, fair and transparent process. It should be reiterated that BlackRock had already deployed a global search for financing during the years leading up to the initiation of the CCAA Proceedings, to no avail.

[102] In the present circumstances, the Court concludes that sufficient efforts have been made to get the best price for BlackRock's assets and that the parties acted providently. The record also shows the efficacy and integrity of the process followed.

[103] The Monitor approved of the process leading to the proposed sale and filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy (s. 36(3)(a) and (b) of the CCAA).

The Monitor not only approved the SISP but also participated in the negotiation and development of the Bidding Procedures and had primary carriage of the process throughout. In the course of the SISP, the Monitor consulted with BlackRock.

[104] The Fifth Report concludes that the SISP was properly conducted and that the Proposed Transaction is beneficial for all the stakeholders compared to a bankruptcy scenario. The Monitor "is of the view that creditors who will suffer a shortfall following the Purchase Agreement would not obtain any greater recovery in a sale in bankruptcy." "Furthermore, bankruptcy proceedings would: (i) [c]ause additional delays and uncertainty in the sale of [BlackRock]'s assets; (ii) [j]eopardize the going concern operations of [BlackRock]; and, (iii) [l]ikely result in employees to be unemployed."[43]

[105] <u>BlackRock's creditors were duly consulted (s. 36(3)(d) of the CCAA).</u> The secured creditors of BlackRock are Orion and IQ who are also the Stalking Horse Bidders. Obviously, they have been consulted extensively and they consent to the RVO Application.

[106] Importantly, the Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee) and the Cree Nation Government also expressed support for the Proposed Transaction, as outlined by their counsel in a letter sent to the Monitor on May 19, 2022:

> Our clients consider that the approval of the Stalking Horse Agreement offers the most, and perhaps the only, viable prospect to bring the BlackRock Mining Project into successful commercial operation and hence to secure for the Cree Nation of Eeyou Istchee the critically important benefits of the BallyHusky Agreement.[44]

[107] The other creditors are unsecured creditors who have been duly advised of the Initial Application and Order, including the Bidding Procedures. They have decided not to participate in the SISP and nothing indicates that they would oppose to the RVO Application.

[108] <u>The effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties are beneficial overall (s. 36(3)(e) of the CCAA).</u> The Stalking Horse Bid is the best available alternative for BlackRock's creditors and other interested parties and should allow for BlackRock to emerge as a rehabilitated business in a stronger position to complete the Construction Financing and move forward with Project Volt. This outcome is advantageous to BlackRock and its stakeholders, including their creditors, employees, trading partners and First Nations partners.

[109] It is true that the RVO will result in the claim of unsecured creditors being transferred to ResidualCo, an empty shell where all unassumed liabilities will be transferred. This transfer simply reflects the fact that the BlackRock's value, as tested in

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[43] Fifth Report, par. 57-60.
[44] Exhibit R-11.

the market through the SISP and for many years prior to the current restructuring, is not high enough to generate value for these unsecured creditors.

[110] As for the other stakeholders, they will benefit on the whole from the approval of the Proposed Transaction, as it will allow the Debtors' business to emerge in a position to move forward as a going concern. This will benefit the employees, trading partners and First Nations partners and it will have indirect socio-economic benefits in the province of Quebec.

[111] <u>The consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value (s. 36(3)(f) of the *CCAA*).</u> The consideration being paid by Orion and IQ, which is in excess of $100M, is importantly linked to the preservation the Debtor's permits (crucial to the conduct of the contemplated mining activities), certain existing contracts and its tax attributes.

[112] The reasonableness of the consideration is well established. Given the amount of the secured debt held by Orion and IQ, the consideration which they will pay exceeds i) what the market would be willing to pay to inherit intangible assets BlackRock has been able to build over time and ii) the capacity to raise on the market the financing required for Project Volt.

[113] Nobody submitted a higher bid after extensive attempts to raise financing over many years.

[114] <u>Exceptionally, the RVO structure is appropriate in the circumstances.</u> In his Fifth Report, the Monitor outlines the reasons why, in his opinion, the reverse vesting order structure that would be implemented would be "more appropriate and beneficial than a traditional vesting order structure and that the reverse vesting order structure is necessary, reasonable and justified in the circumstances":[45]

> (i) Numerous agreements, permits, licenses, authorizations, and related amendments are part of the assets that have to be transferred as per the Purchase Agreements. It could be more complex to transfer the benefits of these assets in a traditional vesting order structure since consents, approvals or authorizations may be required. A reverse vesting order structure minimizes risks, costs or delays of having these assets transferred;
>
> (ii) The proposed reverse vesting order structure results in better economic results for some creditors of BRM who see their pre-filing claim being assumed and retained. Also, the reverse vesting order structure will avoid any delays or costs associated with the assignments of the assumed contracts;

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[45] Fifth Report, par. 65-66.

(iii) The contracts or obligations of the creditors and the stakeholders that are considered Excluded Assets and Excluded Obligations according to Schedule B of the Purchase Agreement will not be in a worse position than they would have been with a more traditional vesting of assets to a third party;

(iv) Most assets of BRM are intangibles, such as agreements, permits, licenses, authorizations and related amendments, and their value depend on the capacity of the purchasers to complete the financing and achieve the project. These assets would have no or limited value if some of them were not being preserved. The reverse vesting order structure allows to avoid any potential risks around the transfer to the purchaser.

[115] The Court agrees with the Monitor's conclusions. RVO structures have been found by courts to be appropriate in situations such as the present case, where a traditional sale of assets would lead to uncertainty regarding the transfer of numerous agreements, permits, authorizations and other regulatory approvals that are required for the continuation of a company's business.[46]

[116] Indeed, BlackRock operates in the highly regulated mining industry. Their business is almost entirely constituted of such intangible assets, which provide a head start of several years to the purchaser. Some of these assets cannot be assigned or are at least difficult to assign. Therefore, the capacity to restructure BlackRock depends heavily on the capacity to keep the existing legal entities in place while restructuring the share-capital of BlackRock. That is exactly what the RVO provides for.

[117] If BlackRock was forced to proceed with a traditional asset sale, it could significantly increase the costs, generate uncertainties and reduce the value its assets, to the detriment of all parties involved.

[118] Moreover, despite the Intervenors' firm belief, the SISP has unequivocally demonstrated that there is no realizable value in BlackRock's business or assets beyond the secured debt of IQ and Orion, such that there is no equity left for its unsecured creditors, let alone its shareholders.

[119] The Court adds that Shareholders have little or no say in CCAA proceedings like the present one, where the debtor company is insolvent and its shares have lost all value. This goes to their legal interest in contesting an arrangement or transaction proposed by the company.[47]

[120] In any case, the shareholders and unsecured creditors of BlackRock are not in a worse position with an RVO than they would be under a traditional asset sale. Either way,

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46 See *supra*, note 28.

47 *Proposition de Peloton Pharmaceutiques inc.*, 2017 QCCS 1165, par. 65-78; *Forest c. Raymor Industries inc.*, 2010 QCCA 578, par. 4-6; *Stelco Inc., Re*, 2006 CanLII 1773, par. 18 (Ont. SC).

they would have no economic interest because the purchase price paid would not generate any value for the unsecured creditors (and even less so for the shareholders).

[121] This is consistent with the conclusions of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in *Harte Gold Corp.*:

> [59] Because the transaction contemplates the cancellation of all existing shares and related rights in Harte Gold and the issue of new shares to the purchaser, the existing shareholders of Harte Gold will receive no recovery on their investment. Being a public company, Harte Gold has issued material change notices as the events described above were unfolding. <u>By the time of the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, the shareholders had been advised in no uncertain terms that there was no prospect of shareholders realizing any value for their equity investment</u>.
>
> [60] The evidence of Harte's financial problems and balance sheet insolvency, the unsuccessful prefiling strategic review process, and the hard reality that the only parties willing to bid anything for Harte Gold were the holders of secured debt (and only for, effectively, the value of the secured debt plus carrying and process costs) only serves to emphasize that equity holders will not see, and on any other realistic scenario would not see, any recovery of their equity investment in Harte Gold.
>
> [61] <u>Under s. 186(1) of the OBCA, "reorganization" includes a court order made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or an order made under the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act approving a proposal. While the term "proposal" is unfortunate (because there are no formal "proposals" under the CCAA), I view the use of this term in the non-technical sense of the word; that is, as encompassing any proposal such as the proposed transaction brought forward for the approval of the Court under the provisions of the CCAA in this case.</u>
>
> <u>[62] Section 186(2) of the OBCA provides that if a corporation is subject to a reorganization, its articles may be amended by the court order to effect any change that might lawfully be made by an amendment under s. 168. Section 168(1)(g) provides that a corporation may from time to time amend its articles to add, change or remove any provision that is set out in its articles, including to change the designation of all or any of its shares, and add, change or remove any rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions, including rights to accrued dividends, in respect of all or any of its shares. This provides the jurisdiction of the court to approve the cancellation of all outstanding shares and the issuance of new shares to the purchaser.</u>
>
> […]
>
> [64] […] In circumstances like Harte Gold's, where the shareholders have no economic interest, present or future, it would be unnecessary and, indeed,

> inappropriate to require a vote of the shareholders […]. The order requested for the cancellation of existing shares is, for these reasons, justified in the circumstances.[48]
>
> [Emphasis added]

[122] In particular, paragraphs 61 and 62 of the above excerpt answer the Intervenors' argument about the jurisdiction of the Court to cancel their shares under *the Canada Business Corporations Act*[49] (**CBCA**). The same logic applies with sections 173 and 191 of that statute. The power to cancel and issue shares in the context of an RVO is captures by the possibility for an court order to "change the designation of all or any of [the corporation's] shares, and add, change or remove any rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions […] in respect of all or any of its shares, whether issued or unissued", pursuant to 191(2) and 173(1)(g) of the CBCA.

[123] It should also be noted that the Intervenors' opposition to the RVO structure in particular appears to be new. Canada Inc.'s non-binding LOI had already conceded on March 9, 2022 that its proposed bid could itself "take the form of a reverse vesting order".[50] Ultimately, it seems that the Intervenors are not objecting to the use of an RVO *per se*, but only to the extinguishment of their equity interests, which would occur irrespective of the use of an RVO structure or of a traditional vesting order.

[124] Therefore, the fact that the transaction is structured as an RVO only has benefits and does not prejudice any of the stakeholders. The Court finds that in the specific circumstances of the present case, the proposed RVO is an appropriate arrangement.

7.3 Discussion on the releases

[125] The Proposed Transaction contemplates releases for various parties, including Orion and IQ, from all claims relating to, in particular, BlackRock, its restructuring or the Proposed Transaction.

[126] While the Intervenors do not object to a release being granted to BlackRock directors or to the Monitor, they argue that Orion and IQ's actions constitute an abuse of both their rights as shareholders and of the CCAA process. Thus, the effect of the requested releases in favour of Orion and IQ would be to dismiss the Intervenors' potential claims without the benefit of hearing any evidence allowing for the determination of their potential liability.

[127] For the reasons below, the Court holds that the releases in favor of Orion and IQ will form part of the Proposed Transaction.

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48 *Harte Gold Corp. (Re)*, 2022 ONSC 653, par. 59-64.
49 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44.
50 Exhibit A-2.

[128] It is now commonplace for third-party releases, in favor of parties to a restructuring, their professional advisors as well as their directors, officers and others, to be approved outside of a plan in the context of a transaction.[51] In fact, similar releases have been approved by this Court in recent cases involving RVO transactions, including in *Nemaska Lithium*.[52]

[129] This being said, the courts should not grant releases blindly and systematically.

[130] In *Harte Gold Corp.,* the Court approved releases in favor of various parties that included the purchaser and its directors and officers and considered the criteria ordinarily canvassed with respect to third-party releases provided for under a plan, as articulated in *Re Lydian International Limited*[53] and elsewhere[54]. They are the following:

a) Whether the parties to be released from claims were necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;

b) Whether the claims to be released were rationally connected to the purpose of the plan and necessary for it;

c) Whether the plan could succeed without the releases;

d) Whether the parties being released were contributing to the plan; and

e) Whether the release benefitted the debtors as well as the creditors generally.[55]

[131] In the present file, IQ's and Orion's participation was obviously instrumental to the restructuring of BlackRock's business. Considering the SISP and the opportunity given to BlackRock's stakeholders to participate in the process, it is reasonable for IQ and Orion to now start with a clean slate and not to be under the threat of potential claims as they will be leading BlackRock's efforts with Project Volt. The release will provide more certainty and finality.

[132] The release is thus reasonably connected and justified as part of the Proposed Transaction,[56] and it is to the benefit of BlackRock and its stakeholders generally as it will allow BlackRock to emerge as a solvent entity and be in the best possible position to,

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51 See *Re Green Relief Inc.*, 2020 ONSC 6837, par. 23-25; *8640025 Canada Inc. (Re)*, 2021 BCSC 1826, par. 43.

52 *Arrangement relatif à Nemaska Lithium inc.*, 2020 QCCS 3218, par. 103-106 (leave to appeal dismissed, 2020 QCCA 1488; leave to appeal to SCC dismissed, 2021 CanLII 34999).

53 2020 ONSC 4006.

54 *Harte Gold Corp. (Re)*, 2022 ONSC 653, par. 78-86. See also *Re Green Relief Inc.*, 2020 ONSC 6837, par. 27-28.

55 *Re Lydian International Limited*, 2020 ONSC 4006, par. 54. See also: *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Cord. (Re)*, 2008 ONCA 587;

56 See *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (Re)*, 2008 ONCA 587, par. 70 (leave to appeal to SCC dismissed, 2008 CanLII 46997).

hopefully, secure financing for Project Volt. They are also fair and reasonable in the present circumstances.

[133] The eventual claims for which Orion and IQ should not be released, according to the Intervenors, are based on allegations of abuse related solely to Orion's and IQ's Stalking Horse Bid and their conduct during the SISP.

[134] The Court was sensitive to the shareholders' submissions initially and extended the SISP delays to ensure that the process was as fulsome and fair as possible. Still, and in spite of all the efforts made over the years, IQ and Orion remain the only entities who are ready to take over the development of BlackRock and to further invest in same.

[135] In the process leading to the Bidding Procedures Order, to the refusal of the Bid Extension Application and to the approval of the Proposed Transaction (Reverse RVO), the Court was able to appreciate the context leading up to the final outcome ordered as per the present judgment and also found the Proposed Transaction, as proposed by Orion and IQ, to be fair and reasonable. The Court sees little to no room for a finding of abuse in the events leading to the CCAA proceedings, to the SISP or to the approved transaction.

[136] To the contrary, there is no good reason to leave the door open to the Intervenors' potential claims against Orion and IQ, to BlackRock's detriment.

[137] Therefore, the release provided for in the Proposed Transaction will be granted.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:

[138] **DECIDES** in accordance with the attached orders.

MARIE-ANNE PAQUETTE, Chief Justice

Me Jean Legault
Me Jonathan Warin
Me Ouassim Tadlaoui
LAVERY DE BILLY
Attorneys for Debtor

<u>Me Jean-Yves Simard</u>
<u>M. Laurent Crépeau</u>
DS AVOCATS
Attorneys for the Shareholder Bidder

Me Alain Riendeau
Me Brandon Farber
FASKEN MARTINEAU
Attorneys for the Monitor

Me Luc Morin
Me Guillaume Michaud
Me Noah Zucker
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
Attorneys for the Secured Creditor, Investissement Québec

Me Doug Mitchell
IMK AVOCATS
Attorney for the Intervenor

Me David Bish (Par Teams)
Me Julie Himo
TORYS
Attorneys for the Secured Creditor, OMF fund ii h ltd. (orion)

Me Brendan O'Neill
GOODMANS
Attorney for the Special Committee Of The Board Of Blackrock

Me Geneviève Cloutier
Me François Dandonneau
GOWLING WLG (Canada) S.E.N.C.R.L., s.r.l.
Attorneys For The Grand Council Of The Crees And The Cree Nation Government

Me Gilles Robert
Me Kloé Sévigny
MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE DU CANADA
Attorneys For The Canada Revenue Agency

Hearing dates: May 30, 31, 2022

TAB 10

Court File No. CV-23-00696017-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE	)	FRIDAY, THE 12TH
	)	
JUSTICE CONWAY	)	DAY OF MAY, 2023

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF LOYALTYONE, CO.

(the "**Applicant**")

APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER

THIS MOTION, made by the Applicant, pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**"), for an order approving the sale transaction (the "**Transaction**") contemplated by an asset purchase agreement between the Applicant and Bank of Montreal ("**BMO**"), dated March 9, 2023 (as amended from time to time, the "**Asset Purchase Agreement**") and vesting in BMO's affiliates, 14970179 Canada Inc. ("**TS Holdco**") and 14970144 Canada Inc. ("**Newco**" and together with TS Holdco, the "**Buyers**"), the Applicant's right, title, and interest in and to the Purchased Assets (as defined in the Asset Purchase Agreement) was heard this day by judicial videoconference via Zoom.

ON READING the Affidavit of Shawn Stewart, sworn May 3, 2023, and the Exhibits thereto (the "**Stewart Affidavit**"), the Third Report of KSV Restructuring, Inc. in its capacity as the court-appointed monitor of the Applicant (the "**Monitor**") dated May 8, 2023 (the "**Third Report**") and such further materials as counsel may advise, and on hearing the submissions of counsel to the Applicant, counsel to the Monitor, counsel to BMO and the Buyers, and the other parties listed on the counsel slip, and no one else appearing for any other party on the Service List although duly served as appears from the affidavit of service of Behnoosh Nasri sworn May 3, 2023 and the affidavits of service of Alec Hoy sworn May 5 and May 10, 2023, filed.

SERVICE AND DEFINITIONS

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion and Motion Record herein is hereby abridged and validated so that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that capitalized terms used herein that are otherwise not defined shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Asset Purchase Agreement and/or the Amended and Restated Initial Order made in these proceedings on March 20, 2023 (the "**A&R Initial Order**"), as applicable.

APPROVAL OF TRANSACTION

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Asset Purchase Agreement and the Transaction are hereby approved and the execution of the Asset Purchase Agreement by the Applicant is hereby authorized and approved, with such minor amendments as the Applicant, with the consent of the Monitor, may deem necessary. The Applicant is hereby authorized and directed to take such additional steps and execute such additional documents as may be necessary or desirable for the completion of the Transaction and for the conveyance of the Purchased Assets to the Buyers and the assumption of the Assumed Liabilities, as applicable.

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that this Order shall constitute the only authorization required by the Applicant to proceed with the Transaction and that no shareholder or other approvals shall be required in connection therewith.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant is authorized and directed to perform its obligations under the Asset Purchase Agreement and any ancillary documents related thereto.

VESTING OF THE PURCHASED ASSETS

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that upon the delivery of a Monitor's certificate to the Applicant (or its counsel) and to the Buyers (or their counsel) substantially in the form attached as **Schedule "A"** hereto (the "**Monitor's Certificate**"), all of the Applicant's right, title and interest in and to the Travel Services Shares shall vest absolutely in TS Holdco at 12:01 a.m. as of the date of the Monitor's Certificate and all of the Applicant's right, title and interest in and to the balance of the Purchased Assets (other than the Travel Services Shares) shall vest absolutely in Newco at 12:06 a.m. as of the date of the Monitor's Certificate, in each case free and clear of and from (a) the Excluded Claims; and (b) any and all security interests (whether

contractual, statutory, or otherwise), hypothecs, mortgages, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), liens, executions, levies, charges, or other financial or monetary claims, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing: (i) any encumbrances or charges created by the Initial Order, the A&R Initial Order, the SISP Order, or any other orders made in this CCAA proceeding; (ii) all charges, security interests or claims evidenced by registrations pursuant to the *Personal Property Security Act* (Ontario) or any other personal property registry system in any province or territory in Canada or the Civil Code of Quebec, including without limitation those registrations listed on **Schedule "B"** hereto; (iii) all Taxes assessed or that could be assessed, and any Claims or Encumbrances relating thereto, in respect of the Applicant or its business, property, and assets; and (iv) those claims listed on **Schedule "C"** hereto (all of which are collectively referred to as the "**Encumbrances**", which term shall not include the Permitted Encumbrances, listed on **Schedule "D"**), and, for greater certainty, this Court orders that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Purchased Assets are hereby expunged and discharged as against the Purchased Assets.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that all options, conversion privileges, equity-based awards, warrants, securities, debentures, loans, notes or other rights, agreements, or commitments of any kind whatsoever that are held by any Person that are convertible or exchangeable for any shares in the capital of Travel Services, or otherwise relating thereto, shall be deemed terminated and cancelled.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except as expressly contemplated in the Asset Purchase Agreement and subject to the payment of any amounts required to be paid pursuant to Section 11.3 of the CCAA (or such other amount as agreed upon between Newco and the counterparty to the Assumed Contract), all Assumed Contracts will be and remain in full force and effect upon and following delivery of the Monitor's Certificate and completion of the Transaction, and no Person who is a party to an Assumed Contract may accelerate, terminate, rescind, refuse to perform or otherwise repudiate its obligations thereunder or enforce or exercise any right (including any right of set-off, dilution or other remedy) or make any demand under or in respect of any such arrangement, and no automatic termination or termination upon notice will have any validity or effect by reason of:

(a) any event that occurred on or prior to the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate and is not continuing that would have entitled such Person to enforce those rights or remedies (including defaults or events of default arising as a result of the insolvency of the Applicant, or any of their affiliates);

(b) the insolvency of the Applicant, or any of its affiliates, or the fact that the Applicant or any affiliate sought or obtained relief under the CCAA or any of the Applicant's affiliates sought or obtained any relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code;

(c) any compromises, releases, discharges, cancellations, transactions, arrangements, reorganizations, or other steps taken or effected pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement or to effect the Transaction, or the provisions of this Order, or of any other Order of this Court in this CCAA proceeding, or any Order of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court under the Bankruptcy Code in respect of an affiliate of the Applicant; or

(d) any transfer or assignment, or any change of control of Travel Services arising from the Asset Purchase Agreement or the Transaction or the provisions of this Order.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, as of the Closing Time and subject to the payment of any amounts required to be paid pursuant to Section 11.3 of the CCAA (or such other amount as agreed upon between Newco and the counterparty to the Assumed Contract), all Persons shall be deemed to have waived any and all defaults of the Applicant then existing or previously committed by the Applicant, or caused by the Applicant, directly or indirectly, or non-compliance with any covenant, warranty, representation, undertaking, positive or negative covenant, provision, condition, or obligation, express or implied, in any Assumed Contract arising directly or indirectly from the insolvency of the Applicant, the filing by the Applicant under the CCAA, the Asset Purchase Agreement or the Transaction, including, without limitation, any of the matters or events listed in paragraph 8 hereof and any and all notices of default and demands for payment or any step or proceeding taken or commenced in connection therewith under an Assumed Contract shall be deemed to have been rescinded and of no further force or effect.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that from and after the Closing Time, any and all Persons shall be and are hereby forever barred, estopped, stayed and enjoined from commencing, taking, applying for, or issuing or continuing any and all steps or proceedings, whether directly, derivatively or otherwise, and including, without limitation, administrative hearings and orders, declarations and assessments, commenced, taken, or proceeded with or that may be

commenced, taken, or proceeded with against the Buyers relating in any way to the Excluded Assets, Excluded Liabilities, Excluded Contracts, any Encumbrances (other than Permitted Encumbrances), and any other claims, obligations, and other matters that are waived, released, expunged or discharged pursuant to this Order.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of Encumbrances, the net proceeds from the sale of the Purchased Assets shall stand in the place and stead of the Purchased Assets, and that from and after the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate all Encumbrances shall attach to the net proceeds from the sale of the Purchased Assets with the same priority as they had with respect to the Purchased Assets immediately prior to the sale, as if the Purchased Assets had not been sold and remained in the possession or control of the person having that possession or control immediately prior to the sale.

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DIRECTS** the Monitor to file with the Court a copy of the Monitor's Certificate, forthwith after delivery thereof to the Applicant and the Buyers, or to their respective counsel.

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor may rely on written notice from the Applicant and the Buyers regarding the fulfilment or waiver of conditions to closing under the Asset Purchase Agreement and shall have no liability with respect to delivery of the Monitor's Certificate.

RESERVE ACCOUNT

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, without limiting anything herein, Newco shall acquire at the Closing Time all of the Applicant's right, title, interest, and powers, and assume all obligations, in, to, and under the Reserve Agreement and Security Agreement, and all accounts, deposits, funds and monies subject thereto including, for greater certainty, in respect of or related to the RBC Accounts and: (i) all Investments that are at any time or from time to time deposited with or specifically assigned to RBC or its agent by the Applicant for the purposes of the Reserve Agreement and all Investments derived from the investment of any monies or other Investments which, in each case, are part of the Reserve Fund (as defined in the Reserve Agreement); (ii) without limiting (i), the right of the Applicant to be paid or receive any and all Redemption Fees (as defined in the Reserve Agreement) payable at any time or from time to time thereunder; (iii) all substitutions, accretions and additions to any of the monies or Investments described in the foregoing, including without limitation, all interest, dividends or other amounts earned or derived therefrom; (iv) all certificates and instruments evidencing the foregoing; (v) all proceeds of any of the foregoing of any nature and kind including, without limitation, goods, intangibles, documents

of title, instruments, investment property, or other personal property; and (vi) goods, intangibles, documents of title, instruments, investment property, or other personal property and any other assets or property forming part of the Reserve Fund, in each case free and clear of all Claims and Encumbrances whatsoever save and except for the Permitted Encumbrance in favour of RBC.

PIPEDA

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, pursuant to clause 7(3)(c) of the Canada *Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act*, the Monitor and the Applicant are authorized and permitted to disclose and transfer to the Buyers all human resources and payroll information in the Applicant's records pertaining to the Applicant's past and current employees. The Buyers shall maintain and protect the privacy of such information and shall be entitled to use the personal information provided to it in a manner which is in all material respects identical to the prior use of such information by the Applicant.

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding:

(a) the pendency of these proceedings or the termination of this proceeding;

(b) any applications for a bankruptcy or receivership order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada), R.S.C. 1985 c. B-3, as amended (the "**BIA**") or other applicable legislation, in respect of the Applicant or its Property, and any bankruptcy or receivership order issued pursuant to any such applications; or

(c) any assignment in bankruptcy made in respect of the Applicant,

the entering into of the Asset Purchase Agreement and the vesting of the Purchased Assets in the Buyers, as applicable, pursuant to this Order shall be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy or receiver that may be appointed in respect of the Applicant or its Property, and shall not be void or voidable by creditors of the Applicant, nor shall it constitute nor be deemed to be a fraudulent preference, assignment, fraudulent conveyance, transfer at undervalue, or other reviewable transaction under the BIA or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, nor shall it constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct pursuant to any applicable federal or provincial legislation.

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Transaction is exempt from the application of the *Bulk Sales Act* (Ontario), as it read immediately before it was repealed, or any similar legislation in any

other province and section 6 of the *Retail Sales Tax Act* (Ontario) or any equivalent or corresponding provision under any other applicable tax legislation.

REPAYMENT OF DIP FINANCING FACILITY

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that concurrently with or immediately following delivery of the Monitor's Certificate, the Applicant shall indefeasibly and irrevocably repay, or cause to be repaid, in full in cash all obligations owing under the DIP Term Sheet (the "**DIP Distribution**") and that the Applicant is authorized to sign a direction at the time of closing the Transaction, in a form acceptable to the Monitor, irrevocably authorizing the Buyers to pay the DIP Distribution directly to the DIP Lender. The DIP Distribution shall be free and clear of all Encumbrances and shall be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy or receiver that may be appointed in respect of the Applicant and shall not be void or voidable by creditors of the Applicant, nor shall it constitute nor be deemed to be a fraudulent preference, a transfer at undervalue, a fraudulent conveyance or other reviewable transaction under the BIA or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, nor shall it constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct pursuant to any applicable federal or provincial legislation. Following payment of the DIP Distribution in accordance with this paragraph, the DIP Lender's Charge shall be automatically released and terminated without any further action.

PAYMENT TO FINANCIAL ADVISOR

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that concurrently with or immediately following delivery of the Monitor's Certificate, the Applicant shall indefeasibly and irrevocably pay, or cause to be paid, in full in cash all obligations owing to the Financial Advisor as secured by the Financial Advisor Charge (the "**Financial Advisor Payment**"). The Financial Advisor Payment shall be free and clear of all Encumbrances and shall be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy or receiver that may be appointed in respect of the Applicant and shall not be void or voidable by creditors of the Applicant, nor shall it constitute nor be deemed to be a fraudulent preference, a transfer at undervalue, a fraudulent conveyance or other reviewable transaction under the BIA or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, nor shall it constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct pursuant to any applicable federal or provincial legislation. Following payment of the Financial Advisor Payment, the Financial Advisor Charge shall be automatically released and terminated without any further action.

RELEASE OF BID PROTECTIONS CHARGE

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that effective as of the Closing Time, the Bid Protections Charge granted in the SISP Order dated March 20, 2023 shall be automatically released and terminated without any further action.

RELEASES AND OTHER PROTECTIONS

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, effective as of the Closing Time, (a) the current and former directors, officers, employees, legal counsel, agents and advisors of the Applicant and LoyaltyOne Travel Services Co./Cie Des Voyages ("**Travel Services**") (other than Joseph L. Motes III and any other person who, at any time after November 5, 2021, has also served as a director, officer, or employee of (i) Bread Financial Holdings, Inc. f/k/a Alliance Data Systems Corporation ("**Bread**") or (ii) any other entity that, at any time after November 5, 2021, was or is a direct or indirect subsidiary of Bread); (b) the Monitor and its legal counsel and their respective present and former directors, officers, partners, employees, agents and advisors; (c) BMO, its affiliates, and their respective current and former directors, officers, employees, agents, legal counsel and advisors; (d) the DIP Lender, its affiliates, and their respective current and former directors, officers, employees, agents, legal counsel and advisors; and (e) the Consenting Stakeholders and their respective current and former directors, officers, employees, legal counsel, agents and advisors (in such capacities, collectively, the "**Released Parties**" and each a "**Released Party**", which for greater certainty, do not include the Applicant or Travel Services) shall be deemed to be forever irrevocably released by the Releasing Parties (as hereinafter defined) and discharged from any and all present and future claims (including, without limitation, claims for contribution or indemnity), liabilities, indebtedness, demands, actions, causes of action, counterclaims, suits, damages, judgments, executions, recoupments, debts, sums of money, expenses, accounts, liens, taxes, recoveries, and obligations of any nature or kind whatsoever (whether direct or indirect, known or unknown, absolute or contingent, accrued or unaccrued, liquidated or unliquidated, matured or unmatured or due or not yet due, in law or equity and whether based in statute or otherwise) based in whole or in part on any act or omission, transaction, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place on or prior to the Closing Time or undertaken or completed in connection with, in respect of, relating to, or arising out of (i) the Applicant, Travel Services, the business, operations, assets, Property and affairs of the Applicant or Travel Services, wherever or however conducted or governed, the administration and/or management of the Applicant or Travel Services, or this CCAA proceeding, or (ii) the Asset Purchase Agreement, the Closing Documents, the Transaction Support Agreement, any agreement,

document, instrument, matter or transaction involving the Applicant or Travel Services arising in connection with or pursuant to any of the foregoing, and/or the consummation of the Transaction (collectively, subject to the excluded matters below, the "**Released Claims**"), which Released Claims shall be deemed to be fully, finally, irrevocably and forever waived, discharged, released, cancelled and barred as against the Released Parties; provided that, nothing in this paragraph shall waive, discharge, release, cancel or bar (x) any claim against a Released Party that is not permitted to be released pursuant to section 5.1(2) of the CCAA or claim with respect to any act or omission that is finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have constituted actual fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence, (y) any obligations of any of the Released Parties under or pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement, the Closing Documents, the Transaction Support Agreement, the Definitive Documents and/or any agreement, document, instrument, matter or transaction involving the Applicant or Travel Services entered into pursuant to the foregoing, or (z) any obligations of BMO to its own banking customers with respect to the AIR MILES® Reward Program offered by BMO to its customers. "**Releasing Parties**" means any and all Persons (other than the Applicant and Travel Services and their respective current and former affiliates), and their current and former affiliates, current and former members, directors, managers, officers, investment committee members, special committee members, equity holders (regardless of whether such interests are held directly or indirectly), predecessors, successors, assigns, participants, subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, limited partners, general partners, affiliated investment funds or investment vehicles, managed accounts or funds, and each of their respective current and former members, equity holders, officers, directors, managers, principals, members, management companies, advisory board members, investment fund advisors or managers, employees, agents, trustees, investment managers, financial advisors, partners, legal counsel, accountants, investment bankers, consultants, representatives, and other professionals, each in their capacity as such.

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, effective as of the Closing Time, the Released Parties shall be deemed to be forever irrevocably released by each of the Applicant and Travel Services, and discharged from, any and all Released Claims held by the Applicant or Travel Services as of the Closing Time, which Released Claims shall be deemed to be fully, finally, irrevocably and forever waived, discharged, released, cancelled and barred as against the Released Parties; *provided* that, nothing in this paragraph shall waive, discharge, release, cancel or bar (a) any claim against a Released Party that is not permitted to be released pursuant to section 5.1(2) of the CCAA or claim with respect to any act or omission that is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have constituted actual fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence; or (b) any obligations of

any of the Released Parties under or in connection with the Asset Purchase Agreement, the Closing Documents, the Transaction Support Agreement, the Definitive Documents and/or any agreement, document, instrument, matter or transaction involving the Applicant or Travel Services arising in connection with or pursuant to any of the foregoing.

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Claim that is not released pursuant to clause (x) of paragraph 21 or clause (a) of paragraph 22 of this Order shall be irrevocably and forever limited solely to recovery from the proceeds of any insurance policies payable on behalf of the Applicant or Travel Services or their Directors and Officers in respect of any such Claim (each an "**Insurance Policy**"), and such claimants shall have no right to, and shall not, directly or indirectly, make any claim or seek any recoveries from any of the Directors or Officers in respect of any such Claim, other than enforcing their rights to be paid from the proceeds of the applicable insurance policies available to the Applicant or Travel Services. Nothing contained in this Order prejudices, compromises, releases or otherwise affects any right, defence or obligation of any insurer in respect of an Insurance Policy.

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in this Order shall (i) prejudice, compromise, release, waive, discharge, cancel, bar or otherwise affect any present or future claim, liability, indebtedness, demand, action, cause of action, counterclaim, suit, damage, judgment, execution, recoupment, debt, sum of money, expense, account, lien, tax, recovery, and obligation of any nature or kind whatsoever (whether direct or indirect, known or unknown, absolute or contingent, accrued or unaccrued, liquidated or unliquidated, matured or unmatured or due or not yet due, in law or equity and whether based in statute or otherwise) against or in respect of Joseph L. Motes III and any other person who, at any time after November 5, 2021, has also served as a director, officer, or employee of (a) Bread or (b) any other entity that, at any time after November 5, 2021, was or is a direct or indirect subsidiary of Bread (collectively, the "**Excluded Parties**" and each, an "**Excluded Party**"), which Excluded Parties, for greater certainty, shall not be, and shall not be deemed to be, Released Parties, or (ii) limit recovery against any Excluded Party to the proceeds of any insurance policies.

GENERAL

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Applicant, the Monitor or the Buyers may apply to the Court as necessary to seek further orders and directions to give effect to this Order.

26. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicant, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding or to assist the Applicant and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

27. **THIS COURTS ORDERS** that this Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard/Daylight Time on the date of this Order without any need for filing or entry.

Conway J.

Schedule “A” – Form of Monitor’s Certificate

Court File No. CV-23-00969017-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF LOYALTYONE, CO. (the “**Applicant**”)

MONITOR’S CERTIFICATE

RECITALS

A. Pursuant to an Order of the Honourable Justice Conway of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “**Court**”) dated March 10, 2023 (as amended and restated, and as may be further amended and restated from time to time, the “**Initial Order**”), KSV Restructuring, Inc. was appointed as monitor of the Applicant (in such capacity, the “**Monitor**”) in proceedings commenced by the Applicant under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*.

B. Pursuant to the Approval and Vesting Order of the Court dated May 12, 2023 (the “**Approval and Vesting Order**”), the Court approved the Asset Purchase Agreement between the Applicant and Bank of Montreal (“**BMO**”) dated March 9, 2023 (as amended from time to time, the “**Asset Purchase Agreement**”), providing for the vesting in the Buyers, as applicable, of all of the Applicant’s right, title and interest in and to all of the Purchased Assets (as defined in the Asset Purchase Agreement), which vesting is to be effective with respect to the Purchased Assets upon the delivery by the Monitor to the Buyers (or their counsel) and the Applicant (or its counsel) of this Monitor’s Certificate.

C. Unless otherwise indicated or defined herein, capitalized terms used in this Monitor’s Certificate shall have the meanings given to them in the Approval and Vesting Order and/or the Asset Purchase Agreement.

THE MONITOR CERTIFIES the following:

1. The conditions to Closing set forth in the Asset Purchase Agreement have been satisfied or waived by the Applicant and the Buyers, as applicable.

2. The Buyers have paid or satisfied the Purchase Price, subject to applicable adjustments (if any), for the Purchased Assets payable on the Closing Date pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement and/or the Approval and Vesting Order.

3. The Transaction has been completed to the satisfaction of the Applicant, the Monitor and the Buyers, respectively.

DATED at Toronto, Ontario this ________ day of ________________, 2023.

KSV RESTRUCTURING INC., solely in its capacity as Monitor of the Applicant and not in its personal capacity

Per: ______________________________

Name:
Title:

Schedule "B" – PPSA Registrations to be Released

- *Personal Property Security Act* (Ontario) financing statement filed against the Applicant with registration number 20211027 1316 1590 1370 and reference file number 777686328 in favour of Bank of America, N.A., as Administrative Agent;

- *Personal Property Security Act* (Alberta) financing statement filed against the Applicant with registration number 21102717456 in favour of Bank of America, N.A., as Administrative Agent; and

- *Personal Property Security Act* (Nova Scotia) financing statement filed against the Applicant with registration number 35343458 in favour of Bank of America, N.A., as Administrative Agent.

Schedule "C" – Encumbrances

- Encumbrances granted by the Applicant pursuant to, and in connection with, the Credit Agreement and the other Loan Documents (as defined therein).

Schedule "D" – Permitted Encumbrances

1. Encumbrances in respect of the Reserve Agreement and the Security Agreement;

2. Encumbrances with respect to trust accounts required to be maintained by or for Travel Services under Applicable Law of the provincial travel and insurance regulators;

3. Encumbrances contained within any Assumed Contracts in favour of the counterparties to such Assumed Contracts;

4. Encumbrances associated with, and financing statements evidencing, the rights of equipment lessors under any of the Personal Property Leases that are registered under the PPSA;

5. Encumbrances in favour of the DIP Lender;

6. Encumbrances disclosed in a disclosure letter;

7. to the extent not included in the Encumbrances listed in #2 above in this Schedule "D", normal and customary rights of setoff or compensation upon deposits in favour of depository institutions, and liens of a collecting bank on cheques and other payment items in the course of collection; and

8. the right reserved to or vested in any municipality or government, or to any statutory or public authority, by the terms of any lease, license, franchise, grant or permit acquired by the Applicant or any statutory provision to terminate any such lease, license, franchise, grant or permit, or to require annual or other periodic payments as a condition to the continuance thereof.

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF LOYALTYONE, CO.

Court File No. CV-23-00696017-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT
TORONTO

APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER

Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP
2100 Scotia Plaza
40 King Street West
Toronto, ON M5H 3C2

Ryan Jacobs LSO#: 59510J
Tel: 416.860.6465
rjacobs@cassels.com

Jane Dietrich LSO#: 49302U
Tel: 416.860.5223
jdietrich@cassels.com

R. Shayne Kukulowicz LSO#: 30729S
Tel: 416.860.6463
skukulowicz@cassels.com

Natalie E. Levine LSO#: 64908K
Tel: 416.860.6568
nlevine@cassels.com

Lawyers for the Applicant

TAB 11

CITATION: Target Canada Co. (Re), 2015 ONSC 7574
COURT FILE NO.: CV-15-10832-00CL
DATE: 2015-12-11

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: **IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TARGET CANADA CO., TARGET CANADA HEALTH CO., TARGET CANADA MOBILE GP CO., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (BC) CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (ONTARIO) CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (SK) CORP. AND TARGET CANADA PROPERTY LLC.**

BEFORE: Regional Senior Justice Morawetz

COUNSEL: *J. Swartz* and *Dina Milivojevic*, for the Target Corporation

Jeremy Dacks, for the Target Canada Entities

Susan Philpott, for the Employees

Richard Swan and *S. Richard Orzy*, for Rio Can Management Inc. and KingSett Capital Inc.

Jay Carfagnini and *Alan Mark*, for Alvarez & Marsal, Monitor

Jeff Carhart, for Ginsey Industries

Lauren Epstein, for the Trustee of the Employee Trust

Lou Brzezinski and Alexandra Teodescu, for Nintendo of Canada Limited, Universal Studios, Thyssenkrupp Elevator (Canada) Limited, United Cleaning Services, RPJ Consulting Inc., Blue Vista, Farmer Brothers, East End Project, Trans Source, E One Entertainment, Foxy Originals

Linda Galessiere, for Various Landlords

ENDORSEMENT

[1] Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc., in its capacity as Monitor of the Applicants (the "Monitor") seeks approval of Monitor's Reports 3-18, together with the Monitor's activities set out in each of those Reports.

[2] Such a request is not unusual. A practice has developed in proceedings under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") whereby the Monitor will routinely bring a

motion for such approval. In most cases, there is no opposition to such requests, and the relief is routinely granted.

[3] Such is not the case in this matter.

[4] The requested relief is opposed by Rio Can Management Inc. ("Rio Can") and KingSett Capital Inc. ("KingSett"), two landlords of the Applicants (the "Target Canada Estates"). The position of these landlords was supported by Mr. Brzezinski on behalf of his client group and as agent for Mr. Solmon, who acts for ISSI Inc., as well as Ms. Galessiere, acting on behalf of another group of landlords.

[5] The essence of the opposition is that the request of the Monitor to obtain approval of its activities – particularly in these liquidation proceedings – is both premature and unnecessary and that providing such approval, in the absence of full and complete disclosure of all of the underlying facts, would be unfair to the creditors, especially if doing so might in future be asserted and relied upon by the Applicants, or any other party, seeking to limit or prejudice the rights of creditors or any steps they may wish to take.

[6] Further, the objecting parties submit that the requested relief is unnecessary, as the Monitor has the full protections provided to it in the Initial Order and subsequent orders, and under the CCAA.

[7] Alternatively, the objecting parties submit that if such approval is to be granted, it should be specifically limited by the following words:

> "provided, however, that only the Monitor, in its personal capacity and only with respect to its own personal liability, shall be entitled to rely upon or utilize in any way such approval."

[8] The CCAA mandates the appointment of a monitor to monitor the business and financial affairs of the company (section 11.7).

[9] The duties and functions of the monitor are set forth in Section 23(1). Section 23(2) provides a degree of protection to the monitor. The section reads as follows:

> (2) Monitor not liable – if the monitor acts in good faith and takes reasonable care in preparing the report referred to in any of paragraphs (1)(b) to (d.1), the monitor is not liable for loss or damage to any person resulting from that person's reliance on the report.

[10] Paragraphs 1(b) to (d.1) primarily relate to review and reporting issues on specific business and financial affairs of the debtor.

[11] In addition, paragraph 51 of the Amended and Restated Order provides that:

> … in addition to the rights, and protections afforded the Monitor under the CCAA or as an officer of the Court, the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or the carrying out of the provisions of this Order, including for great certainty in the Monitor's capacity as Administrator of the Employee Trust, save and except for any gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part.

[12] The Monitor sets out a number of reasons why it believes that the requested relief is appropriate in these circumstances. Such approval

(a) allows the monitor and stakeholders to move forward confidently with the next step in the proceeding by fostering the orderly building-block nature of CCAA proceedings;

(b) brings the monitor's activities in issue before the court, allowing an opportunity for the concerns of the court or stakeholders to be addressed, and any problems to be rectified in a timely way;

(c) provides certainty and finality to processes in the CCAA proceedings and activities undertaken (eg., asset sales), all parties having been given an opportunity to raise specific objections and concerns;

(d) enables the court, tasked with supervising the CCAA process, to satisfy itself that the monitor's court-mandated activities have been conducted in a prudent and diligent manner;

(e) provides protection for the monitor, not otherwise provided by the CCAA; and

(f) protects creditors from the delay in distribution that would be caused by:

a. re-litigation of steps taken to date; and

b. potential indemnity claims by the monitor.

[13] Counsel to the Monitor also submits that the doctrine of issue estoppel applies (as do related doctrines of collateral attack and abuse of process) in respect of approval of the Monitor's activities as described in its reports. Counsel submits that given the functions that court approval serves, the availability of the doctrine (and related doctrines) is important to the CCAA process. Counsel submits that actions mandated and authorized by the court, and the activities taken by the Monitor to carry them out, are not interim measure that ought to remain open for second guessing or re-litigating down the road and there is a need for finality in a CCAA process for the benefit of all stakeholders.

[14] Prior to consideration of these arguments, it is helpful to review certain aspects of the doctrine of *res judicata* and its relationship to both issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel.

The issue was recently considered in *Forrest* v. *Vriend*, 2015 Carswell BC 2979, where Ehrcke J. stated:

> 25. "TD and Vriend point out that the doctrine of *res judicata* is not limited to issue estoppel, but includes cause of action estoppel as well. The distinction between these two related components of *res judicata* was concisely explained by Cromwell J.A., as he then was, in *Hoque* v. *Montreal Trust Co. of Canada* (1997), 162 N.S.R. (2d) 321 (C.A.) at para. 21:
>
> > 21 *Res judicata* is mainly concerned with two principles. First, there is a principle that "… prevents the contradiction of that which was determined in the previous litigation, by prohibiting the relitigation of issues already actually addressed.": see Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, *The Law of Evidence in Canada* (1991) at p. 997. The second principle is that parties must bring forward all of the claims and defences with respect to the cause of action at issue in the first proceeding and that, if they fail to do so, they will be barred from asserting them in a subsequent action. This "… prevents fragmentation of litigation by prohibiting the litigation of matters that were never actually addressed in the previous litigation, but which properly belonged to it.": *ibid* at 998. Cause of action estoppel is usually concerned with the application of this second principle because its operation bars all of the issues properly belonging to the earlier litigation.
>
> …
>
> 30. It is salutary to keep in mind Mr. Justice Cromwell's caution against an overly broad application of cause of action estoppel. In *Hoque* at paras. 25, 30 and 37, he wrote:
>
> > 25. The appellants submit, relying on these and similar statements, that cause of action estoppel is broad in scope and inflexible in application. With respect, I think this overstates the true position. In my view, this very broad language which suggests an inflexible application of cause of action estoppel to all matters that "could" have been raised does not fully reflect the present law.
> >
> > ….
> >
> > 30. The submission that all claims that <u>could</u> have been dealt with in the main action are barred is not borne out by the Canadian cases. With respect to matter not actually raised and decided, the

> test appears to me to be that the party should have raised the matter and, in deciding whether the party should have done so, a number of factors are considered.
>
> …
>
> 37. Although many of these authorities cite with approval the broad language of *Henderson* v. *Henderson, supra*, to the effect that any matter which the parties had the opportunity to raise will be barred, I think, however, that this language is somewhat too wide. The better principle is that those issues which the parties had the opportunity to raise and, in all the circumstances, should have raised, will be barred. In determining whether the matter should have been raised, a court will consider whether proceeding constitutes a collateral attack on the earlier findings, whether it simply assets a new legal conception of facts previously litigated, whether it relies on "new" evidence that could have been discovered in the earlier proceeding with reasonable diligence, whether the two proceedings relate to separate and distinct causes of action and whether, in all the circumstances, the second proceeding constitutes an abuse of process.

[15] In this case, I accept the submission of counsel to the Monitor to the effect that the Monitor plays an integral part in balancing and protecting the various interests in the CCAA environment.

[16] Further, in this particular case, the court has specifically mandated the Monitor to undertake a number of activities, including in connection with the sale of the debtors assets. The Monitor has also, in its various Reports, provided helpful commentary to the court and to Stakeholders on the progress of the CCAA proceedings.

[17] Turning to the issue as to whether these Reports should be approved, it is important to consider how Monitor's Reports are in fact relied upon and used by the court in arriving at certain determinations.

[18] For example, if the issue before the court is to approve a sales process or to approve a sale of assets, certain findings of fact must be made before making a determination that the sale process or the sale of assets should be approved. Evidence is generally provided by way of affidavit from a representative of the applicant and supported by commentary from the monitor in its report. The approval issue is put squarely before the court and the court must, among other things conclude that the sales process or the sale of assets is, among other things, fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

[19] On motions of the type, where the evidence is considered and findings of fact are made, the resulting decision affects the rights of all stakeholders. This is recognized in the jurisprudence with the acknowledgment that res judicata and related doctrines apply to approval

of a Monitor's report in these circumstances. (See: *Toronto Dominion Bank v. Preston Spring Gardens Inc.*, [2006] O.J. No. 1834 (SCJ Comm. List); *Toronto Dominion Bank v. Preston Spring Gardens Inc.*, 2007 ONCA 145 and *Bank of America Canada v. Willann Investments Limited*, [1993] O.J. No. 3039 (SCJ Gen. Div.)).

[20] The foregoing must be contrasted with the current scenario, where the Monitor seeks a general approval of its Reports. The Monitor has in its various reports provided commentary, some based on its own observations and work product and some based on information provided to it by the Applicant or other stakeholders. Certain aspects of the information provided by the Monitor has not been scrutinized or challenged in any formal sense. In addition, for the most part, no fact-finding process has been undertaken by the court.

[21] In circumstances where the Monitor is requesting approval of its reports and activities in a general sense, it seems to me that caution should be exercised so as to avoid a broad application of res judicata and related doctrines. The benefit of any such approval of the Monitor's reports and its activities should be limited to the Monitor itself. To the extent that approvals are provided, the effect of such approvals should not extend to the Applicant or other third parties.

[22] I recognized there are good policy and practical reasons for the court to approve of Monitor's activities and providing a level of protection for Monitors during the CCAA process. These reasons are set out in paragraph [12] above. However, in my view, the protection should be limited to the Monitor in the manner suggested by counsel to Rio Can and KingSett.

[23] By proceeding in this manner, Court approval serves the purposes set out by the Monitor above. Specifically, Court approval:

(a) allows the Monitor to move forward with the next steps in the CCAA proceedings;

(b) brings the Monitor's activities before the Court;

(c) allows an opportunity for the concerns of the stakeholders to be addressed, and any problems to be rectified,

(d) enables the Court to satisfy itself that the Monitor's activities have been conducted in prudent and diligent manners;

(e) provides protection for the Monitor not otherwise provided by the CCAA; and

(f) protects the creditors from the delay and distribution that would be caused by:

 (i) re-litigation of steps taken to date, and

 (ii) potential indemnity claims by the Monitor.

[24] By limiting the effect of the approval, the concerns of the objecting parties are addressed as the approval of Monitor's activities do not constitute approval of the activities of parties other than the Monitor.

[25] Further, limiting the effect of the approval does not impact on prior court orders which have approved other aspects of these CCAA proceedings, including the sales process and asset sales.

[26] The Monitor's Reports 3-18 are approved, but the approval the limited by the inclusion of the wording provided by counsel to Rio Can and KingSett, referenced at paragraph [7].

Regional Senior Justice G.B. Morawetz

Date: December 11, 2015